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INTRODUCTION 
In its "Resolution concerning the Rules on Competition 
and the position of European Enterprises within the Common 
Market and in the Wo!ld Economy" of7 June 1971, the European 
Parliament asked the Commission to make each year a special 
report on the development of competition policy. As the present 
report is the first such report submitted by the Commission, as a 
result of the Resolution, it gives an outline of competition policy 
as a whole and its development since its inception. 
The Commission is pleased to note the' interest shown by 
the Parliament in the problems raised by competition policy, which 
is an important means for achieving the aims of the Treaties. 
The Treaties establishing the European Communities laid down 
that the Community institutions have to see to the establishment, 
maintenance and observance of normal. competitive conditions in 
the markets for coal and steel and, as regards the other sectors of 
economic activity, the setting-up of a system which will ensure 
that competition is not distorted within the Common 1Vlarket. 
Competition is the best stimulant of economic activity since 
it guarantees the widest possible freedom of action to all. An 
active competition policy pursued in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Treaties establishing the Communities makes it easier 
for the supply and demand structure~ continually to adjust to 
. technological development. Through the interplay of decentra-
lized decision-making machinery, competition enables enter-
prises . continuously to improve their efficiency, which is the sine 
qua non for a steady improvement in living standards and em-
ployment prospects within the countries of the Community. 
From this point of view, competition policy is an essential means 
for satisfying to a great extent the individual and collective needs 
of our society. 
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At both Community and national levels, competition policy 
endeavours to maintain or to create effective conditions of com-
petition by means of rules applying to enterprises in both the 
private and public sectors. Such a policy encourages the best 
possible use of productive resources for the greatest possible 
benefit of the economy as a whole and for the benefit, in particular, 
of the consumer. In this respect, the Commission is not only 
concerned with increasing by means of the rules of competition 
the quantity of goods available for consumption, but is also taking 
action to promote better information for consumers and to bring 
about the harmonisation of ;laws and the removal of technical 
barriers to trade, in order t~ provide the best possible oppor-
tunities for establishing a genuine common market. 
The Commission would also like to underline the impor-
tance it attaches to competition policy 'as a means of fighting in-
flation, especially now, since inflation presents in many respects 
, a structural obstacle to adaptation. Competition policy also 
contributes considerably to the better use of labour, since ill 
adjusted structures which are encouraged by inflation give rise 
to under-utilisation of the labour, potential within the Com-
munity and to under-payment of skilled workers. 
iBroadly speaking, the action of the Community and of the 
Mem~er States in the Field of competition policy should be directed 
along! conv~rging lines. Although it is evident that the compe-
tition policy of the Community must be directed to\Vards the 
creation and proper operation of the common market, its effect-
iveness would, nevertheless, be considerably improved if it were 
carried out in conjunction with more active competition policies 
at the national level and with the removal of certain obstacles to 
the free play of the market in various sectors, such as the fixing 
of prices and the placing of orders by public authorities, as the 
Commission has emphasized in its Memorandum on Industrial 
Policy. 
Finally, the Commission's CGmpetition policy cahnot oper-
ate in isolation independent of efforts being made in other fields. 
The first Programme of Medium-term Economic Policy outlined 
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the links to be established between competition policy and certain 
structural policies. Thus, competition policy and regional policy 
must work together in order to bring about competitive con-
ditions, where these do not yet operate fully, thus making possible 
the harmonious devdopment of activities throughout the Com-
munity. 
, 
The role assigned to the Community institutions with re-
gard to competition policy by the .Treaties establishing the Euro-
pean Communities consists especially in bringing into operation 
and defining precisely the rules of competition as appliedto enter-
prises, in the implementation of the provisions regarding state aid 
and in the modification of state monopolies of a commercial 
nature. 
With r~gard to rules of competition applicable. to enter-
prises, the Community's policy must, in the first place, prevent 
governmental restrictions and barriers-which· have been abol-
ished-from being replaced by similar measures of a private nature. 
Agreements on quotas as well as agreements for the purpose of 
dividing the Common Market into regions,or of dividing up or frag-
menting markets by other means are in flagrant contradiction to 
the provisions of the Treaties .. Economic integration will never 
be fully achieved if agreements and concerted practices of this 
kind are not resolutely opposed. Indeed, they could even pre-
judice the degree of integration already achieved. Moreover 
competition policy must ensure fair competition so that enter-
prises operating within the Common Market can, in general, 
benefit from the same conditions of competition. If the poli,cy of 
modifying state monopolies of a commercial nature and systems 
of state' aids is unsuccessful the functioning of the Community 
could in the long-term be placed in jeopardy, since the economy 
and the political forces of the Community will not permit the open:" 
ing up of internal' frontiers unless competitive conditions are 
not distorted. State aids which take account of the CommlJlnitj's 
interest and which are necessary from the point of view of struc-
t'ural policy do not conflict with the principle of fair compt;lition. 
They are in fact one of the conditions for a smooth development 
of economic life within the Community .. 
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Nowadays, enterprises can participate freely in the Common 
Market in almost all sectors where technical barriers to trade have 
lost their importance and where the nature of the products and 
services offered enables them to be marketed throughout the 
Market as a whole. Nevertheless, the integration process is far 
from complete. Some enterprises still direct their sales efforts 
exclusively to their home markets. That is why the Commission 
particularly encourages cooperative efforts between small and 
medium-sized enterprises to establish themselves in markets 
other than their own. 
Most enterprises, however, are taking advantage of the 
increased potential offered by the Common Market for the sale 
of their output. Statistics of the .increase in intra-community 
trade show this in an impressive manner. The number of subsidi-
aries 'set up in other countries and the cases of cooperation be-
tween enterprises from different Member States have also increased 
in recent years. 
This development has led to an increase in the range of 
products offered on the market and consequently to a wider 
choice for consumers. Although the intensity of competition, 
relative to the present level of integration can be considered to be 
generally satisfactory for the purpose of making the benefits of the 
Common Market available to consumers, it should be noted that 
prices to the ultimate consumer still vary considerably in some 
cases. These price differences may be explained partly by differen-
ces in value added tax rates, and partly by structural differences 
in trade and by price interventions on the part of Member States. 
Differences in the habits of consumers and in income levels con-
tinue to exist among various Member States. 
In spite of the undeniable successes brought about by inte-
gration, is must be recognized that the tendency still exists in 
some economic sectors to maintain separate national markets by 
the use of prohibitions on export and by invoking industrial and 
commercial property rights. Since the parties concerned have 
never been able to justify such serious restrictions on competition, 
the Commission has always been opposed to attempts in thisdirec-
tion. The possibility of invoking industrial and commercial 
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property for market-sharing purposes has, in the OplnlOn of 
the Commission, been reduced considerably by the case law deve-
loped by the European Court of Justice. 
The examination of a large number of cases has been satis-: 
factorily concluded by the Commission, the latter's purpose being 
to take decisions in typical cases. 
In 1971, nineteen decisions, including those on procedure, 
were handed down under the terms of Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EEC Treaty, and twenty decisions were handed down under the 
terms of Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty. Several of these 
decisions concerned questions which had not been raised before. 
This was particularly true of the first cases in applying Article 86 
of the EEC Treaty, and also of the first decisions relating to the 
compatibility with Article 85 of the EEC Treaty of certain con-
tractual clauses, often found in agreements about patent licences 
and technical know-how. -
The Commission believes that, by giving an overall picture 
of the subject, this report will also provide information for in-
dustry and commerce on the kind of restrictions on competition· 
and business practices which are prohibited by the rules of com- . 
petition : the, circumstances under which it would be advisable 
to notify the Commission of agreements that restrict competition : 
and finally, the conditions necessary to obtain exemption from the 
prohibition. 
The Commission's decisions, the Court's judgments and the 
. communications and regulations concerning the rules of compe-
tition applicable to enterprises, all point to certain features of the 
Community's competition policy which deserve special mention, . 
namely: 
1. Restrictions on competition and practices which jeopardize the 
unity of the Common Market are proceeded against with 
special vigour. Cases in point are agreements on market-
sharing by dividing areas, agreements to allocate customers, 
and collective exclusive dealing agreements. Agreements 
which indirectly result in concentrating demand on certain 
producers are 'also prohibited. As for exclusive dealing agree-
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ments, these must not prevent distributors and consumers 
from obtaining goods in any Member State on the terms 
customary in that State; 
2. Enterprises engaging in restrictions. on competition which 
are forbidden and who are thereby seriously damaging con-
sumers' interests must expect heavy fines; 
3. The Commission is firrrily opposed to' the abuse of dominant 
positions in the Common Market. Subject to contrary inter-
pretation of the provision by the Court of Justice,' the Commis-
sion will also apply Article ,86 of the EEC Treaty to mergers 
entered into by enterprises in a dominant position to the preju-
dice of consumers;' 
4. The Commission is determined to reinforce the competitive 
position of enterprises by exempting by means of regulations 
or individual decisions, positive forms of cooperation from the 
ban on cartels. This applies particularly to cooperation between 
small and medium"':~ized enterprises, which can often only 
compete effectively with larger enterprises' by means of this 
sort of cooperation; 
5. The Commil'sion does hot apply the Article 85 'prohibition to 
restrictions on competition which (~ccording to, criteria which 
it has made known) have ,no appreciable effect on the Common 
Market. 
Competition policy is not' limited to the need for en-
forcing respect for the rules of competition on the part of 
enterprises. ~ It· must also show clearly the Coinmunity's in-
terests ,:in the fields of state aid 'and of state monopolies of a 
commercial nature. 
'Developments during, the last ten years have shown that 
Member States have- increasingly made use of state aid as in 
instrument of economic policy. The increasing liberalization of 
international trade and integration within the Community have 
meant that there is less scope than in the past for conventional 
measures of protection. Furthermore, increased competition and 
more rapid technological changes have revealed structural weak-
nesses in a number of sectors and regions of the Community. 
Neither the national public authorities concerned nor the insti-
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tutions of the Community can remain indifferent to these I weak-
nesses, either for economic or social reasons. 
'> Although other means· of actiori sometimes provide more 
appropriate remedies for the problems which arise (whether rela-
ting to infrastructures, social policy measures for facilitating oc-
cupational training and mobility etc.), state aid must be considered 
as a necessary instrument of structural policy. 
Even though the operation of market forces is an irreplace-
able factor for progress and the most appropriate means of 
ensuring the best possible distribution of production factors, 
situations can nevertheless arise when this in itselfis n()t enough to 
obtain the required results without too much delay and intolerable, 
social tension. When the decisions of the enterprises themselves 
do not' make it ,possible for the necessary changes to be made at 
on acceptable cost in social terms, then recourse to relatively 
short-term arid limited intervention is necessary in order to 
direct such decisions towards an opt!tnal economic and social 
result. The purpose of such aids must be to re-integrate the 
sectors and regions benefiting from them within a practicable and 
efficient system of competition while reducing the social cost of 
change, . without,however, permenantly tying up resources 
which could be used more effectively elsewhere. 
The overall approach underlying the Treaty rules on aid 
reflects this fact for while they s'upport a choice of a system.where 
competition is not distorted by aid which reduces the scope of 
free circulation or militates against a better allocation of factors 
of production, they also allow, with the Commission's approval, 
certain broadly defined categories of aid to be applied by the 
Member States. . 
In its approach to state aid, the Commission is essentially 
guided by three principles. 
Uriilateralstate aid, must be brought back into line with 
Community policy for the solution of the problems in qu~stion, 
otherwise it will only lead to costly rivalry, reciprocal neutralization 
of national policies, or even a transfer of the difri~ulties of one Mem-
ber State to another, thereby creating fresh difficulties at Commu-
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nity level. In this respects, it is especially important that the amount 
of aid to be granted should be appropriate to the gravity of the 
problems it is intended to deal with, as seen not only from a 
national point of view but from that of the Community as a 
whole. The Commission thus regards its action as something 
making {or coordination anq. efficiency without which serious 
tensions "would develop within the Common :l\hrket. 
To be justifiable, such aid must also contribute effectively 
towards an improvement in regional and sectoral structures within 
the Communhy, while doing the minimum harm from the point 
of view of competition. Whether aid is granted to regions or to 
sectors, it must be clear that the objective is to place enterprises 
benefiting from such· aid in a position to compete on the market 
on their own. 
This means that the aid granted should have certain charac-
teristics. It should be of a sufficiently temporary nature, even 
tapering off so as to encourage the necessary changes and it must 
not impede perrpatiently the best allocation of production 
factors. Aid intended to preserve the existing structure or to 
provide operational facilities is therefore, in general, excluded. 
Aid granted to enterprises should not be so large as to cover the 
enterprises concerned against most of their operational risks. 
It should be granted to enterprises or production centres whose 
development and restructuring (taking developments in the sector 
concerned into account) are likely to enable them to compete 
successfully on the market. It is necessary that such aid be as 
transparent as possible, not only to enable the Community insti-
tutions to appreciate its effects and the public authorities as well 
as local authorities to access the cost involved, but also to· ensure 
that the enterprises themselves properly evaluate their true com-
petitive situation. 
Finally, the Commission, when examining national initia-
tives,.must never lose sight of the social and human factors invol-
ved, which may justify aid beyond what is required by strictly 
economic reasoning. Such considerations may lead the Commis-
sion to approve aid the effect of which is simply to lessen the 
impact of inevitable changes. Here again; aid must be granted as 
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part of wider innovations which plan for other measures for the 
basic. solution of the social problems involved. To this end, it 
~ is possible to use means other than aid, such as measures to 
build up parts of the infrastructure or to speed up occupational 
training and retraining of workers. 
The Commission is endeavouring to win. acceptance of these 
guide-lines with regard to both regional and sectoral aid. 
If regional aid, when adequate, is one of the essential in-
struments for balanced regional development,· which is one of the 
objectives of the Treaty of Rome, it· should also be noted that if 
has given rise to competition between Member States which 
has tended to upset the very balance it was aimed at by increasing 
the cost of carrying out plans undertaken and by preventing the 
regions with the greatest disadvantages from benefiting from the 
necessary priorities. Coordination of regional aid granted in cen:-
tral regions has helped to achieve substantial success in 1971, 
througli introducing the rules needed to eliminate the counter---:--
productive results of regional aid. 
In certain cases, sectoral aid requires that the principles of 
coordination and harmonization of state aid be laid down, in 
order to ensure not only effective competition but,: also a better 
ordered structural development within the Community. It 
should be noted, as .has already been emphasized, that national 
initiatives often take into account purely national situations and 
objectives, while experiences suffered in common have created 
".similar difficulties throughout the Community, and that aid grailt-
ed by one Member State can have adverse consequences for its 
partners. The initiatives taken by the Commission in this res'-
pect in the textile and ship-building sectors have shown ho~ 
such problems can be solved. 
The system of control of state monopolies of a commerci# 
nature, as laid down in Article 37 of the EEC Treaty, is n~t y~t 
completed. The Commission's view is that the best solution iiI 
this case would be to remove exclusive monopoly rights in ordq 
. to eliminate any possibility of discrimination. In so far as this 
has not yet been achieved, Member States intend with certain 
exceptions to put an end to such monopolies in the very near future. 
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As regards state commercial monopolies which still remain by 
reason of their correlation with developing common policies, 
the Commission has been able to remove the more important 
discriminations. . . 
The developmen:t of mergers and take-overs in the Common. 
Market can only be discussed superficially because of the lack of 
comparative statistical data. The tendency towards concentra-
tion has intensified since 1966. International interpenetration 
has also increased steadily. In order to obtain accurate data on 
concentration, the Commission has launched a wide series of 
studies on the development, causes and effects ·of concentration; 
these studies should be completed by the end of 1973. 
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" 
Part one 
The Community's competition policy 
regarding enterprises 
21-22
Introductory remarks. 
Within the framework of the Community's medium-term economic 
policyl and in accordance with the guidelines in the Memorandum on the 
Industrial Policy of the Community,2 the Commission has gradually defined 
its policy on cartels and monopolies. . 
In order that enterprises may 'be better informed as to the actions 
which are permitted and ~hose which are forbidden, the Commission 
has, wherever possible, ruled on typical cases 6f prohibited and permitted 
. restrictions on competition in the field of horizontal agreements (Chapter I, 
point I), vertical distribution systems (Chapter I, point II) and licence' 
agreements (Chapter I, point III). 
There are special rules with regard to the conduct of enterprises 
in a dominant position. The abuse of a dominant position is prohibited 
(Articles 86 of the EEC Treaty and 66(7) of the ECSC Treaty.) Mergers 
and takeovers of enterprises can, according to Commission policy, also 
constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 86. Under the ECSC 
Treaty, mergers and takeovers of enterprises must be submitted for prior 
authorization (Article 66). The present report gives a survey of decisions 
made under Article 66 of the 'ECSC Treaty and Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty (Chapter I, point IV). 
In order to ensure that the rules of competition are respected, the 
Commission has imposed fines in several cases or made its decisions subject 
to certain stipulations and conditions (Chapter I, point IV). 
When applying the ban on discrimination to which enterprises of the 
coal and steel industries are submitted (Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty), 
the Commission endeavours to take changes in market conditions into 
account (Chapter I, point VI). . 
Up to the end of the transitional period, i.e. 1 January 1970, enter-
. prises were obliged to respect the regulations on dumping in intra-Com-
munity trade (Article 91 of the EEC Treaty). This report gives details of 
experience gained by the' Commission in the application of this provision 
of the Treaty (Chapter I, point VII). Following the systematic account 
of decisions made by the Commission in Chapter I, Chapter II is devoted 
to a review of the implementing regulations which have been put into 
operation for the purpose of enforcing the rules of competition of the 
Treaties. There is also a description of the Commission's communications 
and of a number of genc::ral problems arising out of the implementation of 
the rules of competition. 
1 The Council, Second Programme of Medium-term Economic Policy, Chapter II, 
. Sec. 11, OJ No. L 129, 30 May 1969, p. 23 and 24. 
2 The Commission, Memorandum on the Industrial Policy of the Community, 
Part II, Chapter II, p. 137 to 183. 
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CHAPTER I 
MAIN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
§ 1. - Horizontal Agreements prohibited and forms of cooperation 
permitted under Article 85 
During the past years, the 'Commission has systematically pursued 
its efforts with r!'!gard to the implementation of Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty and of Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, in order to put an end to 
agreements which were contrary both to the system of competition and 
, market unity, while at the same time defining the limits laid down by the 
Community's competition 'rules for cooperation among enterprises. 
PROHIBITED HORIZONrALAGREEMENTS 
1. Respect,for the cartel prohibition laid down by Community ;law has 
been fuHy assured by the decisions' t6 impose fines taken in recent, years 
by the Commission. PraQtices incompatible with Article 85 have been 
indicated not only by prohibition decisions but also by those decisions 
granting negative clearance or exemption which reveal restrictions on com: 
petition that, have been eliminated or, modified at the request of ,the Com-
mission in order' to allow f..t!ic1e 85 ( 3) to apply. Although clear b~eaches 
of the competitic;m rules laid down in the Treaties should, in principle" be 
'tqe c?bject o{'a prohipition decision' and; if necessary, of the impositiol1 ()f 
f;p.es, the eliminatio~ of practi<;es incRmpatible with the principl~ of com-
,petition has enabled certai.n cases to be clos~d without further action~, This 
method was adopted chiefly to avoid tge preparatory work and procedural 
delays required for the preparation of decisions once the Commission's 
views were clearly established, or when a decision would not have added 
in ariy way to existing administrative' case-law. This was particularly the 
Cllse with the price-fixing and quota agreements, joint selling agencies and 
conditions of sale. ' 
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Although decisions made in this context do not easily fit into a general 
pattern, since each case has to be treated according to its particular charac-
teristics, some guidelines can be drawn from a series of decisions handed 
down by the Commission'. This is particularly true for market-sharing, 
price-fixing and the allocation of quotas where, up to the present, there 
has not been a single case where exemption has been granted. This was 
also the case for systems protecting national markets which result, for 
example; from collective reciprocal-dealing agreements for purchases and 
sales within a member state, from agreements for aggregated rebates without 
, the inclusion of purchases from other member states, and from national 
cartels fixing resale prices for imported products or fixing selling prices 
for exported products. 
Market-sharing agreements and quotas 
2. Market-sharing agreements are particu,larly restrictive of competition 
. and contrary to the achievement of a single market. Agreements or con-
certed practices for the purpose of market-sharing are generally based on 
the principle of mutual respect of the national markets of each Member 
State' for th'e benefit of producers resident there. The direct object and 
result of their implementation is to eliminate the exchange of goods between 
the Member States co[lcerned. The protection of their home market allows' 
producers to pursue a commercial policy-particularly a pricing policy-
in that market which is insulated from the competition of other parties to 
the agreement in other Member States, and which can sometimes on[y be 
maintained because they have no fear of competition from that direction. 
The fixing of delivery quotas' in relation to tota~ sa~es, combined in some 
cases with a compensation scheme to.ensure that the quotas are respected, 
means 'that the members of the group give up any possibility of obtaining 
an advantage over their competitors by applying an individual sales policy. 
Maintainance of the equilibrium as fixed by the quotas directly endangers 
intra-Community trade as soon as the sales quotas are applied to one or 
more markets within the Community. 
3. It is the Commission's opinion that, in principle, exemption from the 
prohibition cannot be considered for market-sharing agreements. The 
elimination ofa competitor from the market--either in whole or in part-
cannot be justified objectively on economic or technical grounds or in the 
interests of the consumer. This principle was illustrated by' the decision 
made in the case of Tuberies Julien/Van Katwiik 1 prohibiting a typicaJ 
1 Commission Decision of 28 October 1970, OJ No. L 242, 5 November 1970, 
p.18. 
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market-sharing agreement between the two enterprises. The market-sharing 
had been arrived at in the following manner. One enterprise was com-
pletely banned from selling on the market of the partner, while the other 
voluntarily limited its exports on the basis of an agreement which the . 
judgments rendered by the national courts had declared to be obligatory in 
all respects on the contracting parties. 
Similarly, a decision was made and fines were imposed in the case of 
the International Quinine Agreement.1 The decision condemned what the 
contracting parties called a gentleman's agreement made for the purpose of 
protecting national markets within the Common Market for the benefit of 
the respective members of the countries concerned and of preventing the 
other members from exporting to those countries. 
4. The Commission had previously intervened on a number of occasions 
against market-sharing. The first intervention in this context in the case 
of Cleaning Products2 led. to the immediate abandonment of a reciprocal 
agreement safeguarding the respective markets of Belgian and Dutch pro-
ducers which had been supported by' prohibitions on export imposed on 
their respective customers. This case concerned a type of agreement which 
is so obviously contrary to Community rules of competition that in every 
similar case investigated the enterprises conc~rned terminated their agree-
ments or concerted practices at the instance of the Commission before formal 
action was necessary. This was particulary the case with a market-sharing 
agreement concluded for construction equipment between members of an 
association of enterprises who gave up their right to export to a Member 
State in favour of one single enterprise that had obtained a corresponding 
undertaking from the producers of that State.. The other case was that of 
the agreement not to export semi-finished ~etallic products.s 
This was an agreement between manufacturers of a Member State for 
the purpose of preventing deliveries on their internal market from other 
Member States: Reciprocal protection of national markets was also prac-
tised by the national groups of the International Cabl~ Development Cor-
poration (ICDC)4 and its affiliated firms. These concerted practices were 
immediately terminated by the cable manufacturers as a result of the Com-
mission's investigations into the market for insulated high-!ension electric 
\ 
1 Commission Decision of 16 July 1969, OJ No. L 192 of 5 August 1969, p. 5. 
28th GenerarReport on the Activities of the Communities, No. 64. 
31st General Report on the Activities of the Communities, No_ 52 and 53_ 
, Bulletin No_ 5-69, Chapter VI, Sec 6_ 
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cables. The terms included a prohibition on investment or partlC1pation 
and, in addition, agreeing to forego rill/advertising in the countries of the 
other manufacturers as well as refusing, in principle, delivery to buyers 
in the countries of the other manufacturers or supplying them at more 
favourable conditions than those· obtaining in their country. A further 
example of a case being disposed of without a formal'decision by the Com-
mission was that concerning an agreement made by most of the main 
European producers of sheet glas·s. This agreement was based on the 
mutual respect of the qational markets of the' members and the existing 
level of export sales of sheet glass. Moreover, the concerted practices 
between Ltalian and German producers on the restriction of trade between 
the respective markets of the members of the group, by the conclusion 
of delivery agreements between producers which implicitly excluded all 
direct exports,! were brought to an end. 
5. The decision on negative clearance handed down by the Commission 
in the case of Christiani and Nielsen2 confirmed that a wholly owned sub-
sidiary which has no economic independence is not in a position to conclude 
restrictive agreements, as defined in Article 85, with the parent company 
exercising complete control over it. In these conditions, restrictions im-
posed on the subsidiary company with regard to operating only in the 
country where it is situated could only be considered as a division of tasks 
within the economic organisation of the group as a whole. 
As regards relations between a number of subsidiaries situated in dif-
ferent countries of the Community, the deoision handed down in the case 
of Kodak? laid down that the identical nature of the conditions of sale of 
the companies of .the gro~p established in the Common Market cannot be 
considered as an agreement 'or a concerted practice either between the parent 
company and its subsidiaries or between the subsidiaries themselves. Since 
the subsidiaries concerned are completely and exclusively dependent on the 
parent company, which ir fact exercises control by giving the former 
precise instructions to be complied with, it is not possible for the subsi-
diaries to act independently of each other in' matters governed by the 
parent company. 
On the other hand, it was considered that restrictions imposed on 
third parties, in this case export prohibitions imposed on resellers by the 
1 Ibid. No.8-70, Part Two, Chap. I, Sec 8 and 9 and 4th General Report on the 
Activities of the Communities No. 28. 
2 Commission Decision of 18 June 1969, OJ No. L 165 of 5 July 1969, p. 12. 
a Commission Decision of 30 June 1970, OJ No. L 147 of 7 July 1970, p. 24. 
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variQus subsidiaries of the grQup,l fall under ,the prQhibitiQn'laid dQwn in 
Article 85. 
Price-fixing 
JQint p~ice-£ixing Qf go.o.ds s~ld in the CQmmQn Market is a]so. likely, 
to. affect adversely trade between Member States and serio.usly restrict 
cQmpetitio.n. 
6. In the Quinine case, the agreement o.f piice~ ~nd rebates applied no.t 
QnlytQ eXPo.rts to. no.n-member States, but also. to. eXPo.rts to. unreserved 
markets within the Community and was, therefore, an additio.nal guarantee 
in.respect of deliveries to reserved territories where they were authQrized 
o.n an exceptio.nai basis in spite Qf the principle Qf territo.rial pro.tectiQn. 
ThIs· enabled the co.ntracting parties to. avo.idany threat to. their internal 
price levels and also. to. maintain the equiHbrium o.fthe market ... These 
agreements to. fix prices and to. protect natio.nal m~rkets are mutually. 
co.mplementary and co.nstitute, therefore, an o.bstacle' to. trade since they 
prevent buyers fro.m ,benefiting fro.m the co.mpetitive market co.nditions' 
which Wo.uld have prevailed had there been no such agreements. Similarly, 
in the case Qf Sheet Glass the restriction Qn trade, by the application of the 
principle Qf reciprocal respect Qf national markets, was achieved by national . 
grQUps o.f producers mutually agreeing the prices: and cQnditions which 
WQuJd apply in the markets o.f their partners, thus eliminating any incentive 
for customers to import. 
.' 
7. The dec1siQn Qf the CQmmission impQsing fines in the Dyestuffs casc2 
invQlved concerted practices applying to. a uniform and' a.]most simultaneQus' 
increase in prices within the CQmmQn Market. Since their purpose was 
the application by all the enterprises t~kiilg part Qf an identical increase 
. ;" 
in price at almQst identkal' d~tes and tQr the same' classel> of products-if 
nQt fQr all the cQuntries affected by the indease~theke ~~rrcei:ted practices . 
directly fixed the selling price of the variQUS dyestuffs 'marketed by each'" ., 
enterprise within the CbmmorlMarket. These breaches were a!ll'the mQre .,' 
seriQus since pra~tical1y all the eitterprises selling the dyestuffs within' the 
EEC-where'they accQunted fQr more than 80% of the market~patti­
cipated in the concerted practices so. that the effects were felt particularly 
strongly by a large number of industries using dyestuffs. 
1 See infra, p. 61.. . 
2 Commission Decision of 24 July 1969; OJ No: L 195, 7 ,August' 1969, p. 11. 
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8. The prohibition of cartels also covers agreements condqded between 
enterprises of one and the same Member State for the purpose of fixing 
prices and resale conditions, for imported products or for,. fixing prices 
and selling conditions for products of their own manufacture as regards 
their exports to markets within the EEC. Such agreemnt~ eliminate all 
possibility of price competition between members of the cartel so that-
. where their share of the market is not negligible-competition within the 
Common Market is restricted and trade between Member States affected by 
the resultant bias against imported and exported products. 
Thus, negative clearance was given by the Commission in the case 
of Vereniging van Vernis- en Verffabrikanten in Nederland (VVVP)l only 
. after the elimination of the obligation to respect minimum selling prices 
and other conditions of sale and delivery for exports within the Com-
munity. These ,had been previously agreed to by an association, of which 
practically all the Dutch enterprises manufacturing and exporting paints 
and v,arnishes' were members, so that· a considerable part of the supplies 
of the products concerned in the Common Market were offered at uniform 
prices and conditions. ' 
9. The decision taken in 1971 in the case of Vereniging van Cementhan-
delaren (VCH) 2 illustrates the Commission's position regarding national 
agreements on prices and resale conditions for imported products. Even 
collective action among enterprises in any one of the Member States which 
aims to introduce on the markets of that State a system of uniform prices 
and selling conditions for products which, for the most part, are imported 
,from otber Member States, is likely to prejudice the establishment of a 
single market. There is little chance that such agreements can be exempted 
from the prohibition of cartels as there is nothing to show, except in very 
special cases, that the elimination of competition between traders would be 
more likely to ensure regular supplies to the market on more favourable 
conditions than competition itself. 
In the case in question, the Commission was of the opinion that the 
opening of the Dutch market to unrestricted imports of cement from the 
other Member States was not sufficient. This had already Iargely been 
achieved by the abandonmerit of reciprocal exclusivity between traders and 
, suppliers and by the removal of aU obstacles to genuine competition between 
manufacturers by giving up joint fixed priCes and selling conditions. In 
1 Commission Decision of 25 June 1965, OJ No. L 168,.10 July 1969, p. 22. 
2 Commission Decision of 16 December 1971, OJ ~o. L'13, 17 January 1972, p. 34. 
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view of the price control exercised by the wholesalers, this could only have 
a limited effect on Dutch cement consumers:1 Indeed, so long as organized 
trade maintained a system of fixed prices and, to a certain extent, recom-
mended prices, the advantages which should be passed on .to the consumers 
from competition between manufacturers and importers on the Dutch mar-
kets 'Yere not likely to materialize. 
ZO. The negative clearance in the case of ASP A (Association Syndicale 
BeIge de Ia Parfumerie)2 was only granted after removal of those clauses 
which were contrary to the terms of Article 85. The clauses particularly 
concerned were those obliging the membet3 of the group to fix resale prices 
and to ensure the observance of such prices by successive sellers: the clause 
requiring that all members of the group should abide by and compel the' 
retailers to abide by exclusive concessions and the use of official distri-
bution channels: and the clause which provided for boycotting by means 
of 'collective suspension of deliveries to retailers who had failed to fulfil 
the obligations imposed on them. This collective system of control appreci-
ably restricted the possibilities of competition among the various brands 
of products originating in the Community and imported on the Belgian 
market. It was Iikely to interfere with imports within the Common Market 
as a result of the restrictions on the freedom of reseHers to obtain supplies 
of products coming under the regulatory system mentioned above unless 
they were obtained through the official distribution channels. 
The Commission also adopted a decision imposing fines as regards 
agreements and concerted practices on the German scrap iron market'" which 
were clearly prohibited by Article 65 (1) of the ECSC Treaty.4 These 
agreements and practices hindered or distorted normal competition in the' 
Common Market, in so far as sources of supply of the raw materials were 
concerned, by instituting among enterprises of the iron and steel industry 
1 See reply to written question No. 574/70, OJ No. C 44 of 7 May 1971, p. 6. The 
enterprises and associations of enterprises had voluntarily cancelled the Noord-
wijk Cement Agreement (NCA) on 31 December 1970 thereby giving up joint 
fixing of prices and uniform trading conditions on the Netherlands markets. 
They asked for exemption in favour of a transitional system which provided 
for a temporary modified quota system. The procedings concerning this request 
are still pending in view of the need to examine the new situation thus created. 
Furthermore the VCH Contract which was initially the essential element of the noti-
fication made by the Vereniging Cementhandelarcn and which introduced exclusive 
reciprocal relations among the manufacturers of the NCA and the members of the 
VCH was cancelled in 1967. 
2 Commission Decision of 30 June 1970, OJ No. L 148, 8 July 1970, p. 9. 
3 Commission Decision of 21 January 1970, OJ No. L 29,6 February 1970, p. 30. 
4 Opinion of the High Authority of 24 February 1960, OJ No. 17, 12 March 1960, 
p.594/60. 
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a system of buying quotas which brought about a limitation of demand 
which would have reduced prices. They also fixed uniform maximum price~ 
in order to eliminate competition of any .kind among the parties concerned 
with regard to the supply of scrap. . 
Joint selling agencies 
11. By means of joint selling agreements, producers grant to ~ common 
agent the right to sell their products-generally on an exclusive basis-in 
all markets or on certain specified markets. The producers allocate among 
themselves, in predetermined proportions, the total quantity of products 
to be sold and offer these products on the market through their joint/selling 
agency at uniform prices and conditions of sale. Any variations in receipts 
from sales according to the markets and the categories of the products may 
be compensated by a system of equalizat,ion so as to ensure that all the 
members of a group receive the same final price per unit delivered. The 
exclusivity enjoyed by the joint selling agency, the apportioning of delivery 
quotas and the fixing of prices prevent any competition among the mem-
bers of the group who have, therefore, neither the incentive nor the capa-
bility to develop individual selling activities for their products at prices 
freely determined according to quantity and destination. At the same time, 
.. buyers lIre deprived of a choice between several sources of supply and have 
no way of stimulating price competition ~mong the differentprodu~ers. 
12. The. Commission's position with regard to joint selling agencies was 
laid down in the decisions on the joint selling agreements concluded in Bel-
gium and in France by producers of nitrate fertilizers in the case of Cobelaz -
Producteurs de synthese, Cobelaz-Cokeries et CPA ("Comptoir franr;ais de 
l' azote" ).1 These decisions show that negative clearance was granted only 
1 Commission Decisions of 6 November 1968, OJ No. L 276, 14 November 1968, 
p. 29. To these decisions should be added others concerning similar organizations 
in Italy for the sale of Chemical Fertilizers, in the case of the SElF A (Commission 
Decision of 30 June 1969, OJ No. L, 173,15 July 1969, p. 8) and in France for the 
export of phosphate fertilizers in the case of SUPEXIE (Commission Decision of 
23 December 1970, OJ No. L 10,13 January 1971, p 12. In the case of BELGAP-
HOS, the patties concerned decided to dissolve the company as a result of remarks 
made by the Commission concerning some of the clauses (4th General Report 
No. 28, EC Bulletin No.8-70, Part Two, Chap. 1, point 10). The Commission's 
case law with regard to joint s~lling agreements and equalization of sales prices, 
when they refer to sales within the Common Market, has been confirmed by this 
case where the enterprises had kept their individual freedom to sell individually 
and to fix prices, but subsequently proceeded to an equalization of profits. In 
this way trade between the Member States was no longer affected so that negative 
clearance could be given (by the Commission). 
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after the system of joint selling was altered by the parties at the request 
of the Commission, so that the agreements no longer fell under the general 
ban on cartels. 
With this object in view, the system of joint selling was restricted 
- to the national markets and to the markets outside the EEC. Joint selling 
agencies no longer interfere in any way with exports -to countries of the 
Common Market since such exports can only be carried out by the producers 
themselves or their dealers. Agreements no longer include provisions Hkely 
to discourage either direct deliveries by the producers or. resale by inter-
mediaries in the other countries of the Community. In particular, the 
fre,"dom of buyers to import and export within the Common Market cannot_ 
be restricted by prohibiting the resale of the products outside the national 
territory or by the granting of loyalty discounts. The conditions under 
which certain quantities of products are placed at the disposal of the joint 
seHing agency may not be such as to deprive individual,members of the right 
to determine the quimtities which they wish to export themselves. Equali-
zation'of selling prices on the home markets and export prices to countries 
outside the Common Market is likely to discourage exports by individual 
members of the group to countries within the Common Market and cannot 
therefore be allowed. 
13. On the other hand, when giving these negative clearances to certain 
joint selling agencies, the Commission decided to proceed in due course with 
a new examination of all such cases in order to gain precise knowledge of the 
development of the situation inuhis ,field. l The Commission is at present 
making enquiries and undertaking investigations in order to see that, inde-
pendently of the removal of the explicit restrictions on exports to other 
Member States, the maintenance of national joint selling agencies does not 
lead to a de facto protection of internal markets incompatible with the 
competition rules of the Treaty, ' 
14. In 1971, i:he intervention of the Commission in the case of CIM-
FRANCE2 1ed French cement producers to amend their agreement in order 
that their joint selling agency was no longer responsible for exports to the 
1 See Commission replies to written questions No, 158/70 of 8 August 1970 OJ No. 
C 133, 5 November 1970, p. 3, 226/70, 26 August 1970, OJ No. C 141, 27 Novem-
ber 1970, p. 13 and 443/70 of 14 January 1971, OJ No. C 26, 23 March 1971, p. 18. 
2 EC Bulletin No. 1-72, Part Two, Chap. I, Sec. 4. 
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.,j,. 
countries of the Common Market. As the activities ofthi~ selling agency, 
which was concerned' exclusively with exports, are now . limited to sales 
to markets outside the Community, they are no longer likely to restrict 
competition within the EEe. On the subject" of agreements made by 
enterprises established within the Community with a view to exporting to 
third countries, the Commission had already made its position dear by 
giving negative clearance in the case of Deca ("Dutch Engineers and Contrac-
tors' Association").1 This is a group made up of four Dutch enterprises 
with the object of organizing cooperation arri'ong its members to undertake 
construction and public works outside the Community. In view of the 
facts known to the Commission, there was nothing to show that cooperation 
among these enterprises for exports to markets outside the Community 
would have any effec~ on competition within the Common Market. 
15. An export sales agency was however the object of a prohibition deci· 
sion in 1971, in the case of Nederlandse Cement-Handelsmaatschappij 
(NCH).2 This agency grouped together ,a large number of German cement 
producers and completely eliminated competition between them in the Bene-
lux export market, particularly in the Netherlands which relied heavily on 
imports. Although this joint selling agency did indeed help in improving 
distr,1bution, the Commission considered that the disproportion between 
the results obtained and the means employed-that is to say, the complete 
elimination of competition among the producers on export markets result-
ing both from' the exclusive selling rights given to the joint selling agency 
and from the rules on prices and quotas-was such as to exclude any 
possib1lity of exemption from the prohibition on cartels. Even if the 
centralization of sa[es ~ould bring about reductions in sales costs, it should 
not be forgotten that; in the case of individual competition and marketing, 
the manufacturers concerned would not need to take over all the functions 
carried out by.the selling agency since part at least of these functions could 
be handled by the wholesale trade. The absence of an appropriate marketing 
link coul only be attribued to the existence of a joint selling agency which 
by excluding imports prevented the distribution network from fulfilling 
its potential to expand. Furthermore, some distribution functions could 
hav,e been carried out just as well by an independent distributor without 
a centralized agency fixing q~otas and prices and without exclusive. links 
with producers. 
1 Commission Decision of22 October 1964, OJ No. 173,31 October 1964, p. 2761/64. 
2 Commission Decision of 23 December 1971, OJ No. L 22, 26 January 1972, p. 16. 
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16. Where joint selling agencies for the products covered by the ECSC 
Treaty are concerned, the High Authority had to define for each case two 
limits within which join't sales could be authorized. First, the joint selling 
agencies could not be of such importance as to restrict competition within 
the Community more than was absolutely necessary. Second, these agencies 
had to be sufficiently large and organized in such a way as to improve distri-
bution of the products concerned,1 Taking into account the development 
of the market structures the Commission published a notice recently2 which 
states that, with regard to competition, agreements on joint selling have 
one special feature in that they remove, generally, speaking, all price com-
petition among the members of the group, As against specialization agree-
ments, joint selling agreements encourage the alignment of prices at the 
highest level of costs and, consequently, the maintenance of the least effi-
cient units, Quite often the disadvantage is that the structure of the selling 
agency created by the agreement on joint selling does not, as is the case 
with independent enterprises, permit sufficient flexibility in adapting to 
changes in demand, 
Joint selling agreements may tend to improve distribution ,but they 
are not generally of decisive importance for production and, do not normaHy 
constitute a means of achieving industrial reorganisation. In view of the 
, fact that the expected improvements had not materialized, the Commission 
refused to extend the authorization granted in 1967 for the Laminated Steel 
Joint Selling Agency of the German iron and steel industry, The agreem-
ents which were finally authorized were essentially concerned with both 
specialization and rationalization, each enterprise selling, with some excep-
tions, its own products independently within ,the framework of the groups, 
set up for rationalization purposes.3 
17, These various decisions clearly slow the Commission's attitude to-
wards joint selling agencies, where such agencies regulate the behaviour 
of a large proportion of producers on the markets concerned and where they 
may very well jeopardize the effectiveness of competition, As against this, 
the Commission has already made clear in its Notice on Cooperation4 that 
joint selling carried out by small or medium-sized enterprises, even when 
competing with one another, very often do not result in an appreciable 
restriction of competition. 
16th General Report on the Activities of the Community (1958); Volume I, p. 79-80. 
2 G:eneral Guideline on the Policy of Competition in Iron and Steel Structures, 
Sec 8, OJ No. C 12, 30 January 1970, p. 5. . 
3 Bulletin No. 9-71, Part Two, Chap. I, Sec 14, see above page 39. 
• Sec II 16. 
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This position of the Commission was illustrated in its decision in the 
case of SAFCO (Societe Anonyme des Fabricants des Conserves alimen-
taires).1 For the first time, a joint export selling agency which was also 
responsible for exports to countries within the Common Market was 
granted negative clearance be~ause of the small size of the enterprises con-
cerned. In view of the competitive situation on the markets of the Com-
munity for these products, it sItuation which was characterized by the 
wide range of similar products competing in both quality and price, it was 
considered desirable from the point of view of competition policy that new 
and increased export activity should take place by regrouping small producers 
of a 'local or purely national market, in the face of competition from severa] 
larger enterprises. In this case, the Commission noted that it was only by 
means of such cooperation that enterprises were able to organize the export 
of their products to markets outside their normal spheres of activity. 
18. The Commission also showed in the Alliance de Constructeurs fran-
fais de Machines-OutilsZ case that Article 85 is not opposed to the setting 
up by small and medium-sized enterprises of a joint marketing agency on 
foreign markets. Such an agency leaves to its members the right to fix their 
selling prices but aho includes a non-competitive undertaking underlining 
a pre-existing specialization in the production 6f its members and encouraged 
by the situation on the market. The maintenance of this product speciali-
sation is necessary to strenghten the links of confidence which will make 
the proper functioning of the joint marketing service possible and to prevent 
the coming into being of supplementary agreements and concerted prac-
tices, with special references to prices. As the Commission has set forth 
in its Notice on Cooperation, the setting-up of a joint selling agency does 
not present a restriction on competition when the member enterprises are 
not in competition with one another for the products covered by the 
agreement. 
Collective exclusive reciprocal dealing 
19. Collective obligation for exclusive purchasing from specific manufac-
turers or importers, or for exclusive deliveries to certain buyers within a 
Member State can also give rise to very serious restrictions on competition 
likely to affect trade between Member States. Where the obligations are 
reciprocal these collective exclusive dealing agreements can result in the 
splitting of an otherwise unified market into two seperate parts, one made 
1 Commission Decision of 16 December 1971, OJ No. L 13, 17 January 1972, p. 44. 
2 Commission Decision of 17 July 1968, OJ No. L 201,18 August 1968, p. 1.. 
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up of manufacturers adhering to the agreements_and their recognized clients, 
and the other of the producers not adhering to' the agreement and the -
clients who have not been selected. This artificial division of the market of 
a Member State, which is the result of such exclusive reciprocal engagements, 
means that the market as a whole is never open to producers of the other 
Member States, and that buyers of the Member States itself can never 
choose from among all the goods available within the Common Market. 
When, as is generally the case, the manufacturers who are parties to 
such agreements within a Member State hold a strong position in the market 
and where the selected clients represent a major part of the distribution 
network of the market concerned, these agreements tend to isolate certain 
sectors of the economy of the Member States within the Community'. 
20. As the Commission declared in its recommendation on Article 3 of 
Regulation No. 17 in the case of the Pottery Convention 1 the agreement 
_ constituted in principle a closed selling circuit aimed at assuring outlets for 
the member manufacturers rather than promoting the efficient utilization 
-of the products concerned or improving their distribution. In view of their 
serious effect on imports, such restriCtions on competition were in any case 
not indispensable to achieve the objectives of the agreement. This opinion 
of the Commission was not fundamentally changed by making the system 
more flexible through the elimination of the obligation of exclusive buying 
imposed on customers, so long as the agreement maintained the obligation 
of member manufacturers to respect technical standards which had Aot 
been laid down by any regulatory bodies and to sell only to buyers who 
could meet certain conditions, even if these buyers already fulfilled the legal 
requirements laid down for the exercise of their profession. Th~ agreement 
nevertheless continued to present an obstacle to the opening up of the 
market concerned to imports from other member countries. Even if all the 
producers of the Common Market had the possibHity of adhering to the 
agreement, they were presented with the ahernative of submitting to the 
restraints of a private organization or of being excluded from'a large part 
of the distrtbution network, while certain categories of buyers were still 
excluded from receiving direct deliveries from the member. manufacturers. 
For these reasons and as a result of the Commission's criticisms, the Pottery 
Convention was terminated in 1971 as was also a similar agreement, the 
Stoneware Convention, which had been concluded for regulating the distri-
bution of tiles on the Belgian market.2 
1 Bulletin No. 5-64, Annex II, 7th General Report on the Activities of the Com-
munity No. 67. ' 
2 Bulletin No. 12, 1971, Part Two, Chap 1, Sec 3. 
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21. Undertakings of mutual exclusivity between manufacturers and 
dealers are often the extension at the distributive level bf, agreements 
between manufacturers for fixing quotas and prices. By establishing 
such exclusive trade relations with buyers, .. the producers party to the 
agreement tend to shield themselves from competition from other 
suppliers. 
The Commission -intervened on it number of occasions against 
this type of agreement. In the case of Gravier (gravelJ1 a number of 
Belgian, German and Dutch producers undertook to deliver exclusively 
to Belgian and Dutch trading groups which in their turn undertook to 
obtain supplies exclusively from the producers con~erned. This 
arrangement was completed by the territorial sharing of markets among 
the groups of traders and provisions for the alignment of prices. In 
the "water-beaters" case, the exclusive obligation, undertaken between 
manufacturers and importers on the one hand and the Belgian whole~ 
salers on the other, were reinforced by the express prohibition of 
re-import and export as well as by fixing prices and discounts. The· 
agreement on quotas and prices between Belgian, Genrian and Dutch 
producers for the sale of Silica2 on the Dutch market was also strength-
ened by exclusive buying agreements with traders and the joint fixing 
of minimum prices by sellers. This also applied to an agreement con-
cluded by Belgian, German and Dutch produc!Ors to fix quotas for d~­
liveries to the Dutch market of Cement and Clinker2 which included the 
fixing of uniform prices and selling conditions. 
22. The intervention by the Commission led to the cancellation of the 
agreements notified to it concerning quotas, prices and collective obliga-
tions of exclusivity. This was also the case for Paper,3 CampingtlJaterial,4 
Timber from the North,5 Agricultural Machinet:.),,6 and Sanitary Installations. 7 
Another ,agreement of this type was cancelled in 1971 following the 
Commission's intervention. This agreement was concluded between 
Belgian and Luxembourg manufacturers for the sale of Steel Tubes8 
on the Belgian market and fixed quotas for deliveries in respect of each 
one of the member enterprises and also imposed uniform selling 
18th General Report on the Activities of the Community No. 63 and 65. 
29th General Report on the Activities of the Community No.· 56 and 57. 
39th General Report on the Activities ofthe Community, No. 53, h 
4 First General Report on the Activities of the Community, No. 54. 
6 2nd General Report on die Activities of the Community, No. 29. 
6 3rd General Report on the Activities of the Community, No. 37. 
14th General Report on the Activities of the Community, No. 28 . 
. 8 Bulletin No. 9/10-71, Part-Two, Chap 1, Sec 14. 
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conditions. The clauses involved· seriously limited the possibilities of 
competition among the members and adversely affected trade between 
Member States by preventing the Luxembourg member of the group 
from developing sales on the Belgian market. Furthermore, the under-
taking by the Belgian wholesalers who had signed the standard contract 
with the manufacturers to obtain supplies exclusively from members 
of the group closed a considerable part of the Belgian market to 
manufacturers from the other Member States. 
23. Protection of a national market can also be obtained by means of 
a horizontal agreement among importers of different brands of goods 
in one Member State with a view to creating' or guaranteeing full 
territorial protection for their individual exclusive dealing agreements. 
Following the Commission's intervention, based on Article 85, 
in the case of RAJ - Comaubel ("De Rijwiel- en Automobiel-Industrie" 
and the "Chambre. Syndicale du commerce Automobile de Belgique"),l 
the associations of importers and distributors of automobile spare 
parts and accessories released their respective members from their 
obligations under horizontal agreements setting up full territorial 
protection of their individual exclusive dealing agreements with foreign 
. suppliers, or guaranteeing the full territorial protection laid down in 
the contract. It is for this reason that members of the associations 
were obliged to respect the right to exclusive purchases registered in 
the name of another member and could not undertake parallel import 
of products registered in this way nor resell products thus imported. 
The two associations had also come to an agreement concerning intra-
Benelux trade under the terms of which members were not allowed to 
export to the other country a product for which an exclusive selling 
concession had been granted in favour of the member of the other 
association. 
Aggregated rebate cartels 
24. Isolation of an economic sector of a national market within the 
Community can also occur even where exclusive agreements have not 
been made between producers and buyers, as a result of agreements 
among producers of a Member State where such agreements grant to the 
buyers in that State rebates, the rates of which are fixed jointly in re-
lation to the total purchases made during the period under consideration 
from all the producers who are parties to the agreement. A cumulative 
14th General Report, No. 28, Bulletin No. 7-70, Part Two, Chap 1, Sec 5. 
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system of.'rebates encourages buyers to. obtain rebates acthe highest 
possible rates by concentrating their purchases on the national produ-
cers and, therefore, not taking offers from other suppliers into conside-
ration even if these offers are more favourable. This way of attracting 
custom restricts sales possibilities of foreign producers on the market 
concerned and producers from other Member States in particular. An 
artificial obstacle, collectively imposed, makes access to the market of 
a Member State more difficult and is prejudicial to the establishment 
of a single market within the Community. 
This is illustrated by the Commission's decision in the case of 
Ceramic Tiles.l 
This occurs, in any case, when members of the manufacturers 
group represent an important part of the national production and 
when the buyers with whom they are dealing represent an appreciable 
part of the distribution network for the sale of their products on the 
market so that the possibilities for outlets on the market to suppliers 
from other 'Community countries are considerably restricted. In this 
case, no exemption from prohibition could be granted. Indeed, the 
Commission was of the opinion that the advantages that could have· 
resulted from the impI'ementation of the agreement on the level of the 
products' distribution' or on the activities of the participating manufac-
turers were not such as to compensate the disadvantages resulting from 
the artificial protection of a national market to the detriment of products 
of a competitive nature offered by producers of the other Member 
States. 
PERMITTED FORMS OF COOPERATION 
25. In parallel with the elimination of situations that are incompatible 
with competition and the unity of the market, the Commission has 
pursued its policy in recent years of encouraging cooperation between 
enterprises where this can produce favourable. economic results and 
maintain effective competition within the Common Market. To this 
end, the Commission has endeavoured to define, by a double series of 
measures (one of which is individual and the other general), those 
agreements which do not come under the prohibition and those which 
do come under such a ban but which are entitled to exemption. 
I 
1 Commission Decision of 29 December 1970, OJ No. L 10, 13 January 1971, p. 15. 
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The Commission adopted a large number of individual decisions 
granting negative clearance where it was shown that the agreements which 
had been submitted did not restrict competition within the Common 
Market, so that it was not necessary for the Commission to intervene 
under Article 85. 
Thus the intention regarding a certain number of types of agree-
ments has been clarified in the light of the provisions of Article 85 
and the individual cases examined. In order to indicate· its favourable 
attitude towards cooperation, particularly between small and medium-
sized enterprises, and also to dispel the uncertainty that still exists 
with regard to forms of cooperation which do not come under the ban 
on agreements, the Commission endeavoured to explain, in more general 
terms, by means of its Communication concerning Cooperation between Enter-
prises . those forms of cooperation which do not normally involve any 
restriction on competition. 
Most of the individual decisions of negative clearance' arising 
from the examination of the terms of the agreements have shown 
that they do not entail any restriction on competition within the meaning 
of Article 85 because the situation of the market and the position of 
third parties on the market are not appreciably affected. 
In its Communication concerning Agreements of Minor Importance, 
the Commission laid down quantitative criteria for the general definition 
of cases of this kind. Agreements between enterprises which are limited 
by their minor position on the market and by their limited economic 
and financial potential are, in general, incapable of appreciably affecting 
either the intensity of competition or the freedom of choice of third 
parties. 
The main part of this activity is, however, at present based on the 
definition of conditions for block exemption under the terms of Article 
85(3) within the framework of the proposed exemption regulations. 
In recent years, particular forms of cooperation have been exempted 
from prohibition through a series of individual exemption decisions where 
the agreements fulfilled the necessary conditions. Exemption is nor-
mally granted for each separate. case since it cannot be decided on 
without the particular characteristics of the agreements and their effects 
on the market being studied. It is for this reason that the decisions 
so far published do not allow for the formulation of premature genera-
lizations, since the conditions for exemption can only be defined for 
each separate case. It is only in. certain fields that certain types of 
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agreement-to ~he extent that their characteristics can be placed within a 
, general delimitation-can be eligible for Block Exemptions. Certain 
general considerations emerge as to the possible of authorizing certain 
categories of agreement concerning standardization, specialization, 
research and development as well as the use of the results obtained; 
and the Commission has therefore been authorized to draft regulations 
for block exemption in thisarea .. Several important individual decisions 
were also handed down in these matters, and the results of these are 
being exa~ined with a view to defining the conditions under which 
general solutions can be found and put into operation. In other 
fields, specific decisions are still necessary so that the situation' is clari-
fied by proceeding from case to case. 
Specialization agreements 
26. Favourable results from the point of view of the economy as a 
whole can be obtained by means of specialization agreements, and the 
Commission, considering that such agreements are de·sirable, has 
encouraged those which have been submitted for exemption, as is shown 
in the decisions made under the terms of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
in the cases of Jaz-Peter, Ciima Chappee-Buderus1 and more recently in 
th,e case of Sopelem-Langen. 2 . 
Cooperation· of this kind between enterprises of a certain size, 
restricts competition within the Common Market and, in view of their 
position on the Community markets, is likely to affect trade between 
Member States. The basis of specialisation agreements is the agreed 
allocation of production between the parties, accompanied by mutual 
obligations on each party to supply the other exclusively with the 
products in which he specialises for sale in the territory of the other 
party. Such agreements prevent a member producer from recommen-
cing the manufacture of a product given up in favour of another producer 
or from marketing directly under his own mark in the territory of . 
another producer the produ<;.t in which he specialises. The consumers, 
therefore, no longer have the possibility of stimulating competition 
between the products of manufacturers participating in the agreement. 
27. Such agreements do, however, provide ·ameans of obtaining 
specialization which contributes to lower costs by the setting up of 
1 Commission Decision of 22 July 1969, OJ No. L 195,7 August1969, p. 175. 
2 Commission Decision of 20 December 1971, OJ No. L 13,17 January 1972, p. 47. ' 
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long production runs and a better utilization of available production 
capacity by the concentration of effort on a limited number of products. 
The obligation of reciprocal supply gives each party, in spite of the 
specialization of their production, the possibility of continuing to offer 
for sale to their customers a complete range of products, while the fact 
that each party represents its partners in the group within the territory 
in which it has a sales network at its disposal facilitates the marketing 
of the products concerned. The agreements concerned also generally 
aim at promoting among the members of the group a more highly 
developed technical cooperation, thus creating the motive force for 
standardization and rationalization, for example by means of exchange 
of information and indeed by jointly working out new products. The 
specialized enterprises are thus able to offer improved and better adapted 
products at more advantageous prices. 
28. The Commission has not failed to recognize, however, tbe limi-' 
tations of this useful trend, limitations which the decisions adopted have 
already underlined. The essential condition for granting exemption 
to such agreements is that the specialization shall not compromise the 
effectiveness of competition in such a way that the parties to the agree-
ments can utilize the savings in costs for their exclusive profit instead 
of sharing them fairly with their customers. Even if the real advantages 
obtained for the customers are not immediateley apparent when. the 
agreement is examined, there must nevertheless be established· with 
sufficient probability that any such advantages will accrue in the future 
as a result of the progressive development of the specialization, thus 
enabling the parties to achieve a reduction in selling price-a result 
which will be encouraged by the pressures of competition. Although 
such agreements may enable the parties thereto to strengthen their 
position on the market, they must remain subject to effective competition 
from other manufacturers established in the Common Market or 
distributing goods similar to those covered by the specialization 
agreement. Competition at the distribution level must also be ensured 
by allowing intermediaries to make parallel imports of the specialized 
products covered by the agreements. 
The indiyidual decisions adopted in this context already provide 
an impression of the kinds of specialization agreements which will be 
entitled to block exemption by the Commission, 1 with a view to making 
1 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2821 of 20 December 1971 concerning the appli-
cation of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices, OJ No. L 285, 29.December 1971, p. 46. 
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possible the conclusion of agreements which conform to the rules of 
competition. To this end, the regulation to be adopted will define 
clearly the admissible clauses which are normally indispensable for the 
required cooperation. 
On the other hand, a specialization agreement cannot be authorized 
under the terms of Article 85(3) even if the advantages implied by 
the agreement cannot be obtained by other means, when it reduces 
the number of suppliers to a figure below the minimum required to 
maintain effective competition. Article 85(3)(b) excludes any exemption 
for agreements which give the contracting parties the possibility of 
eliminating competition for a substantial part of the products concerned. 
29 .. The case FN - CF (Fabiique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre - La 
Cartoucherie Franc;:aise) which also resulted in an exemption decision 
granted by the Commission in 1971,1 was characterized by the important 
positions occupied by the contracting parties in the market of the pro-
ducts which were the object of the agreement. It was also typical in 
that the specialization on the .main lines of production agreed to by the 
parties also involved the inclusion of clauses on joint research and 
development of new products which were likely to be incorporated in 
the respective production of each partrrer to the agreement (the obliga-
tion to specialize in the case in question covers the future production 
. programmes of the parties to the agreement). Each party was to be 
responsible for the representation of its partner in the territories where 
it had the most highly-developed sales network, i.e. France and the 
French territories for the CF and Benelux, Germany and Italy for the 
FN. 
The mutual grant of exclusivity on sales and purchases covered 
by the agreement was considered in this instance to be a restriction on 
competition which was indispensable if the favourable effects of the 
agreement were to be achieved: Indeed, as far as the mutual sales 
exclusivity was concerned, it could not reason;bly be expected that the 
parties to the agreement should renounce their right to all the benefits 
from sales in their own territory of products manufactured by the other 
party within the framework of the joint technical and development 
system envisaged by the agreement. 
A number of requirements were appended to the exemption deci-
sion in order to permit the Commission to verify the 'effective implemen-, 
1 Commission Decision of 28 May 1971, OJ No, L 134,20 June 1971, p. 6. 
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tation of the specialization measures as well as the effects of these meas-
ures, the reduction of selling prices and the maintenance of effective 
competition on the market for the specialized products, taking into 
. account a possible increase in the market share of the parties to the 
agreement. At present the position is that although both the FN and 
the CF are important within the Community (and in the Benelux coun-
tries in particular), the Commission notes that they are nevertheless still 
subject to the competition of other large EEC cartridge manufacturers 
and to competition from imports from countries outside the Common. 
Market. 
30. SpeCialization agreements have also played an 'important part in 
the implementation of the ECSC Treaty, the High Authority also having 
encouraged such agreements when they had been submitted for authori-
zation in accordance with the terms of Article 65(2) of that Treaty. 
The Commission's policy also takes into account the fact that1 the 
purpose of specialization is generally to coordinate rationalization and 
expansion of the production of different iron and steel products, ·al-
though, where the enterprises concerned are important, this can result 
in restrictions on competition within the Common Market which can 
affect the mechanism of competition. 
T~is basic and fundamental position held by the Commission was 
illustrated by the decisions made in 1971 authorizing the setting up of 
four groups for rationalization in the German iron and steel industry2 which 
were intended to replace the selling agencies for· rolled steel, and for 
which an extension of the authorization given in 1967 had been refused 
by the Commission. The agreements, which had been authorized in 
view of the specific situation of the Community'S steel markets are es-
s·entially directed towards production specialization and should make it 
possible to find adequate solutions to restructuring problems which are 
apparent in ·the German iron and steel industry. In view of the fact 
that the giving up of certain lines of production and of new investments 
in certain sectors presents serious risks which vary according to product 
and are very difficult to evaluate, the Commission agreed that specialized 
agreements could contain possible quantitative financial or equalization 
measures between the enterprises concerned for certain specified 
produCts. It should be emphasized that the Commission did not 
1 Guidelines on competition policy relating to the structures of the iron and steel 
industry; OJ No. C 12, 30 January 1970, p. S. 
2 Commission Decision of 27 July 1971, OJ No. L 201,5 September 1971, p. 1. 
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authorize production quotas, allotting percentages of the group's 
production to each individual enterprise in respect of each one of its 
products, such quotas having originally been envisaged in the agree-
ments concerning the four rationalization groups. ' The main effects 
of these quotas would have been to fix permanently the respective 
shares of each eriterprise within the group and this would have been 
contrary to any genuine "improvement in production. 
The Commission therefore authorized only those agreements which 
were essential for achieving the desired rationalization effects and which 
were no more restrictive than necessary to achieve the objective of 
specialization and rationalization. Furthermore, the authorizations 
were subject to a series of conditions designed to ensure that these 
effects will in fact be achieved and· that more severe restrictions on 
competition will not occur. At the same time, the conditions ensured 
that the independence and autonomy of the enterprises concerned on 
the common market for steel will not be compromised by personal 
links or restrictive practic~s between the enterprises and the groups 
.or by practices with third parties particularly within the framework of 
association of enterprises. 
Agreement onjoint research and dClJelopment 
and utilisation of results 
31. Efforts made in pure and applied research determine the competi-
tivity of enterprises and the possibilities of development of the economy 
as well as the pace of technological innovation. That is why the 
Conlmission has tried to remove, within the Common Market, obstacles 
to the cooperation of enterprises in research and development within 
the limits of the rules of competition laid down in the E~C Treaty. 
To the extent that they do restrict competition, agreements be-
tween small add medium-sized enterprises concerning joint research 
and development only, do not generally present any particular danger 
to competition. It is rather at the stage of utilization of the results of 
research that problems with regard to the law on cartels may arise. 
The Commission will, therefore, have to examine, on the basis of in-
dividual decisioQs already adopted as well as decisions to be adopted, 
the conditions under which certain cat,egories of agreements on research 
and development of products and processes up to the stage of industrial 
application as well as utilization of the results obtained, including 
provisions regarding the use of industrial property rights and of secret 
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technical know-how,l can be exempted from the:: prohibition. The 
regulation which the Commission is authorized to adopt should define 
the limits laid down by Community law on cartels for cooperation in 
research and development which it considers necessary for the purpose 
of ensuring the possibilities of technical and economic development 
and the competitive capability of enterprises in an enlarged market 
but which must not allow restrictions of comp~tition, such as the sharing 
or protection of national markets. 
32. The Commission's first dd;ision co~cerning an agreement on 
joint research was made in the ca~'e of Eurogpysum.2 This is an associa-
tion, the aim of which is to promote, on a European scale, the develop-
ment of the plaster and gypsum industry. To achieve this aim, it carries 
out joint studies and research on questions of interest to the industry, 
and disseminates the results of the research carried out. The granting 
of negative clearance was made possible because the joint research 
activities carried out and financed in common had neither the object 
not the effect of restricting competition. The parties were not prevented 
from carrying out research individually and the articles of agreement· 
did not contain any discriminatory conditions as regards entry into 
the association and representation therein. The association did in fact 
publish the results widely. 
This concept 'Nas confirmed by the Commission in its Notice on 
Cooperation between Enterprises,3 the terms of which made clear 
that agreements arrived at for the purpose of undertaking joint research 
do not generally restrict competition on condit\on that the enterprises 
are not restricted as far as their own research activities are concerned, 
and that the results of the joint research are made available to all parti-
cipants in proportion to their participation. In principle, third parties 
must not be excluded from access to the results of joint research, although 
the constitution of a joint research organization justifies the obligation 
not to grant licences to third parties unless there is prior joint agreement 
on the part of the contracting parties to do so or unless this is reached 
by a majority vote. 
1 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2821 of 20 December 1971 concerning the appli-
cation of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements, decisions arid 
concerted practices, OJ No. L 285, 29 December 1971, p. 46. 
2 Commission Decision of 26 February 1968, OJ No. L 57, 5 March 1968, p. 9. 
3 Notice on agreements, decisions and concerted practices, concerning cooperation 
between enterprises 11/3, OJ No. C 75, 27 July 1968, p. 3. 
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Particular circumstances may, however, arise in the case of some· 
agreements for joint research which distinguish them from the usual 
cases envisaged by the Commission in its notice on cooperation. This 
notice concerns, in particular, cooperation agreements between small 
and medium-sized enterprises. In the case where large enterprises 
take part in this type of agreement, something which the Commission 
considers as a possibility, the notice referred to above should. only be 
taken with certain reservations. As was already stated in the c:ommis-
sian's notice, reservations can arise even on agreements which do not 
impose restrictions as regards the utilization of the results of the joint. 
research and even if the contracting parties have not excluded the 
possibility of carrying out research individually since they would' not 
be expected to undertake such research because of the cost involved or 
because of lack of success in the past. 
33. ,The decision recently handed down in the HeI1kel-Colgate1 case 
gave the Commission the opportunity to underline this viewpoint. 
It held that the prohibition of Article 85(1) cO).lld apply to joint research 
by two large enterprises with world-wide markets and with a very strong 
position on the Community markets which are characterised by their 
oligopolistic structure and great technical homogenity of products 
offered, as well as by particularly intensive and costly advertising, 
which makes penetration of the market very difficult for other manu-
facturers who wish to compete. In these conditions, the position of 
manufacturers in the market and their possibilities of expapsion are 
largely determined by the degree of technical progress and innovation, 
so that competition in the field of research is extremely important. A 
supplier can gain an advantage over his competitors in such a market 
only by improving the quality and use of his products by means of 
research, and by showing by advertising that these products are a 
technical improvement on those of his competitors. This means that 
an agreement which excludes the other contracting party from such 
advantages appreciably restricts competition between the two parties 
and in the market so that, as regards the position of the parties in Com-
munity markets, this is likely to restrict intra-Community trade. The 
clause according to which licences to third parties can only be granted 
by agreement between the contracting parties has not given rise to a 
ruling which is different from that concerning the research agreement 
itself. The clause in itself does not bear the stamp of a restriction on 
t Commission Decision of 23 December 1971, OJ No. L 14, 18 January 1972;,p. 14. 
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competition and is only of secondary importance since it is the normal 
consequence of the setting up of a joint research organization with the 
object of gaining new knowledge jointly. 
By its decision, the Commission granted this agreement the exemp-
tion provided for in Article 85(3), since the joint research in the field 
of textile detergents did not include any restriction at the level of 
production and distribution of the products manufactured on the basis. 
of the results of the joint research. The two pa1!'ties will in fact have 
access to the results of the joint research and development (patents and 
know-how) on the same conditio1).s and will be able to use th~m without 
limitation. Each party will have the right to obtain from the research 
company (which is their joint 'Subsidiary) licences for all countries on 
payment of a maximum royalty of 2%. In order to prevent the joint 
research from exceeding the limits of the agreement in practice and also 
to ensure that the research does not lead to market sharing or to concer-
ting the production and sales policies of the two parties, the Commission 
made its decision subject to certain conditions. These were that the 
enterprises must keep the Commission informed on their policy regarding 
licensing, patents and know-how resulting from the joint research, 
and must also provide information concerning the acquisition of share 
holdings or the establishment of personal links between both groups. 
34. The agreement between ACEC - Bertiet, l which had also benefited 
from an exemption decision, was a special case. This agreement 
was for technical cooperation and joint research and development, 
and was concluded with the object of developing a new type of elec-
trically powered bus. It was characterized by the fact that two enter-
prises, each of which specialized in one aspect of the product,. agreed to 
carry out joint research .. This was likely to increase the. possibility 
of a useful result being obtained. The Commission had considered 
that the non-competitive clause (prohibition of cooperation with 
third parties in the field covered by the agreement) and the undertaking 
concerning exclusivity (supplies of complementary products needed 
for the manufacture of the finished product resulting from -the j'oint 
development) were an indispensable and justified measure of protection 
which would enable the two firms to profit from their .investments. 
In addition, the clause limiting the number of buyers of the new electrical 
propulsion system was considered a necessary condition for ensuring 
the profitability of the new product. A decisive element in the Commis-
1 Commission Decision of 17 July 1968, OJ No. L 201, 12 August 1968, p. 7. 
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· sion's assessment was the fact that the concentration of the manufactu're 
of the new products to a limited number of producers (apart from the 
fact that these would compete with the manufacturers of buses provided 
with mechanical propulsion) would not be likely completely to prevent 
competition between them, as their respective possibilities for selling 
· on all markets of the Community were in no way restricted. 
35. The limits which the rules of competition impose on joint research 
and developments agreements with regard to the' utilization of the 
results obtained were also set forth in an Opinion published by the Com-
mission in 1971. concerning a case which had been submitted to itl. 
The Commission opposed the methods envisaged for the utilization of 
the results of the joint research. which gave each party favoured treat-
ment in respect of royalties relating to licences on its main market and 
granted it a preferential territorial position which was inadmissible. 
The Commission also pointed out that in order to ensure the free move-
ment of goods within the Common Market, . patents. and technical 
knowledge obtained as a result of joint research could not be utilized 
for the' purpose of preventing imports into a Member State of products· 
manufactured by one of the parties with the help of results obtained 
through joint research and put into circulation in another Member 
State. 
Joint advertising, joint use of quality labels, standardization 
36. As the Commission has stated in its Notice on Cooperation be-
tween Enterprises,2 joint advertising as such does not constitute a 
restriction on competition if the participating enterprises are not 
prevented from carrying out their own publicity. As, in the case of 
joint research it cannot of course be excluded that, contrary to the 
general case which the Community had in mind in its Notice, joint 
advertising by enterprises of a certain size might come under the general 
han. Such a situation can arise wheq a market is characterized by an 
oligopolistic structure where advertising as a means of competition 
· plays a decisive role. ' 
Joint advertising which aims at drawing the attention of buyers 
to certain classes Qf products, is generally linked with associations for 
standards which establish a common quality label guaranteeing to 
1 Bulletin No. 5-71, Pa.t;t Two, Chap. 1, Sec 7. 
• Sec II, 7 and 8. 
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customers that the quality of a product bearing such a·' label is up to 
established standards. The Commission has also stated that, in general, 
agreements on the use of a common label do not restrict competition 
if competitors, whose products satisfy the required quality conditions, 
may use the labels on the same terms as the members themselves. 
37. The Commission's position in this matter was illustrated by the 
decision in the ASBL pour la promotion du tube d' acier soude electriquement 
(for the development of electrically soldered steel tube).! The Com-
mission granted negative clearance, noting that the members of the 
association remained free to carry pn individual publicity for their own 
products and that the possibility of using the joint quality label and of 
membership of the association was open to all producers meeting the 
quality standards laid down objectively. . 
A restriction on competition may arise, however, if the use of the 
label is linked with obligations concerning production ~nd marketing, 
when, for example, the participating enterprises, because of an agreement 
or a concerned practice, are not free to fix prices or when they are obliged 
to manufacture or sell products of guaranteed quality only. 
This qualification expressed in the Commission's Notice on 
Cooperation found application in the case of Vereniging lJanVernis-
Verffabrikanten in Nederland (VVVF),2 where negative clearance was 
granted only after the removal of the obligation on the part of members 
to respect minimum prices and other conditions of sale fixed by the 
group for their exports within the Common Market, and· after con~ 
firming that the obligation to export under official trade names only 
those products which could satisfy the minimum quality requirements 
leaves the member prbducers free to export other products. 
. By means of these decisions, the Commission showed that para-
graph 1 of Article 85 is not opposed to the efforts of associated producers 
to improve the quality of their proqucts by means of certain measures 
of st~ndardization which include the use of a common trade mark and 
making them known through joint advertising, on condition that 
competition between the parties to the agreement or access of other 
producers to the agreement is not excluded. 
1 Commission Decisioh of 29 June 1970, OJ No. t 153, 14 July 1970, 
p.14. 
~ Commission Decision of 25 June 1969, OJ No: L 168, 10 July 1969, 
p.22. 
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38. As was shown in the case of Transocean Marine Paint Associa}ion, I 
an exemption from the' general ban on cartels is also not to be excluded 
when cooperation agreements in this field result in an appreciable 
restnctlOn on COmpetltlOn. This association consisted of medium-
sized producers each established in a different country, of which five 
were within the EEC, and was set up with the intention of developing 
certain marine paints by utilizing their joint technical- knowledge. 
The members agreed to manufacture paint of the same quality and to 
sell it under the same trade mark in order to make themselves more 
competitive with the biggest international groups on the market. 
Sales were organized in such a manner that each member had to guaran-
tee, in its main area of activity, regular supplies of products of the 
same quality and sold under the common trade mark, so that buyers 
would be able to obtain, whenever they required it and in a large number 
of countries marine paif.J.ts of identical quality. In this case, the Commis-
sion authorized for a launching period a flexible system of geographical 
division which provided each member with a privileged competitive 
position, since deliveries to countries where other members were 
established could only be made by means of a system of reciprocal 
compensatory commlSSlOns. This arrangement did not in fact exclude 
exports, so that a corrective factor remained in respect of possible 
artificial differences in prices charged .by the members to the detriment 
of consumers. 
39. Certain problems concerning competition may arise from agree-
ments which are concerned solely with the uniform application of standards 
and ~ypes. ·Since agreements of this kind need not be notified in ac-
cordance with Article 4(2) Section 3a of Regulation No. 17, the Com-
mission was never made aware of them. As the effectiveness of these 
agreements is linked with the obligation on the part of participating 
enterprises to manufacture or sell only those products or parts of 
products which have been the object of jointly fixed standards, types, 
kinds, dimensions and categories, they may come under the general 
ban on cartels. In general, such agreements do, however, help in 
rationalizing production by means of a better utilization of production 
capacity and of the improvement of supply conditions ,due to the in-
creased interchangeability of the products concerned to the benefit 
of the consumer. Such agreements will, however, only provide the 
possibility of eliminating competition and present real advantages for 
the consumer to the extent that they do not provide a means of 
1 Commission Decision of 27 June 1967, OJ No. K 163,20 July 1967, p. 10. 
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restrlctwg or removing price competItiOn as well as cOmpetltlOn re-
lating to conditions and quality among the participants to the agree-
ment. The Commission will obviously take this into account when 
determining the conditions under which block exemption can be' 
granted for certain types of agreement in the field of standardization.! 
Agreements for joint purchasing 
40. It must be admitted that agreements' for joint purchasing, even 
when the purchasing enterprises are not competing with each other, 
may lead to restrictions on competition between buyers. Funda-
mentally, as a result of the decision made in the case of Socemas,2 the 
Commission considered that the prohibition on agreements was ap-
plicable .to agreements between buyers in the same way as to those 
between sellers. 
On the other hand, purchasing groups established by commercial 
enterprises may be an appropriate means of allowing the retail trade 
access to foreign supply markets and thus overcoming difficulties 
inherent in their size, in the face of integrated forms of distribution 
with regard to obtaining advantageous prices and other purchasing' 
conditions which can be passed on to the consumers. But the creation 
of powerful purchasing groups should be avoided, or at least be kept 
under control, in view of the repercussions they could have on the 
position of suppliers. The determination of the overall position on the 
market of the partiCipating-enterprises and the economic power of their 
aggregate requirements in relation to supply in the 'various markets 
concerned is therefore the main problem to be faced if effective competi-
tion within the Common Market is to be preserved. 
41. In the case in question, the granting of negative clearance was 
based on the fact that the activities of the "Societe frans:aise de coope-
ration d'entreprises commerciales" (French company for cooperation 
among commercial enterprises) in the other countries of the EEC had 
not reached proportions sufficient to cause significant restrictions on 
competition and noticeable effects on trade within the Community. 
The purchases abroad by the participating enterprises, made through 
the intermediary of their joint purchasing agency, represented a very 
1 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2821 of 20 December 1971 concerning the appli-
cation of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices, OJ No. L 285, 29 December 1971, p, 46, 
2 Commission Decision of17 July 1968, OJ No, L201, 12Aug~st 1968, p:4. 
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small part of the market for each ot the products concerned, so that 
the concentration of demand had only slight effect on the position 
. of the suppliers on the various markets in question. 
This decision constitutes . only a first stage in the solution. of 
problems whichi arise in so far as the compatibility of joint purchasing 
agreements with the rules on competition is concerned and in the 
definition of the limits within which such agreements can be permitted. 
Rationalizing Participation in Fairs and. Exhibitions 
42. The Commission also had to deal with competition problems 
caused by regulations connected with exhibitions with regard to ad-
vertising and sales activities of producers and their dealers as well as 
the effect of" these regulations on the organization of large fairs and 
specialized exhibitions. The regulations on exhibitions often restrict 
the freedom of exhibitors to take part, either directly or indirectly, 
for a given period in activities of this kind other than those organized 
periodically by the association itself. 
In the case of the Expositions Europeennes des Machines-Outils 
(EEMO),1 the Commission had already given its vIews on the applica-
bility of Article 85 to restrictions of this type. In view of the need to 
rationalize participation in fairs and exhibitions and of the trend, which 
is often uneconomic, for the proliferation of this type of activity, these 
restrictions were granted exemption. The limitation on the partici-
pation of exhibitors in other similar types of activities is a rationalization 
factor in the trend towards a concentration of specialized exhibitions. 
This concentration provides the opportunity of a periodic comparison 
of practically all the machine-tools concerned in one and the same 
place and thus assists the marketing of these items in the interests of 
consumers. 
43. However, competltlon, between manufacturers or their agents 
as well as the activities of the organizers of fairs and exhibitions should 
not be restricted to such an extent as to hinder the development of the 
advantages offered by such concentration. The decision handed down 
in 1971 in the case of the Comi# Europeen des Constructeurs de machines 
textiles (CEMATEX)2 is of interest, for it shows that the rules on exhibi-
1 Commission Decision of 13 J'vlarch 1969, 'OJ No. L 69,20 March 1969, p. 13. 
2 Commission Decision of 24 September 1971, OJ No. L 227,8 October 1971, p. 26. 
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tions as conceived and applied for a number of years brought about an 
excessive concentration of exhibitions by large manufacturers and sellers 
of textile machinery within the Common Market. In the case of machine 
tool exhibitions, organized every odd-number~d year, the prohibition 
imposed on exhibitors from participating in other fairs every other year 
was permitted. In the case of textile machinery exhibitions, held every 
four years, the right to' participate in other exhibitions of this kind 
every two years was guaranteed at the request of the Commission. 
The adoption of this solution enables competition to be maintained at 
a proper level, and the period of prohibition could reasonably be con-
sidered as essential in view of the high cost and technical difficulties in 
exhibiting and the rate of technical progress in the production of this 
type of equipment. 
It is worth mentioning that these decisions concerned exhibition 
of capital goods and are without prejudice to decisions which may 
be made in the field of exhibitions of consumer goods. Indeed, the 
arguments set out above on the basis of Article 85(3) may not necessarily 
apply to the same extent. 
§ 2 - Adaptation of Distribution systems to the rules on competition 
44. Since the Commission's position in this matter has been fully 
explained, adaptation to the conditions of competition and market 
unity with regard to measures taken by enterprises for organizing 
the distribution of their products can usually be brought about without 
the need for formal procedures. . 
The first case to be considered is that of exclusive dealing contracts, 
the legal position of which in relation to Article 85 had been established 
by the Grundig-Consten case and by Regulation No. 67/67. In some 
cases of refusal to adapt, procedures have to be set in motion to bring 
about the removal of export prohibitions which enable different prices 
to be charged in different countries. The Commission also gave its 
attention to categories of exclusive dealing agreements which are not 
covered by the block exemption regulation, and to problems raised 
by the penetration of new markets. 
There is also the question of conditions of sale imposed by enter-
prises. Here, the Commission clearly established, in the Kodak case, 
that conditions of sale may not lead to partitioning of national markets 
at different levels of distribution. The' same applies, as in the Agfa-
54 REP .. COMPo 1971 
Gevaert case, to clauses intended for resale price maintenance in certain 
member countries and, in accordance with the Omega decision, to restric-
tive undertakings by resellers which ensure a system of selective distri-
bution in the Common Market. The Commission's efforts in 1971 
were directed to making the principles obtained from these test cases 
generally applicable by ensuring that the enterprises concerned removed 
or change their gef,leral conditions of sale in accordance with these 
decisions. 
EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS 
45. During the first stage in the application of the rules on competition 
set out in the EEC Treaty, the problem of exclusive dealing agreements 
was in the foreground of the Commission's competition policy. Special 
attention was given to these agreements because their frequent occur-
rence in economic activity, combined with the notification system·· 
introduced by Council Regulation No. 17/62, gave rise to a formidable 
problem of filing and documentation regarding these agreements. 
The attention given to the exclusive dealing agreements was fundamen-
tally due to the fact' that such agreements are particularly likely to create 
obstacles with regard to the integration of national markets into a single 
market, to the extent that they guarantee to the holder of the concession 
not only the exclusive right to obtai~ supplies direct from the manu-
facturer but also to be the only distributor allowed to introduce the 
relevant products into the territory allocated to him. 
46. Absolute territorial protection granted by the manufacturer is 
achieved through prohibiting all resellers in the other areas to export 
into the area allocated to the concession holder. The resulting parti-
tioning of the concession holder's market precludes the possibility of 
parallel imports. It is precisely this possibility which, in the Com-
mission's view on competition policy, should constitute a corrective 
factor for excessive prices imposed by an exclusive concession holder 
and should be an element of price harmonization in a unified market. 
having the same features as a single domestic market. The possibility 
of paralJel imports helps tei ensure that users will have a fair share of 
the advantages accruing from exclusive dealing. The contracting 
parties must not, therefore, be allowed to restrict the freedom of users 
and intermediaries to obtain the product concerned from other resellers 
within the Common Market at more favourable conditions than those 
granted by the exclusive concession holder in his own area. 
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47. The problems artslng from this type of agreement, under the 
terms of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, were resolved in principle 
by a decision of the. Commission in the Grundig Cons/en case, l ·which 
was confirmed in its es~entialpoints by the ruling of the Court of 
Justice.2 Both the decision and the ruling showed that the exclusive 
dealing agreement concluded between the German manufacturer and 
his distributor for the sale of these products in France was an infringe-
ment of the principle of cartel prohibition and could not be exempted 
because absolute territorial protection was combined with the concession 
of exclusivity. Regulation No. 67/67/EEO on block exemption which 
authorises, without requiring notification, bilater!ll agreements for 
exclusive dealing which satisfy the' conditions laid down in the Regula- . 
tion, especially the condition stipulating that parallel imports shall 
not be prevented, has to a large extent solved the problem of the massive 
number of cases faced by the Commission.4 Indeed, the combination 
. of the test decision confirmed by the Court of Justice and of the block 
exemption enabled the Commission to dispose of a large number of 
notifications relating to exclusive dealing agreements by means of a 
simplified procedure, either because they fulfilled the conditions "laid 
down in Regulation 67/67 or because they had been adapted to that end 
by the enterprises themselves. It is, of course, the role of the Commis-
sion to carry out a check on agreements which, although they may 
satisfy the conditions laid down in the regulation, might in some way 
prove incompatible with Article 85(3), and if necessary to issue a 
decision. This could occur where it is shown that the exclusive con-
cession holder had taken advantage of the exemption granted by 
charging excessive prices for the products by the concession. 5 Agree-
ments which do not meet the conditions laid down in .Regulation No. 
67/67 and which are still subject to the normal notification procedure, 
must be examined case by case. 
1 Commission Decision of 23 September 1964, OJ No. 161, 20 October 1964, 
p. 2545/64. 
a Judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 July 1966 in the cases of 56 and 58/64, 
OJ No. 170, 29 September 1966, p. 3015/55 Jurisprudence of the Court No. XII, 
p.429. 
3 -Regulation (EEC) No. 67(67 of 22 March 1967 on the application of paragraph 3 
of Article 85 of the Treaty to categories of exclusive dealing agreements, OJ No. 57, 
25 March 1967, p. 849/67. -
4 See First General Report on the Activities of the Communities in 1967, p. 60, and 
Second General Report on the Activities of the Communities in 1968, pages 43 
and 44. 
6 Article 7 of Regulation No. 19/65 and Article 6 of Regulation No. 67/67. 
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As the Court of Justice has clearly reaffirmed in a recent ruling,! 
an exclusive ,dealing agreement falls, under the prohibition referred 
to in Article 85 of the Treaty when it prevents either de jure or de facto 
the re-export by the distributor of the products concerned to other 
Member States, or the import of such products from other Member States 
into the protected area, for distribution by persons other than the con-
cession holder. The Court underlined the fact that this last condition is 
fulfilled when the concession holder is in a position to prevent parallel 
imports from other Member States into the concession area by a combi-
nation of the terms of the agreement and the effects of national laws on 
unfair c0n;.petition. 
48. The Commission will continue to ensure that these principles are 
observed in all cases, of exclusive dealing arrangements involving 
absolute territorial protection, whether they become known as a result 
of notification, examination, 'or the lodging of a complaint. In its 
reply to written questions, submitted in the European Parliament, 
and. concerning the differences in price of motor vehicles of the same 
make in various Community countries, 2 the Commission stated that it 
was 'using all the means placed at ,its disposal by Community law to 
remove those restrictions on competition which, on the basis of the 
Commission's previous practice, 'are prohibited under Article 85, and 
thus is ujsing its influence to reduce excessive pri<::e differences; In 
recent years, the Commission has succeeded in removing most of the 
export prohibitions which have been brought to its notice. Of ap-
proximately 30 000 cases concerning exclusive dealing agreements 
initially notified, 4500 of which contained export prohibitions, only 
about 1 500 are still pending. Enterprises that have not seen fit to 
give up, of their own accord, the export prohibitions incorporated in 
their agreements' for exclusive dealing, include several producers of 
perfume in addition to manufacturers and importers of motor cars. 
49. The Commission considers that a simple protection (agreements 
not involving absolute territorial protection) is in, gene~al sufficient to· 
enable the concession hol,der to work the market intensively. As it 
1 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 25 November 1971 in case No. 22/71 (Beguelin 
Import Co), OJ No. C 9, 3 February 1972, p. 7. ' 
2 Written questions No. 506/69 of 10 March 1970, OJ No. C 72, 17 June 1970, p. I, 
No. 247/70, 9 September 1970, OJ No. C 138, 18 November 1970, p. 13, No. 393/70, 
11 December 1970, OJ No. C 20,3 March 1971, p. 13, OJ No. 429/70, 8 January 
1971, OJ No. C 22, 9 March 1971, p. 7. 
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, ' 
had previously pointed out,l the temporary authorization of an absolute 
territorial protection might be envisaged for exclusive dealing agree-
ments intended to enable a new producer to break into the market 
concerned. Until now, however, there has been no need for the Com-
mission to decide on such a case. 
The Commission shares the views of the Economic Committee 
of the European Parliament on this subject. 2 Support for such an 
exception to the principle of the incompatibility of absolute territorial 
protection can be found in a previous ruling of the Court of J ustice3 
which allows for a more flexible attitude to those restrictions on compe-
tition required to assist an enterprise in penetrating a market on which 
it is not yet represented. In its decision in the Transocean Marine Paint 
Association Case,4 concerning a cooperation agreement between small 
and medium-sized enterprises, the Commission had already authorized, 
for a limited period, a certain amoupt of territorial protection considered 
necessary to enable each of the members of the association to develop, 
in an initial period, intensive action concentrated on the market in the 
country in which the ~ember of the group was established. 
As regards exclusive dealing agreements between enterprises of 
minor importance, the Court of Justice confirmed its previous ruling5 
in a recent judgment.6 This shows that an exclusive dealing agreement 
between parties of minor importance on the market of the products 
concerned need not come under the prohibition, although this does 
not necessarily exclude from prohibition agreements envisaging full 
territorial protection. 
50. Moreover, in addition to bilateral agreements for exclusive dealing 
relating to trade between Member States~ and concluded between 
manufacturers for particular territories within the Common Market, 
there is a series of exclusive dealing agreements that are not covered 
1 First General Report on the Activities of the Communities in 1967, p 61 
2 Report made on behalf of the Economic Coinmittee on the Rules of Competition 
and on the position of European enterprises within both the Common Market and 
world-wide economies (Rapporteur Mr Berkhouwer), European Parliament docu-
ments of session 1969-70, 2 February 1970, Doc. No. 197, p. 13-44. 
3 Ruling of the Court of Justice of 30 June 1966 in case No. 56/65 (Societe Techni-
que Miniere/Maschinenbau Vim GmbH), OJ No .. 170, 29 September 1966, p. 3013/ 
66, Vol. XII, p. 337. 
• Commission Decision of 7 July 1967, OJ No. 163,20 July 1967, p. 10. 
6 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 July 1969 in the case 5/69 (Volk/Vervaecke), 
OJ No C 105, 14 August 1969, p. 15 RecueiINo.XV, 4, p. 295. 
6 Judgmen! of the Court of Justice of 6 May 1971 in the case 1/71 (Cadillon/Hoss), 
OJ No. C 76, 27 July 1971, p. 9, Recueil No. XVII, 4, p. 351. 
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by the definition in Council Regulation 19j65/EEO and for which, 
therefore, the Comrrussion is not empowered to adopt block exemption 
regulations. Unlike agreements covered by Regulation 67j67/EEC, 
the above agreements are not very numercus. 
51. With regard to exclusive dealing !!greements for exports to non-
member countries the situation was defined by the negative clearance 
granted by the Commission in the RieckermannjAEG-Elotherm case. 2 
This test decision made it possible to settle by a simplified procedure, 
most of some 1 100 notifications or requests for negative clearance for 
this type of agreement, nearly half of which had been submitted by one 
and the same enterprise. 3 The Commission considered that such an 
exclusive dealing agreement concluded with an exporting enterprise 
which was hot organized for selling within the Common Market, could 
not appreciably restrict competition within the latter. The exclusive 
concession to sell in a non-member country may have as a counterpart 
a prohibition on selling in other countries, including Common Market 
ones. Such a prohibition only excludes a potential selling operation, 
which in any case is not very likely. In its first decision, adopted under 
the terms of Article 85, relating to the Gros/illex-Fillistorj case,4 the 
Commission had already considered that there was no case for inter-
vention against the prohibition, imposed on the Swiss sales concession 
holder by the French producer, from re-exporting to the Common 
Market the products to which the agreement related. Indeed, re-
export of products from non-member countries to the Common Market 
is to all intents and purposes impossible since it would entail customs 
duties being imposed twice. 
52. A. systematic study of two other groups of exclusive dealing 
agreements which are not covered by Regulation No. 67/67 was under-
taken in 1970 since, although there were not many of them, no test 
decision had yet been handed down. They involved not only agreements 
between enterprises of one Member State with regard to resale within 
that State, but also exclusive dealing agreements covering all the Com-
mon Market countries. 
1 Council Regulation No. 19/65/EEC of 2 March 1965 concerning the application 
of Article 85 (3) to categories of agreements and concerted practices, OJ No. 36, 6 
March 1965, p. 533/56. . 
2 Commission Decision of 6 November 1968, OJ No. L 276 of 14 November 1968, 
p.13. .. 
3 Second General Report on the Activities· of the Communities in 1968 p. 48. 
4 Commission Decision of 11 March 1964, OJ No. 58 of 9 April 1964, p. 915/64. 
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The Commission holds the view that with very few exceptions 
national exclusive dealing agreements are not likely to affect trade 
between Member States, so that they will only exceptionally fall under 
the prohibition in Article 85(1). ' 
There still remains the question of exclusive dealing agreements 
where the area allocated to the concession holder-covers the Common 
Market as a whole : In such cases it is necessary to examine the extent 
to which such agreements are likely to restrict competition and affect 
trade' between Member States, taking into account the established 
flow of goods within the Common Market. In both these fields, 
systematic study of the existing notifications1 should enable test decisions 
to be made. 
, . As f~r, exclusive dealing agreements between competing enter-
prises, the Commission has excluded them from the application of Reg-
ulation 67/672 because it considered that they jeopardized competition. 
There is a risk of market sharing when, as pointed out by the Economic 
Committee of the European Parliament,3 competing producers and 
manufacturers mutually grant to each other exclusive distribution of 
their products. So far, the Commission has exempted reciprocal 
obligations of exclusive supplying between producers only within the 
framework of specialization agreements. 4 
OTHER SYSTEMS OF DISTRIBUTION 
53. The Commission has also considered export prohibitions included 
in general conditions of sale and other similar measures which lead 
to the partitioning of markets with respect to the distribution of goods. 
Individua:I enterprises or groups of enterprises which constitute an 
economic entity may wish to carry out a marketing policy, and more 
particularly a price policy, which differentiates according to the particular 
market in which it is applied. Their sales policy will be such as to 
ensure that only those products ar~ offered on the different national 
markets ,·as will have been supplied by enterprises established in those 
Member States. In this way they can adopt different prices and condi-, 
1 Only national agreements concerning exports and imports are notifiable under 
the terms of Article 4 paragraph 2, No.1 of Regulation No. 17. 
2 Article 3a of Commission Regulation No. 67(67/EEC and point Se of Council 
Regulation No. 19/6S/EEC. 
3 Report made on behalf of the Economic Committee on competition rules p. 13. 
4 ibid p. 36 above. 
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tions ~ince, when they charge relatively high prices in a Member State, 
they need not fear that dealers and consumers in that country will 
satisfy their requirements by purchasing in another Member State 
_where the same products are offered more favourably. 
'.! . 
As regards the partitioning of national markets by way of export 
prohibitions contained in general sales conditions, the Commission 
has applied the' same principle as that which formed the basis of its 
policy regarding exclusive deaJing agreements. This applies particu-
larly to measures taken by enterprises t? protect from any outside 
interference the system of resale price maintenance existing in certain 
Member States. The maintenance of competition between recognized 
resellers of different Member States with respect to pJ;oducts covered 
by selective distribution systems established in the Common Market 
has also been assured. 
Export Prohibitions contained in Genera! Sales Conditions 
54. The Commission's attitude towards export prohibition clauses 
in general sales conditions has been illustrated! by the negative clearance 
granted in the Kodak case following the adoption of new uniform 
sales conditions for the companies of the group established within the 
Common Market2• Originally, these conditions contained a clause 
whereby the companies forbade their customers to export or resell 
the supplied products for export. These conditions restricted com-
petition within the Common Market and adversely affected intra-
Community trade, since they resulted in the isolation of the market of 
each Member State and protected the prices charged ,on each of the 
markets from competition from one or more Member States. ' 
It follows that, in order that the prohibition under Article 85 
(para. 1) should not be applied; the products concerned must be capable 
of being exported or resold for export within the EEC at prices freely 
determined by the parties involved in these operations, so that they 
may be subjected to competition from resellers in the various Member 
States. The Commission's aim is to prevent excessive prices by ensur-
ing that demand in a Member State can be satisfied by supplies from 
1 The Commission had already previously obtained the removal of export prohib-
itions contained in the general sales conditions of the subsidiaries of N. V. Philips' 
Gloeilampenfabrieken in the Common Market countries. See EC Bulletin No. 4/1969, 
chapter VI, Sec 5. 
2 Commission Decision of 30 June 1970, OJ No. L 147 on Uniform Sales Conditions, 
see page 16 above. 
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another Member State under more favourable conditions if at all pos-
sible. To bring this about the resellers, at all levels of distribution, 
must be free to take advantage of any price difference in a neighbouring 
country in order to buy their products there at lower prices. In the 
Commission's view, this possibility of curbing prices by imports of 
products of the same brand is an essential element for the aligment of 
prices in the various countries of the Common Market. 
Clauses designed to protect National Resale Price 
'Maintenance Systems 
55. The Commission took the same view with regard to clauses intended 
to protect national resale price maintenance systems which are likely 
to bring about the partitioning of markets within the Community. 
, Purely national systems of resale price maintenance do not gen-
erally come under the Community law prohibiting cartels. To the 
extent that they are limited to compelling retailers in a Member State 
to respect certain prices for the resale within that State of products 
supplied by a manufacturer established on that market or by a conces-
sion holder appointed for that territory, trade between Member States 
will not, generally, be affected within the meaning of Article 85 of the 
, BEC Treaty. That is why the Commission considers that the question of 
vertical resale price maintenance is essentially a matter of national 
competition policy. The Commission ensures; however that inter-
mediaries and consumers are enabled to obtain supplies of the product 
concerned at the most favourable prices and wherever they choose 
within the Community.! 
With this in view, the Commission pointed out in the Agfa-Gevaert 
case2 that the fact that a system of vertical resale price maintenance 
was authorized in a Member State in no way constitutes a sufficient 
reason for not applying the prohibition referred to in Article 85 (para. 1) 
to measures intended to make them watertight, that is to say measures 
which prevent the sale in the country concerned of products imported 
1 See reply to written question No, 247/71, OJ No. C 115 of 13 November 1971, p. 5. 
2 EC Bulletin No. 2/1970, Part 2, Chapter I, Sec 5, The companies of the Agfa-
Gevaert Group having given up the restrictions in question for the sale of their. 
products within the Common Market and the result of the Note of Objection 
received by them, an injunction decision by th~ Commission under the terms of 
Article 3 of Regulation No. 17 became superfluous. At the same period, and also 
in the photographic products sector, Zeiss-Ikon-Voigtlander similarly altered 
their general sales conditions. 
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at prices below the price level fixed by resale price maintenance. '.)ther 
clauses which may be covered by the provisions of Article 85(1) are 
those prohibiting exports, re-exports or re-imports and which are in-
tended to preserve the price system operated within a Member State. 
The same was also considered to apply with regard to systems of fixed 
re-export prices under which all foreign customers are obliged to charge 
for re-exports those prices fixed by resale price maintenance in the country 
for which the exports were intended . 
. When examining this case, the Commission considered that these 
measures could not be exempted where the products were of the same 
manufacture and were marketed in the different Common Market 
countries at different prices and resale conditions through distribution 
companies belongirig to the group. In these circumstances, restrictions 
on exports, could only serve to protect those national markets where 
the enterprhes are able to impose resale prices from the disruption of 
their discriminatory sales policy which could result from parallel 
imports. . 
Although national systems of resale price maintenance authorised 
by some national legislations were not directly implicated, the Com-
mission's intervention with regard to measures intended for protecting 
them by isolating national markets within the EEC was not without 
repercussions on the systems themselves.! This has already led many 
manufacturers to give up national resale maintenance completely. 
Selective DistributionS.ystems 
56. The Commission has likewise ensured the possibility of parallel 
trade flows between Member States in the case of selective distribution 
systems based on quantitative criteria and guaranteed by restrictive 
undertakings on the part of exclusive dealers and approved retailers. 
In the Omega case,2 the restriction on competition did not derive 
from the fact th~t approved distributor status was granted only to those 
who satisfied certain requirements regarding expert knowledge and 
equipment, but from the limitation of the number of authorized sellers 
in proportion to the expected level of sales in the relevant area. As 
this limitation also concerns the reselling for export within the Common 
Market, it is likely to affect trade between Member States. Another 
1 Third General Report on the Activities of the Communities, p. 60. 
2 Commission Decision of 28 October 1970, OJ No. L 242 of 5 November 1970, p. 22. 
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restrIctlOn upon competition within the meaning of Article 85 is the 
. condition in appointed retailers distribution contracts, which enforces 
at retail level the selective distribution system established. between the 
manufacturers an,d the exclusive dealers against reselling to distributers 
other than the appointed retailers. This restriction limits the number of 
sales points for the products concerned which are exported from one 
Member State to another. 
Restriction upon competition can have appreciable effects on market 
conditions when a system of exclusive distribution is applied throughout, 
the Community hy enterprises holding a strong position in the particular 
section of the market and when it has the effect of excluding a large 
proportion of retailers possessing the required qualifications from 
reselling such products. Exemption from the prohibition under Article 
85: (para. 3) may be granted, as it was in this case, if the products con-
cerned highly technical and relatively highly priced, and for which 
after sales service and guarantee are of particular importance. In 
this case, the Commission considered that, in order to avoid any deterio-
ration in the distribution of the products concerned, it was essential 
to provide the appointed retailers with a turnover high enough to 
encourage them to make a genuine effort in sales promotion and service. 
Admission to the ranks of appointed retailers for all those retailers who, 
within the Common Market, have the necessary knowledge and equip-
ment demanded by Omega to sell Omega watches would have reduced 
the sales of each of them to only a few units per annum. 
In order to be exempt, however, systems of exclusive distribution 
must be free from restrictive undertakings by exclusive dealers and 
appointed retailers which hinder competition at the distribution stage 
and are likely to partition trade among Member State.s. In other words, 
they may not be organized on a territorial basis in opposition to the aims 
of the Common Market. Thus the Commission, in authorizing the 
agreements which form the basis of the sales organization for Omega 
watches within the Common Market, first made sure that the appointed 
retailers could in future obtain supplies from any of the manufacturer's 
exclusive importers in the EEC, and that they were free to export to 
other Common Market countries by selling to other appointed retailers 
or to consumers at freely determined prices. In the Commission's 
opinion, the possibility of parallel trade flows for the products concerned, 
although limited to arrangements between exclusive dealers and appointed 
retailers and between the latter and the consumer, would tend to reduce 
the prices charged in the various Member States. The marked differ-
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ences in price which might still exist in certain cases would be bound 
to encourage concession holders to seek to buy on better terms in 
neighbouring countrie~. 
57. The' matter of principle raised by export prohibition and other 
measures having a similar effect having thus been settled, the Commission 
then sought to get the enterprises concerned to remove or amend the 
restrictive clauses in their sales conditions to the extent that the' latter 
affect intra-Community trade. To this end, the Commission undertook 
a systematic examination of all outstanding notifications relating to 
general sales conditions which include this type of provision. 
In all the cases examined to date in this field, approximately 120 
have been, settled because the notified sales conditions were either 
removed or amended satisfactorily as a result of the Commission's 
intervention. 
§ 3 - Application of Article 85 to agreements concerning 
industrial and commercial property rights 
,58. 'The question of the relation between the Community rules of 
competition' and national laws protecting industrial and commercial 
property rights raises a number of complex and fundamental problems. 
The most important of these is how to reconcile the exercise of rights 
provided for by national laws within the Community with observance 
of the conditions of competition and the unity of the market which are 
essential for the attainment of the Common Market and economic 
union. This is particularly the case with trade mark law and patent law, 
both of which present the risk of being used by enterprises to maintain 
national frontiers by assuring absolute territorial protection to' trade 
mark or patent owners or their licensees. 
It is also· necessary to determine which clauses in agreements con-
'cerning industrial and commercial property rights are admissible under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, bearing in mind the specific purpose of 
the protection rights and their function in a system of: competition and 
a unified market. ,While ensuring adequate remuneration for inventions 
and avoiding obstacles to the application of patented knowledge and 
to the communication of secret know-how, it is nevertheless necesSl,lry 
to establish a genuine common market for branded goods, either patented 
or incorporating secret know-how without unjustifiably limiting the 
possibilities of competition and the free movement of goods among 
Member States. 
, , 
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· The Court of Justice, in harmony with the views of the Com-
mission, has held that industrial and commercial property rights may 
not be used as a means of partitioning national markets. The 
law on this point, already well established as regards trade marks, has 
recently been extended to one of the exclusive rights akin to copyright. 
For the first time the Commission has expressed in two decisions 
relating to patent licensing and know-how agreements its opinion 
on clauses frequently found in such contracts. These decisions are 
additional to an earlier official announcement and to several findings on 
individual cases. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY AND COMMUNITY LAW 
ON· COMPETITION 
Principle of Territoriality 
59. The recogmtlOn of the so-called "principle of territoriality", 
which enables the holder of exclusive national rights to prohibit the 
reimport of authentic products which have been put into circulation in 
another Member State, would result ~mong other things in enabling 
the holders of exclusive rights to prohibit parallel imports of protected 
products, and thus to share or partition the national markets within the 
Common Market. Apart from the fact that this principle is not expressly 
stated by the laws of the Member States, and is, in these States, not 
upheld in most of the case-law relating to trade mark rights, its validity 
being recognized and upheld only in a few judgements concerned with 
patent law handed down by the higher courts, the principle gives rise 
to reservations with regard to its compatibility with the Treaty estab-
lishing the EEC. The national nature of such protection is likely to 
create an obstacle to the free movement of goods and to the Com-
munity's system of competition. 
60. In its observations submitted to the Court of Justice in a number 
of interlocutory appeals by national courts with regard. to the inter-
pretatidn· of the rules on competition of the EEC Treaty, the Com-
mission has always held the view that the principle of territoriality, 
deriving from the application of national law concerning intellectual, 
industrial and commercial property does not permit the partitioning of 
markets, within the Community. 
The Court of Justice has already given its decision in several 
rulings on questions concerning the compatibility of the exercise of 
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exclusive industrial and commercial property rights with the provisions 
of the EEC Treaty on the free movement of goods and on competition. 
Two of these judgments concern trademark law (Grundig v. Cons ten 
and Sirena v. EDA) and another patent· law (Parke, Davis) .. The 
Court considered that, even if Article 36 allows prohibitions or restric-
tions with regard to the free movement of goods which are justified 
for the protection. of industrial and commercial property, it can only 
accept derogations in this respect insofar as they are justified for the 
purpose of safeguarding rights constituting the specific objective of 
such property. The Court also stated that,. although the existence of 
these rights is not affected by the Treaty, the exercise of these rights may, 
nevertheless, fall under the prohibitions laid down in Articles 85 and 
86. The exercise of an exclusive right with a view to preventing the 
reimportation of the original products was considered contrary to the 
rules of competition when it is the object, the means or the consequence 
of an agreement (Article 85), or when it constitutes an abuse of a domi-
nant position (Article 86), provided that the conditions for the applica-
tion of these rules are fulfilled. The Colirt recognized in its latest 
judgment in this matter (Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro) that, in-
dependently of any agreement restricting competition or of any dominant 
position, the exercise in this way of, an exclusive right akin to copy-
right is contrary to the Treaty rules on the free movement of goods. 
Trade Mark Law 
61. As regards trade mark law, it is clearly recognized that the par-
titioning of the Common Market by means of trade mark rights is fun-
damentally contrary to the Community system of competition and is 
therefore inadmissible. The Commission's prohibition decision and 
the Court of Justice ruling in the Grundlg-Consten easel established 
that recourse to trade mark rights cannot be used to prevent parallel 
imports and to introduce thereby absolute territorial protection. Since 
the prohibition of the exclusive dealing agreement would have been 
ineffectual if the licence holder had been able to continue to use the 
trade mark for the same purpose as that intended by the prohibited 
agreement, the decision deprived the licence holder of the ability to 
enforce the rights deriving from natlonallaws on trade marks in order 
to oppose parallel imports. 
1 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 July 1966 in joint cases 56. and 58/64, 
OJ No. 170 of 29 September 1966, p. 3Q15 Recuei!; 1966 p. 429. 
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62. On the basis of these findings, general limits were fixed by Regu-
lation No. 67/67(EEO on the exercise of industrial property rights 
within the framework of exclusive dealing agreements. Exclusive 
dealing agreements which do not grant absolute territorial protection 
only benefit from the block exemption if the contracting parties do not 
exercise their industrial· property rights with a view. to preventing 
parallel imports of the products covered by the contracts which are 
lawfully marked and put on the market. 
63. When granting an exempti9n in the Transocean case2 in favour of a 
cooperation agreement creating a collective trade mark for the purpose 
of guaranteeing the identical quality of the products as well as their 
interchangeability, the Commission also anticipated the abusive use of 
trade mark rights. It stated that the conditions for the use of a collective 
trade mark registered by several producers in their respective countries 
within the Common Market should not prevent imports from other 
Member States into the country of each producer of the products 
covered by the agreement and manufactured by other producers. 
64. 'In the Remington Rand Italia case,3 the Commission challenged and 
succeeded in ending the use of trade-mark rights based on an assign-
ment agreement with the intention of preventing parallel imports of 
lawfully branded goods from other Common Market countries. This 
use of trade-mark rights was not concerned with the prevention of 
imitations but rather with proving the assignee with absolute territor-
ial protection, an objective that is not part of the true function of a 
trade-mark. 
65. In a ruling handed down recently in the Sirena v. EDA case,' 
the Court of Justice confirmed this view by declaring that Article 85 
. is applicahle where trade-mark law is invoked to prevent the importation 
of products originating in different Member States which bear the same 
trade-mark because their owners have acquired the use or the owner-
ship of the trade-mark by virtue of agreements concluded between them 
or of agreements concluded with third parties. Pointing out that the 
exercise of trade-mark rights was particularly likely to lead to partition-
1 Article 3, (b)(1) of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC. 
2 Commission Decision of 27 June 1967, OJ No. 163 of 20 July 1967, p. 10, 
a Third General Report on the Activities of the Communities in 1969, No 37; 
EC Bulletin No, 8/1969, Chapter V, point 5. 
1 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 February 1971 concerning case 40(70, 
OJ No. C 33 of 7 April 1971, p, 11 Volume XVII, 1, p. 69. 
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ing of the market, and taking into account the relative value of the 
elements protected by the trade-marks, the Court considered that the 
juxtaposition of assignments to different users of national trade-mark 
rights for one and the same product, if it led to the renewal of closed 
frontiers between Member States, could bring about a situation falling 
under the prohibition of Article 85. 
Patent Law 
66. As regards patent law, the Court ruling in the Parke, Davis case,! 
has now ~stablished that a patent holder does not infringe the provisions 
of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty by using his exclusive right to 
prohibit the introduction into the area covered by his patent of a product 
manufactured by a third party in another Member State where there is 
no patent protection. In such a case, if the imported product could 
circulate freely, the specific purpose of the patent would be jeopardized 
since there has been no remuneration for the invention. This ruling, 
however, only concerns a very specific case. 
Exclusive Rights akin to Copyright 
67. In the recent case of Deutsche Grammophon v. METRO SB Gross-
miirkte,2 the Court held that the principle of territoriality invoked by 
the owner of an. exclusive right for sound recordings in order to prohibit 
the marketing in a Member State of prod.ucts originating in another 
Member _ State was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty concerning 
the free rpovement of goods. There was, therefore, a violation of the 
principles laid down in Articles 30 et seq. of the EEC Treaty and, also, 
insofar as the conditions of application provided for were fulfilled, a 
VIolation of the' prohibitions under the terms of Articles 85 and 86 if the 
use of the exclusive right to put the protected products on the market 
has the effect of preventing imports from other Member States in which 
these products have been lawfully sold by the owner of the right himself 
or by a third party with the owner's consent. The decision delivered 
in this case concerns an exclusive right similar to copyright of the 
manufacturer of records. From the arguments in the Court's findings, 
the Commission concluded that the Court's decision also applies to 
other exclusive industrial and commercial property rights, e.g. patents. 
1 Judg'ment of the Court of Justice of 29 February 1968 concerning case 24/67, 
OJ No. C 42 of 6 May 1968, p. 1. Volume XIV, p. 81. 
2 Judginent of the Court of Justice of 8 June 1971 concerning case 78/70 OJ No. 
C 65 of29 June 1971, p, 14, Recuei/XVU, S,p, 487. 
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68. This ruling represents an important development in the Court's 
previous case-law in the field of industrial and commercial property 
rights, the significance of which could very well be a vital factor in 
several fields of Community activ:ity. Apart from Article 36, Articles 
85(1) and 86 are still applicable so that the Commission has a basis 
upon which to act, within the framework of the procedures laid down in 
Regulation No. 17, against enterprises which, by means of agreements 
restricting competition or by means of concerted practices, or as holders 
of dominant positions, use their rights to share or to partition national 
markets and thereby hinder trade between Member States. 
/ 
DETERMINATION OF THE CLAUSES ADMISSIBLE IN PATENT 
AND KNOW·HOW LICENSING 'AGREEMENTS 
Announcement on patent licensing agreements 
69. In 1971, the Commission handed down its first de'cisions on patent 
and technical know-how licensing agreements. In its announcement on 
Patent licensing Agreements,l the Commission had already given a first 
interpretation of Article 85(1) and its application to a number of clauses 
which are frequently met in certain patent licensing agreements. This' 
announcement dealt with the simple form of licensing agreements 
only, since a general appreciation was not possible for agreements on 
patent pools, reciprocal licensing and multiple parallel licensing. This 
announcement listed certain limitations imposed on the licensee which 
are inherent in the exercise of the industrial property right itself and 
which do not, therefore, fall among the prohibited agreements. This 
applies particularly when the exercise of the right is limited to a specified 
territory (within the territory covered by the right), a specified duration 
(within the period covered by the patent), or a specified quantity or 
volume. . 
Communications on Individual Cases 
70. The Commission also set out its views in a number of communica-
tions regarding individual cases, regarding certain restrictive clauses 
to be found in patent licensing agreements notified to it. 
71. Thus the Commission challenged and obtained the removal, 
before any deCision had been taken, of clauses included in patent .sub-
1 Announcement of the Commission of24 December 1962; OJ No. 139 of 24 Decem-
ber 1962, pp. 2922(62. 
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licences granted by two enterprises which had cross-licensed each other, 
resulting in an obligation for the sub-licensees to buy from one of the 
sub-licensors material needed in the patented· processes. The Com-
mission was of the opinion that this was a case of an illicit extension 
of the patent monopoly, since the material involved was not covered by 
the patent, neither was it essential for the technically perfect application 
of the patented processes.· This is the sine qua non condition advanced 
by the Commission in its communication of 1962 for. considering as 
non-restrictive the imposition of quality standards or, where these 
cannot be ascertained according to objective criteria, of obligations to , 
procure supplies with regard to the protected products or semi-finished 
products, raw materials as well as auxiliary materials.} 2 
72. Finally, the Commission' raised objections concerning the pro-
visions of a licensing agreement concluded between a producer from a 
non-member country and a licensee, one part of whose territory covered 
by the licence was situated within the EEC. The provisions of this 
agreement included restrictions on production and sale of patented 
products for a period bryond tbe term of validity of the licensing agreement 
and of the patent itself. 3 The 1962 Communication considered as 
non-restrictive of competition only those limitations on ,the period of 
exploitation by the licensee which were within the period covered by 
the patent. 3 4. 
Decisi()fJs on Palmi and Know-how Licm.ring 
73. For the first time, the Commission has given, by means of formal' 
decisions, its views on the relation between industrial .property rights 
and the laws of competition. In 1971, two decisions were handed 
down under Article 85 concerning patent and know-how licensing 
agreements. The cases concerned were those of Burrougb.r-Delplanque 
and Burrougb.r-Geha. 4. 
74. The CommJssion pointed out that the granting of a patent licence 
for .rpecijied areas and the prohibition against granting sub-licences cannot 
be considered as restrictions on competition. Indeed, a patent gives 
it owner the exclusive right to manufacture the products cover~d by 
1 Ninth General Report (1966) point 53, paragraph g); Bulletin No. 5/1966, Chapter 
III, Sec 10. 
2 See Communication refered to above; Sec IiC and IV; 3rd. paragraph. 
3 EC Bulletin No. 8/1970, Part 2, Chapter I, Sec 8. 
4 Commission Decisions of 22 December 1971, 0] No. L 13 of 17 January 1972, 
pp. 50 and 53. 
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the invention. . The owner can, by granting licences for a specified 
area, transfer the use of the rights arising from these patents. Similarly, 
the owner of a patent is also the only person who' can authorize the 
use of the exclusive rights with regard to the inventfon. In its Notice 
of 1962, the Commission has held that such commitments are not 
restrictive on competition since they only involve partial retention 
of the legal monopoly embodied in the patentee's exclusive rights. 
vis-a-vis the licensee who is authorized to use the invention.1 
75. The same applies with regard to the obligation on the part of. the 
licensee to produce the patented products in sufficient quantity to satisfy 
demand, and to follow the specified quality standards in accordance with 
the technical instructions of the licensor, because they are obligations 
which serve. the sole purpose of permitting sufficient and technically 
adequate exploitation of the rights that the patents confer on their 
owner. 
76. A non-exclusive licence grarited to use the trade-marks of the 
licensor was not considered to be a restriction of competition, parti-
cularly since the licensee may also affix other trade-marks to the products 
manufactured under licence. The same is true when the licensee is 
under an obligation to use a distinctive sign to identify the products. 
In these cases, such an obligation has no other purpose than to facilitate 
the control of the quality and quantity of the products manufactured. 
under licence. In its Communication of 9162, the Commission had 
already laid down that the obligation of the licensee to affix an indication 
of the patent to the products was in the legitimate interests of the 
patentee in that the patented products should bear evidence that they 
are protected by a patent. This cannot restrict competition, if the 
licensee may al,so affix trade-marks of his own choice.2 
77. The obligation on the part of the contracting parties to communicate 
to one another technical imprOl1ements cannot be considered as a'restric-
tion on competition either. The Commission has already made it 
known that undertakings concerning the communication of experience' 
gained in the exploitation of the invention, or concerning the granting of 
licences for improved and applied techniques do not have a restrictive 
effect on competition when they are not exclusive to the licensee and 
provided the licensor has accepted similar undertakings. 3 
1 See Communication 1962, Sec II A and IV, paragraph 1. 
2 Communication 1962, Sec JIB an d IV, paragraph 2. 
3 Communication 1962, Sec IIEl and IV, paragraph 4. 
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78. On the 'other hand, as regards exclusive rights granted to licence 
holders for the manufacture and distribution-of the patented products, 
the Commission held that these could not be' considered as being 
outside the scope of Article 85. The conditions under which this 
Article applied were not considered as being fulfilled in the countrie~ 
in respect of which there had been a decision because in these cases 
market conditions were not appreciably affected (i.e., the exclusivity 
related only to manufacture, while all the licensees and the licens'ors 
were free to sell the easily tf"ansportable patented products in the Com-
mon Market as a whole; and because of the small market share of the' 
licensee in the area assigned to him). It should be noted, however, 
that where the owner of a patent undertakes to 'restrict the exercise of 
his exclusive rights to a single enterprise in the assigned area, thus 
conferring upon that single enterprise the sole right to exploit the 
invention and to prevent other enterprises from exploiting it, he loses 
the freedom to enter into agreements with other applicants for licences. 
The exclusive character of such a licence may amount to a restriction 
of competition and thus fall within the category of prohibited agreements 
in so far that it has an appreciable effect on mark~t conditions. 
79. In order to enable know-how to be marketed, the Commission 
decided that it would not consider a restriction on competition the 
obligation-often included in know-how contracts-not to divulge 
the know-how and not to use the latter after the termination, of the-
agreement., Secrecy is the essence of technical know-how relating to 
industrial processes which are not protected by the laws on industrial 
property. Secrecy is, in fact, a necessary condition for enabling the 
owner to pass such know-how on to other enterprises for the purpose 
of full exploitation prior to it becoming public property. 
80. These first decisions on patent and know-how licensing agreements 
are the most recent steps of a long-term development since the Com-
mission first laid down its views on the implications of the ptohibition 
of Article 85 (para. 1) with regard to clauses included in such agreements. 
These decisions are the result of the analysis of the contents of some 
500. notified licensing agreements. The analysis was carried out in 
order to determine the clauses which most often occur in these contracts; 
and the restrictions imposed in connection with the e}(ercise ofindustrial 
property rights' and the transfer of know-how, which are covered either 
by the protection inherent in the patent rights or are necessary to 
maintain the secrecy of know-how, or do not restrict competi~ion 
even though they do not arise essentially ftom the rights given by the 
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patent or know-how. Other decisions will·soon follow, some of which 
will make it possible to define the conditions under which the granting 
of an exemption under paragraph 3 can be considered to be fulfilled 
despite the presence of a restriction on competition within the meaning 
of Article 85 (para. 1). These decisions will be used to examine the 
possibility of block exemption by the Commission, under Council· 
Regulation No. 19/65, for bilateral agreements concerning the acquisi-
tion or exploitation of industrial property rights and know-how. l 
§ 4 - Application of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty and Article 66 
of the ECSC Treaty to the abu* of dominant positions and mergers 
81. In 1971 the Community'S competition policy which, during the 
first decade had concentrated on the application of rules concerning 
agreements, entered the phase of application of Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty. As a result of the considerable efforts made to define the 
interpretation and application of this important provision, and following 
a constant supervision of the market with a view to finding out whether 
there were threats of abuse of dominant positions, the Commission 
took its first two decisions in the Gema and Continental Can Cy cases; 
These decisions demonstrate the Commission's desire to deal simul-
taneously with two aspects of the applicability of Article 86, namely, 
the control of abuse on the market and the restriction of the free choice 
. of consumers by means of mergers by which an enterprise in a dominant 
position practically eliminates competition by taking over a competing 
enterprise. In accordance with the general objectives of the EEC 
Treaty, the Commission's intervention aims at preventing enterprises 
in a dominant position from putting difficulties in the way of the 
establishment of a system which ensures that competition is not distorted 
within the Common Market or from threatening its very existence. 
The Commission' is following closely developments in several 
sectors with oligopolistic structures and in other sectors where con-
centration is increasing. This systematic supervision enables the 
Commission to intervene, where necessary, in cases of mergers which 
lead to restrictions on the consumer's freedom of choice incompatible 
with the Treaty's rules on competition.2 
1 Council Regulation No. 19/65/EEC of 2 March 1965 on the application of Article 
85, paragraph 3 of the Treaty concerning classes of agreements and concerted 
practices; OJ No. 36 of 6 March 1965, p. 533/63. 
2 See the Commission's reply to written question No. 373/71 of: 26. October 1971, 
OJ No. C 16 of 19 February 1972, p. 3. . 
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The GEMA case 
. . 
82. Article 86 regarding abuse of a dominant position was first applied 
in 1971. The Gesellschaft fur musikalische Auffuhrungs und mechanische 
Vervielfaltigungsrechts (GEMA),l a society dealing with author's rights 
with regard to musical works, which has a virtual monopoly on the 
German market, was obliged to put an end to its abusive practices 
vis-it-vis suppliers and users of music and to remove aU' obstacles to 
the establishment of a single market for authors, composers, and music 
publishers, as well as for music users and performing rights societies. 
The Commission insisted that these breaches of Article 86 should cease 
in accordance with the objectives of its competition policy. 
83. GEMA was prohibited from restricting the economic liberty of 
authors, composers and music publishers. This freedom was being 
curtailed by GEMA's rules and regulations and indeed by its operations, 
to such an extent that its members were to all intent and purposes tied 
for life to the society and were being prevented from granting the 
use of their rights to any other society. With a view to restoring 
economic freedom to authors, composers and music publishers estab-
lished in Germany, the Commission's decision provided each member 
.of GEMA with the right to: 
(a) resign at the end of each year and recover his full rights; 
(b) split the rights enjoyed according to country and the different 
forms of exploitation (e.g., general performing rights, broad-
casting rights, mechanical reproduction rights etc.), so that each 
member could choose freely the society to which he would concede 
his rights, in relation to the royalties which the societies fix for 
. the administration of the various classes of rights. 2 
84. The abolition of the exclusive concession of copyright by a member 
to his society would have contributed to the freedom of choise sought. 
by authors and composers. But it would also have had an unfortunate 
consequence in that it would place individuals in an unfavourable 
position for .negotiating on the market with powerful music users 
~such as broadcasting, television and recording companies). Since 
1 Commission Decision of 2 June 1971, OJ No. L 134 of 20 June 1971, p. 15. 
2 .At the request of GEMA, the Commission is at present examining the question 
of the extent to which the freedom to split rights should be increased in the event 
of the minimum time limit for affiliation being increased to a period in excess of one 
year, as their exists on interdependence between the period and the scope of affilia-
tion. . 
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this could have brought about a reduction in the income of composers, 
the Commission preferred not to insist upon abolition, but instead to 
improve the rights of members vis-a-vis their society on the lin~s laid 
down in the ·d\!cision. This decision in any case does not affect the 
cultural and social activities of GEMA. 
85. The primary aim is to promote the freedom of supply of individual 
musical works in Germany by providing authors, composers and music 
publishers with the right to call upon the services of different authors' 
rights societies. The development of a free m:l:rket as in the supply 
of musical works should in itsel( contribute to the establishment of a 
certain measure of competition: between the various societies by 
opening national markets to societies established elsewhere within the 
Community.! . 
1 These conditions are at present either fulfilled or about to be fulfilled. See Com-
mission's reply to written question No. 349{71 of 12 October 1971, OJ No. C 125 
of 18 December 1971, p. 8. 
The market in the Community for the services consisting of the financial manage-
ment of copyright with regard to musical works showed, characteristics which 
justified the Commission in undertaking the examination of the conditions under 
which it operated with view to an assessment in the light of the Community's rules 
of competition. The existence of de facto monopoly (in the case of GEMA and 
. comparable companies in France, Belgium and the Netherlands), of a de jure mono-
poly (as in the case of a company operating in Italy) exercised by performing 
rights societies within the various Member States, the agreed limitation of the 
direct activities of all the societes to their own defined areas; and the existence 
between them ·of reciprocal exclusive dealing agreements for the use of their 
material resulted in composers, authors or music publishers established in a Mem-
ber State being obliged to make use of the services of the societes in that State -
the management by an individual author of his rights being in practice impossible 
in most cases. . 
The similarity in the situations prevailing in other Member States had led the Com-
mission to proceed, at the same time as the action taken in the GEMA ~ase, against 
the "Societe des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique" (SACBM) and the 
"Societe Beige des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurf de Musique" (SABAM). These 
two societies have already amended some of their rules and regulations which had 
been questioned, and other amendments are to be introduced in the near future. 
The "Bureau voor Musikauteursreeht" (BUMA) fell into line without the Commis-
sion having to commence official proceedings in the matter. GEMA, for its part, 
withdrew its appeal to the Court of Justice against the Commission's decision. 
With regard to the "Soeieta Italiana degli Auton' Editori" (SlAB), the Commission 
by i' decision in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 5 of Regulation No. 17 
(Commission Decision of 9 November 1971, OJ No, L 254 of 17 November 1971, 
page 15), requested the society to supply the necessary information so that the nor-
mal procedure could be followed. 
At the same time, the Commission instituted proceedings under Article 8 on reci-
procal exclusive dealing agreements concluded between the performing rights 
societies. Those clauses in the contracts which involved a restriction on competi-
tion and which did not meet the condition for exemption, have either been removed' 
as a result of the Commission's intervention, or are due to be removed shortly. 
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86. Furthermore, by virtue of the Commission's decision, GEMA can 
no longer discriminate against nationals- of other Member States, grant 
special terms to some of its members, or artifically maintain national 
groupings of enterprises. 
The freedom of composers, authors and music publishers to 
circulate within the Community, which was the object of the decision 
adopted by the Commission, was also jeopardized by discrimination 
between nationals of a country and nationals of other Member States 
who are unable to become full members of GEMA with all the financial 
consequences which this implied. Moreover, the payment of fidelity 
bonuses out of funds subscribed to by all the members of the GEMA 
and other performing rights societies, was made to certain members 
only to the detriment of others, particularly those who were nationals of 
other Member States. It was al~o found that GEMA, by its policy 
prevented the establishment of a single market for the services of 
music publishers. Its Articles were such that the activities of the 
German music publishers in the other Member _ States were rendered 
more difficult, and the same applied to the activities of music publishers 
of other Member States who wished to carry out their activities in 
Germany. As a result, GEMA artifical}y maintained groups of national 
publishers thus preventing composers and authors from ma~ng a free 
choice with regard to publishers within the Community. 
87. The Commission also prohibited certain abusive practices of 
GEMA vis-a-vis the use made of musical works which was likely to 
restrict trade recordings both in' Germany and other Member States, 
(a) by causing an unjustifable increase in the cost of the manufacture 
of records in Germany through the contractual extension of 
. copyright so as to include unprotected works; 
(b) requiring, in the case of the import or re-import of records into 
Germany by independent dealers, an additional royalty, whereas 
records sold in Germany by the manufacturers are subjected 
only once to payments in respect of copyright; 
(c) demanding from importers a higher royalty on the sale of tape 
recorders than that paid by national producers. 
From now on, GEMA cannot claim royalties for musical works 
which have fallen into the public domain, and imported recordings 
will in future be subject to the same royalties as those due on those 
manufactured in' Germany. These discriminatory practices, which 
constituted an abuse of a domi~antposition~ were diametrically opposed 
REP. COMPo 1971 77 
to the objectives of the Commission's competition policy since they 
made parallel imports more difficult, when these should in fact provide 
a corrective to an unjustified disparity between prices in the different 
Member States of the Community. 
88. The significance of the G EMA case goes well beyond the case 
itself, since it defines the implementation of Article 86 in cases where an 
enterprise in a dominant position such as GEMA must not carryon 
practices when they result in an abuse of the position which the company 
holds in its markets. GEMA had an absolute monopoly in Germany 
since there were ~o competitors,', 
It is precisely this situation which makes abuse possible. Accord-
ing to a previous opinion,l there is abuse of a dominant position when 
the holder of the position exploits it in order to obtain advantages which 
would not have been possible had there been effective competition. 
The decision notes that the practices in question would not have 
been accepted by the parnters in the market if GEMA had not held a 
dominant position, and that the practices could have been imposed on 
the partners had there been effective competition. The question as to 
whether or not a practice, constitutes an abuse within the meaning of 
Article 86 when it is carried out by an enterprise in a dominant position 
cannot be settled by specific sets of rules. The problem must be solved 
on the basis of the objectives of the EEC Treaty.2 The decision in 
the GEMA case underlines the fact that Article 86 aims at preventing 
enterprises in dominant positions from putting difficulties in the way of 
setting-up a system intended to ensure that competition is not distorted 
in the Common Market. 
The C~ntinental Can Company case 
89. It has been commo~ knowledge since 1966 that the Commission 
understands Article 86 to apply to those cases of mergers and take-
overs. which constitute an abuse within the meaning of this provision. 
In its Memorandum on "the Problem of Concentration in the Common 
MaJ;ket", 3 the Commission stated that the merger of an enterprise holding 
a dominant position with another enterprise so that a monopoly situation 
1 A problem of concentration in the Common Market, Surveys, Competition series, 
No.3, 1966, Part III, paragraph 4, 22 and 24. 
2 The problem of concentration in the Common Market, Surveys, Competition series, 
No.3, 1966, Part III, paragraph 4, 22 and 24. 
3 Survey, Competition series, No.3, Brussels 1966, p. 26. 
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is brought about by the:: removal of any remaining competition on the 
market in question, may in itself constitute an abuse within the m~aning 
of Article 86. . 
90. Since the rules of competition in the ECC Treaty aim at ensuring a 
system of undistorted competition to be set up under the terms of 
the Treaty (Article 3, para. f), the exploitation of a dominant positiqn 
can, therefore, be considered as abusive if it prevents competition. 
91. During 1971 the Commission, for the first time, put into practice 
this interpretation by giving a decision under Article 86 in the Continen-
tal Can Company case.1 This decision lays down that the merger of an 
enterprise in· a dominant position with a competing enterprise is an 
abuse within the meaning of Article 86 if it restricts the freedom of 
choice of consumers in such a manner as to be incompatible with the 
competition system laid down in the Treaty. . 
The Continental Can Company, an American packaging Company, 
through its Belgian subsidiary, the Europemballage Corporation SA, 
acquired control of the largest German producer of packaging and metal 
closures, Schma7bach-Lubeca-Werke AG, and later acquired a majority 
holding in the Dutch Company, Thomassen & Drijver- Verblija NV, 
the leading manufacturer of packaging material in Benelux. In the 
opinion of the Commission, the situation arising from these mergers in 
the market for light metal containers in the north-west region of the 
Common Market, constituted an abuse of a dominant position within 
the meaning of Article 86. 
92. With regard to the existence of a dominant position held by an 
enterprise, the decision, confirming the terms of the memorandum, 
considers that a dominant position is characterized by the fact that 
those in such a .position are able to take decision without taking their 
competitors, buyers or suppliers into account. The domination of a 
market is not solely defined by the share of the market held by enter-
pr,ises, but by their share of the market combined with the availability 
of technical knowledge, raw material or capital. 
In the Continental Can Company case, the Commission took into 
account not only the share of the market held by the group, but also 
1 Commission Decision of 9 December 1971, OJ No. L 7 of 8 January 1972, p. 25. 
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the group's advantages over most of its competitors resulting from its 
size and economic, financial and technological importance particularly: 
(a) its technological predominance, particularly through patents and 
technical know-how; 
(b) the wide range of its output and the geographical spread of its 
factory, and warehouses; 
(c) the availability of the required machinery for production and 
application of metal containers; 
(d) the possibility of obtaining qpital from the ,international markets. 
Added to the large share of the market, these factors gave the 
Continental Can Company room fo-r independent action which conferred 
on the company a dominant position on the German market for light-
weight containers for preserved meats, fish and shell-fish, as well as on 
the market for metal closures. It should be noted that, as regards 
competition by substitution, the factors restricting the interchangeability 
of the products concerned with other comparable products--especially 
in the case of light-weight metal containers as compared with other 
packaging material, for certain uses, as well as the different machinery 
for each type of packaging-restricted the possibility of changing over 
to another type of packaging. 
At the same time, the Court of Justice, in several rulings,l gave 
its opinion on the concept of a dominant position within the meaning 
of Article 86. The Court considered that the existence of a dominant 
position within- the Common Market, or within a substantial part of 
the Common Market, was clearly established when the enterprise 
concerned, either on its own or jointly with other enterprises of the 
same group, could hinder effective competition in large part of the 
market, taking into account the possible existence of producers marketing 
similar types of goods and their position on the market. 
93. With regard to abuse of a dominant position, the principle has 
been established that a situation which is incompatible with the terms 
of Article 86 of the Treaty arises if an enterprise, which holds a dominant 
position on the market, attempts to strengthen that position l!J means 
of merger with another enterprise, so that any competition which might 
have remained on the market, whether effective or potential, despite the 
1 Judgments 24-67 (Parke-Davis), 40-70 (Sirena against Eda) and 78-70 (DGG 
against Metro), No_ C 42 of 6 May 1968, p_ 1 Recueil 1968, p. 81, OJ No. C 33 of 
7 April 1971, p. 11, Recueil 1971, 1, p. 69 and OJ No. C 65 of 29 June 1971, p. 14, 
Recueil1971, 5, p. 487. 
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initial dominant posltlon is practicallY' eliminated in a substantial part· 
of the Common Market" for the products concerned. The acquisition 
by an enterprise in a dominant position of a large competing enterprise 
constitutes an industrial operation which results in an irreversible change' 
in the suppiy structure, since a return to a competitive situation between 
them in their joint field of action becomes impossible. In its decision,' 
the Commission noted that the Continental Can Company had abused 
the dominant position which it held in a substantial part of the Common 
Market by' taking over one of its main potential competitors, th:us 
strengthening its own dominant position in such a manner as practically 
to eliminate any existing competition for the packaging products 
concerned. 
94. As for the consequences of a breach of Article 86; Article 3 of 
Regulation No. 17 empowers the Commission to issue a decision binding 
on the parties concerned to end such a breach. In this case, the merger 
had an unfavourable influence on competition in that it restricted 
excessively the possibility for the users to choose certain packaging 
materials on the main markets of north-west Europe. This fr<;!edom 
of choice had been limited by the merger which constituted abuse, 
and was to be restored by action to dissolve the merger. In view 
of the natun~ of the measures to be taken and their incidence, an 
appropriate' time limit was set to' enable the enterprise concerned to 
submit proposals to the Commission on the matter. 
Prior authorization of mergers under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty 
95. The Commission is unable to give pdor authorization for a merger 
unless it is satisfied that the ,proposals by the enterprises concerned 
will not result in the prevention of effective competition or the avoidance, 
of the rules on competition laid down ~n the Treaty. 
It is therefore up to the Commission to assess each request for 
authorization and to decide whether the conditions for authorization 
are met, taking into account the size of similar enterprises established 
within the Community and the conditions created by world competition. 
96. In recent years, the coal market has witnessed changes which 
have had a definite influence on the c01'lditions under which mergers 
of coal mining enterprises should be assessed. Thus, for example, the 
Commission authorized the transfer of mining capital to the Ruhr 
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kohle AG, l which now controls approximately 90% of the coal output in 
the Ruhr basin. Such a large concentration could not have been author-
ized but for the fact that coal has lost its long-standing dominant 
position in th(: energy supply market and has become only one of many 
sources of energy in competition with oil and, to an increasing degree, 
natural gas. On the energy supply market, a coal mining enterprise, 
whatever its size, is no longer able to avoid effective competition .. 
·This' does not necessa~ily apply to the market for coking-coal 
and coke for the steel industry since these produ~ts are considered' as' 
essential raw materials. 
Here too, the Commission considered that the pressure applied 
on the market by prices and quantities of the output of non-member 
countries as well as the powerful position of iron and steel manufacturers 
as customers were likely to prevent producers of coking-coal in the 
Community, regardless of the ·size of the enterprises, from deviating 
appreciably from the price levels in international trade .. Nevertheless, 
the Commission in order to provide everyone with equal opportunities 
for obtaining supplies of coking-coal from' the Ruhi:, ensures that all 
consumers of coking-coal in the Common Market have equal access to 
sources of production. 
97. In its "General outlines of a competition poliry relating to the structures 
of the iron and steel industry", 2 issued in 1970 the Commission considered 
that, bearing in mind previously existing structures, the need for 
rationalization, technological developments and international compe-
tition, the development, by means of the re-grouping of enterprises 
towards an oligopoly of about a dozen large groups or independant 
enterprises, the largest of which would be allowed up to 13% of the 
Community'S output of crude steel; fitted in with the maintenance of 
effective competition within the Common Market and with an improve-
ment in the competitivity of the-en.terprises. . 
At the time, the Commission believed .that this threshold of 13%, 
which was naturally subject to review but corresponded at that time to 
13 or 14 million tons per enterprise or group, would not' be likely to 
stop ,the necessary restructuring process and could even lead to new 
re-groupings. 
1 Commission Decision of 27 November 1969, Third General Report, p. 38, 
2 OJ No. C 12 of 30 January 1970, p. 5. 
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The Commission therefore decided tQ authorize the merger 0f 
two Belgian entet;prises, Cockerill-Olfgree-Providence and Esperance-
Longdoz,l two German enterprises, Salzgitter and Peine,2 joint corttrol 
'of Acieries de Pompry by a group of French and German iron arid steel 
enterprises,3 the merger of the two French enterprises Creusot and Loire,4 
the merger of the two Luxembourg and German enterprises Arbed and 
Roehling,5 merger of the two Italian enterprises Fiat and Piombino,6 
and numerous mergers of lesser importance for the improvement 
of the industrial and commercial structure of the enterprises concerned. 
Requests for authorization under Article 66 have often presented 
the Commission with the problem of mergers between- enterprises 
of which one at least fell under the terms of the ECSC Treaty, but 'where 
the real effects of the merger were felt not in the steel sector but in 
sectors outside the scope of the ECSC Treaty. This was the case with 
regard to the setting-up of the Mannesmannriihrenwerke (steel, tubes)? 
by T0'sscn and Mannesmann and of the joint control of Citroen by Fiat 
and Michelin (motorcars).8 
The Commission's practice has been direct its analysis to the 
market for the products concerned and to authorise a merger under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty only if the operation could be considered 
as compatible with the EEC competition rules. In the case of enter-
prises being jointly set up or controlled, an assessment would naturally 
have to be made from the point of view of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
and Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty respectively as to the nature of the 
restrictions on competition which go beyond those, inherent in the 
operation itself. 
1 Commission Decision of31 July 1969, EC Bulletin No. 9-10/1969, Ch. V, point 1,4. 
2 Commission Decision of 5 July 1970, EC Bulletin No. 8/1970, 2nd. part, Ch. I, 
Sec 16. 
3 Commission Decision of 30 September 1970, EC Bulletin No. 12/1970, 8th part 
CH. 1, Sec 5. 
4 Commission Decision of 27 October 1970, EC Bulletin No. 12/1970, 2nd part, 
Ch. 1 Sec 5. I -
5 Commission Decision of 11 June 1971, EC Bulletin No. 8/1971, 2nd part, Ch. 
1, Sec 18. ' :" ": . 
6 Commission Decision' of 7 July 1971, EC Bulletin No. 9-10/1971, 2nd. part, 
Ch. 1, Sec 17. " , 
7 Commission Decision' of 21 January 1970, EC Bulletin No. 3/1970, part 2" 
Ch. 1, point 5. 
8 Commission Decision of 6 February.1970, EC Bulletin No. 4/1970, part 2. Ch. 1, 
point 6. 
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§ 5 - Measures to en£o~e the rules on competition 
98. In 1969 the Commission impos!,!d for the first time fines for breaches 
of Article 8' of the EEC Treaty .. In its decision concerning the Entente 
internationale de la quinine, 1 the Commission had to assess the gravity 
of the breach committed and noted that the enterprises had deliberately 
violated the terms. of the Treaty, and this had been proved by the 
fact that the parties concerned had endeavoured to keep the agreements 
secret. The seriousness of the breach was increased by the harmful 
economic effects resulting from the accumulation of restrictions to 
competition by means of a limitation of output, prire fixing, limitation 
of .outlets and market sharing. Finally, the Commission took into 
account the large part of the market held by the enterprises concerned. 
The amount of the fines imposed on the six enterprises concerned 
varied according to each enterprise's position on the mll-rket and the 
degree of its responsibility. The finesJanged from 10000 to 210000 
units of account. 
In its ruling of 15 July 1970,2 the Court of Justice confirmed the 
Commission's application of the criteria used for the assessment of the 
seriousnes~ of the breach and for fixing the amount of the fine ,and un-
derlined the fact that fines were imposed "in order to stop illicit action 
and ·prevent its repetition". 
, In its decision relating to "Dyestuffs"3 the Commission, in assessing 
the gravity of the· offence; took into account the fact that the enterprises 
concerned had severely· restricted competition and that this was par-
ticularly serious in view of the fact that they were all very large firms 
supplying more than 80% of the dye stuffs within the Common Market. 
The fines imposed by the Commission range from 40 000 to 50 000 units 
of account. The appeals lodged by the enterprises in this case have not 
yet resulted in a ruling by the Court of Justice. . 
. In its decision, handed down in 1970, based on Article 65 of the 
ECSC Treaty concerning agreements and concerted practices on the 
German Market for scrap iron,4 the Commission imposed fines based on 
1 Commission Decision of 16 July 1969, OJ No. L 192 of 5 Augu"st 1969, p. 5. 
2 Ruling of the Court of Justice of 15 July 1970 in the cases No. 41-69 (ACF Chemie-
forma versus the Commission), No. 44-69 (Buchler versus the Commission) and 45-69 
(Boehringer versus the Commission); OJ No. C 130,27 October 1970, p. 3, Recueii 
1970, 6, p. 661, 733 and 769. 
3 Commission Decision of 24 July 1969, OJ No. L 195, 7 August 1969, p. 11.· 
4 Commission Decision of 21 January 1970, OJ No. L 29, 6 February 1970, p. 30. 
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the above considerations. The fines imposed ranged from 1 000 to . 
29 000 units of account. 
99. In 1971 the Commission imposed for the first time a fine for con-
travention of the Commission's right ofinvestigation. The fine amount-
ed to 4 000 units of account (the maximum 'for this type of breach being 
5 000 units of account),. as a penalty for the incomplete presentation of 
books and other documents request~d by the Commission. 
Although the competition rules in the EEC and ECSC; Treaties do 
not expressly provide for the publication of such decisions, the Com-
mission nevertheless published its decisions concerning the imposition 
of.the fines, with the exception of the last 'case (fine for contravention of 
the Commission's right of investigation). In its ruling of 15 July 1970 
relating to the case No. 41-69 (ACF Chemiefarma versus the Commission), 
the Court confirmed the Commission's action and noted that "the pu~ 
blicity thus given to the decision may contribute to an increasing respect 
for the Treaty's competition rules". 
100. In the following decisions to allow agreements, the Commission 
imposed certain obligations on the enterprises concerned which enable 
the Commission to check whether the exemption conditions are being 
properly fulfilled: ' 
(a) the "Transocean"l decision ~bliged the parties concerned to com-
municate details of all supplementary agreements made under the 
terms of the general agreement which had already been authorized; 
(b) The "Transocean" and "Fabrique Nationale-Cartoucherie Franfaise'.'2 
decisions, provide for reports to the Commission at regular inter-
vals on' the activities covered by the agreement, including the 
development of production, sales, prices and market shares. 
(c) The Omega,3 Eemo,4 Cematex5 decisions bound the parties to re-
port any case of expulsion or refusal to grant membership for, 
the purpose of avoiding discrimination against either members of 
the agreement or third parties; 
1 Commission Decision of 27 June 1967, OJNo'. L 163,20 July 1967, p. 10. 
, 2 Commission Decision of 28 I\fay 1971, OJ No. L 134, 20 June 1971, p. 6. 
3 Commission Decision of 28 October 1970, OJ No. L 242', 5 November 1970, p. 22. 
• Commission Decision of 13 March 1969, OJ No. L 69, 20 March 1969, p. 13. 
6 Commission Decision of 24 September 1971, OJ No. L 227,8 October 1971, p. 26. 
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Cd) The Henkel-Colgatel decision obliged the enterprises to keep the 
Commission informed of their policy relating to patent licensing 
and know-how, and to notify the Commission without delay of any 
links or participation established between the enterprises of both 
groups, and of all interests acquired by the enterprises of both 
groups in non-member enterprises. 
With regard to the application of the ECSC Treaty, the Commis-
sion makes use of its powers to impose obligations and conditions by 
its decisions allowing agreements. This practice is also _followed as 
regards authorization of mergers under Article 66 for the purpose of 
clearly establishing the permissible limits of concentration and of ensur-
ing that they are not exceeded by means of financial, private and con-
tractuallinks with enterprises outside the merged undertakings. 
§ 6 - Definition of the prohibition of discrimination 
(application of Article, 60 of the ECSC Treaty) 
101. The application of Article 60 in accordance with the decisions 
taken by the High Authority in 1953 has raised many problems, both in 
the past and in the present. The conditions obtaining in the energy 
supply and steel markets require that enterprises in the coal and steel 
industries should be able to adapt themselves more smoothly to these 
conditions than is permitted by the present rules. 
While remaining true to the general principle of the ECSC Treaty 
and Article 60 thereof the Commission is at present attempting to define 
new implementing rules which would enable enterprises to make some 
of the necessary changes. The Commission will have to take the appro-
priate measures after referring the matter to the Consultative Committee 
and the Council of Ministers. 
The method chosen is to use the power granted to the Commission 
under Article 60 to make decisions, after consultation with the Consul-
tative Committee and the Council, to define discriminations practices 
without reference to the obligation to publish prices. 
Such a definition would also permit, where necessary, to modify the 
extent and from of the obligation imposed on enterprises to publish 
1 Commission Decision of 23 December 1971, OJ No L 14, 18 January 1972, p 14 
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their prices and conditions of sale (Article 60(2a)), and to adapt the pro-
visions on alignment of prices (Article 60 (2b)) to the proposed changes 
concerning the obligation to publish prices. 
102. According to present rules,1 the "application of unequal conditions 
to comparable transactions" (Article 60 (1)) is defined in 1!"e1ation to the 
obligation to publish price lists and selling conditions (Article 60 (2a)). 
Any departure from the published prices constitutes discrimination when 
it cannot be justified by the seller either because the transaction concerned 
does not fall within the category of transactions shown in the 'price list, 
or that all comparable transactions have been treated similarly. 
The definition which the Commission intends to give of "compara-
ble transactions" would sever the link which exists at present between, 
the ban on discrimination and the obligation to publish prices. Anyl 
deviation from the published price lists would then no longer be a breach 
to the ban on discrimination. In this way, it would be easier for enter-
prises to adapt market conditions. 
The proposals which the Commission has submitted to the Con-
sultative Committee and to the Council of Ministers, provide for an 
autonomous definition of comparable transactions. 'The proposals 
must therefore define the exact criteria of comparability as regards buyers, 
products sold and other essential characteristics of the transactions. 
Buyers 
103. On the basis of various provisions of the ECSC Treaty (the pro~ 
gressive establishment of conditions which in themselves will ensure 
the most rational distribution of production, the task of the institutions 
to ensure that all comparably plared consumers in the Common Market 
have equal access to the sources of production, and the general ban on 
discrimination) and especially Article 60 itself, the Commission considers 
that transactions must be considered comparable when the buyers are 
in a comparable position, which is the case wheri buyers are competing 
among themselves. Any application of unequal conditions would mean 
that some buyers are favoured and, others are placed at a disadvantage 
with regard to competition.' It is ,.generally agreed that buyers are in 
competition with each other to the extent to which they come up against 
each other on their sales markets. 
1 Decision of the High Authority No. 30-53 concerning practices,prohibited by , . 
,Article 60(1) of the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Com!l:'\unity, in the form 
of a Communication publisped by the High Authority in OJ of 24 December 1963, 
. No. 2980(63 to 2982(63 (Annex 1).' ", 
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Situations can arise, however, where, for technical reasons ·or 
because of the distances involved, competitive relations exist to a limited 
extent only, or indeed do not exi~t at all, so that for legal reasons and in 
. the interest of ;10 efficient implementation of the ban on discrimination, 
the matter cannot be left to the judgment of the sellers. That is why the 
Commission proposal extends the concept of comparability of transac-
tions to those buyers who produce similar or identical goods or exercise 
the same commercial functions. . 
The proposed rules would enable enterprises to differentiate in 
their prices and conditions of sale between determined categories of 
buyers. Their adaptation to market conditions would thus be facilated. 
Products 
104. For transactions to be considered comparable, they must concern 
identical or similar products. 
Essential characteristics of transactions 
105. Comparability' of transactions also depends on other factors. 
Since transactions may be considered as non-comparable only when they 
show an appreciable difference, the proposals provide for the definition 
of the essential characteristics and important differences. 
It should be noted that these essential characteristics include the 
quantities sold and the period of delivery and supply. These are essen-
tial elements of the definition of "comparable transactions" as attempted 
by the Commission. 
The other new provisions envisaged by the Commission relate to 
the obligation to publish prices and follow from the proposal for an 
autonomous definition of "comparable transactions". 
The Consultative Committee has alre!ldy been consulted and the 
Councll of Ministers is in the process of being consulted. 
§ 7 - The Commission's policy on dumping 
(application of Article 91 of the EEe Treaty) 
Introduction 
106. In order to establish "a system which insures that competition is 
not distorted within the Common Market'" (Article 3(£)), it is not 
sufficient to counter restrictions on competition; it is also necessary to 
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prevent excessive competition between enterprises. Genuine dumping 
, constitutes such an excess. ,It occurs when an enterprise, exports a 
product at lower prices than the normal ,price of the product in the 
exporting country, thus causing serious damage to the corresponding 
national industry in .the importing country. 
That is why the chapter in the EEC Treaty on competition also 
includes provisions' regulating intra-Community dumping. These 
provisions fall into two categories: repressive action in the form, of 
proceedings following a complaint (Article 91(1»: and preventive 
action in the form of the "boomerang" system introduced,by Article 
91-(2). 
In relations betWeeri the present six Member States bf the EEC the 
application of the provisions of Article 91 carrie to an end at the expiry 
of the transitional period of the Treaty, i.e. since January 1970. On the 
other hand, since similar provisions with appropriate implementing 
regulations are likely to come into force, within the framework of an 
enlarged Community, it would seem advisable to give some details of 
Commission practice in this matter. 
107. Article 91 reads as follows: 
~, 1. If, during the transitional period, the Commission, on applica-
, tion by a Member State or 'by any other interested p~rty, 
firids that dumping is 'be'ing practised within the, Common 
Mark!,,!!, it shall address recommendations to the' person or 
persons with whom such practices originate for the purpose, 
of putting an end to them. , 
Should the practices continue, the Commission shall authorise 
the injUred Member State t? take protective measures, the 
conditions and details of which the Commission shall deter~ 
, mine. 
, ," . 
, 2. As soon as this Treaty enters into force, products whi~h 
originate in or are in free circulation in one Member State and 
which have been exported to another Member' State shall, 
on reimportation, be admitted into the territory of the first-' 
mentioned State free of all customs duties, quantitative restric-
tions ot measures having equivalent effeCt. The Commission 
shaillay down appropriate rules for the application of this para-
graph." ' ' 
It should be noted that paragraph I, which sets out the,procedure 
for lodging complaints and the action to be taken by the Commission 
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is applicable only during the transitional period. Paragraph 2, which 
lays down that, as from the entry into force of the Treaty,re-imports 
from one Member State to another can be admitted free of duty has lost 
all practical significance since customs duties and quotas were complete-
ly abolished between the Member States on 1 January 1970. 
The reason why the authors of the Treaty of Rome considered that 
dumping practices between the Member States presented a temporary 
problem, which would solve itself during the transitional period, was 
set out as follows in the Report on the Messina Conference of 1956 : 
"An enterprise can only practice dumping on other markets to the 
extent to which its own national market is protected. The simul-
taneous and reciprocal removal of obstacles to trade within the Common 
Market will tend to eliminate the problem automatically. These effects 
wjll not, however, be felt fully during the transitional period."! 
The application of Article 91(1) 
Principles 
108. Article 91(1) entrusts the Commission with the power to intervene 
at the request of a Member State or of any other interested party when 
dumping is practiced within the Common Market. This is, in fact, 
a "repressive" procedure in two stages. In the first stage, when the 
Commission notes that dumping practices exist, it issues at first a recom-
mendation to those responsible for the dumping with a request that the 
latter should be brought to an end. In the second stage, where dumping 
nevertheless continues, the Commission authorises the Member State 
whichis prejudiced to take the necessary protective measures. 
This procedure, which can only be set in motion following a 
specific request, always requires'the intervention of the Commission and 
excludes, therefore, any possibility for the Member States to take .unilat-
eral anti-dumping measures against their partners. . 
Since the Treaty gave no precise definition of "dumping practices" 
and envisaged no regulation for defining this concept, the Commission, 
after having consulted the competent authorities of the Member State, 
laid dow!,l in a directive to its staff in 1961 setting out the principles of 
the policy to be followed on this subject. 2 
1 Report of the Heads of Delegations to the l\Hnisters for Foreign Affairs-Inter-
governmental Committee set up by the Messina Conference-Brussels-21 April 
1956, p. 54. 
2 Thes'e internal directives were summarized in the Fifth General Report on the 
Activities of the Community, No. 49. 
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· It is of particular importance that the Commission, using Article VI 
of GATT as a basis, decided to put into operation the procedures laid 
down in Article 91 (1) of the Treaty in cases where the Commission estab-
lished that exports of a specific product to the market of a Member 
State were carried out at prices that were lower than the normal value 
of the product concerned in the exporting Member State, thus causing, 
or being very likely to cause, serious damage to the corresponding 
national.industry of the Member State directly concerned. 
Cases where the' procedure has been applied 
109. During the twelve years that Article 91 has been applied, the Com-
mission examined 40 cases of presumed dumping practices between 
Member States. Official action according to the Treaty was, however, 
justifiable in only 26 cases. 
Of these 26 formal complaints 10 were submitted to the Commission 
through the permanent representatives of the Member States, while the 
other 16 were submitted by the enterprise$ themselves (6 cases) or 
through their professional groups (10 cases). 
The complaints originated in the following countries : 
Germany 3 
France 
Italy 
Benelux 
6 
3 
14 (6 onglnating in Belgium, :2 in the Netherlands, 
1 in Luxembourg and 5 jointly submitted by the three 
countries within the framework of their economic 
union). 
The investigation bf these 26 cases had the following results : 
In 11 cases the existence of wrongful dumping practices could not 
be proved and the complaints were rej ected as unfounded. 
In the remaining 15 cases where the Commissio~'s intervention 
was justified, 3 necessitated that a recommendation be forwarded to the 
originators of the dumping,t while the procedure laid down in Article 
91(1) did not have to be applied in the other 12 cases, as the parties 
concerned had voluntarily put an end to the wrongful practices before 
the cOnclusion of the investigation. 
1 These recommendations were addressed to a French enterprise on 5 August 1960, 
to a German enterprise on 3·May1961 and to another German enterprise on 7 July 
1964. -The recommendations were not made public. -
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In spite of their non-compulsory nature, the three recommendations 
were immediately followed by the cessation of the dumping practices 
so that the second stage of the procedure provided for in Article 91 (1) 
did not have to be initiated. 
All told, of the 50 EEC enterprises accused of dumping practices, 
35 (16 German, 9 Italian, 6 French, 3 Belgian and 1 Dutch) had in fact 
practiced operations of this kind. 
The table below the number of complaints submitted to the Com-
mission annually from 1958 to 1969 (I) together with' the number of 
, complaints considered justified (II). 
Year 
1958 
1959· 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1 
5 
5 
5 
4 
2 
II 
1 
3 
4 
1 
4 
1 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
2 
1 
1 
II 
1 
The dumping practices established included 10 cases relating to 
chemical products, three relating to foodstuffs and two cases relating to 
medical products. ' 
Methods of investigation 
110. It was not considered necessary to lay down regulations for the 
procedure to be followed in order to apply Article 91(1). 
As a general rule, the investigation of complaints was carried out 
in the following manner. 
Upon receipt of the request and after verifying whether it was 
possible to apply the provisions of Article 91(1), the enterprises con-
cerned were notified by the Commission of the details of the complaints 
made against them, and were informed of the chief arguments advanced 
by the plaintiffs, and were requested to give, their views on the matter 
by a fixed-date (generally three weeks). Where necessary, the plaintiffs, 
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were asked at the same time to supply additional information. In 
some cases, either the plaintiffs or the defendants were given the oppor-
tunity to explain their point of view orally. 
In the case of four complaints and in order to speed up the proceed-
ings, the Commission organized meetings between the opposing par~ 
ties. All these meetings were not only attended by the parties concerned, 
sometimes with their legal advisors, but also by the representatives of . 
the national authorities of the countries of the parties concerned. In 
order to safeguard the confidential character of the meetings, no official 
minutes. were prepared. . 
Flihhermore, the interested national authorities were, in all c~ses, 
informed by the Commission each time that a complaint against dump-
ing had been received by an enterprise of their c'ountry (except where. 
the plaintiffs had stated that their national authorities had already been 
informed). The national authorities were also informed of complaints 
lodged against an enterprise of their country. In several cas the 
national authorities took an active part in the investigation. 
Conclusions 
111. Experience gained during the investigations of the 26 complaints 
submitted to the Commission in application of Article 91(1), has shown 
that the wording of the provision, together with the guiding principles 
adopted by the Commission in 1961, were a sufficient legal basis for 
stopping dumping practices between Member States during the tran-
sitional period. 
The informal and flexible methods used for the investigation of 
complaints have proved quite satisfactory. 
The results obtained give an indication of the strong influence on 
enterprises exerted by the "moral pressure" of a complaint sumitted to 
the Commission. In no case did Article 91(1) have to be fully applied; 
and recommendations had to be issued in three cases only .. Most of the 
enterprises which had in fact carried out dumping practices preferred to 
end these during the investigation and before they were officially re-
quested to do so by the Commission. 
As will be seen in the table in paragraph 109, the forecast of the 
Treaty's authors concerning the progressive disappearance of intra-Com-
munity dumping with the achievement of a customs union were amply 
justified. Most of the complaints submitted to the Commission were 
made during the first haJf of the transitional period. 
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Applictltion of Article 91 (2) of the Treaty 
General 
112. Article 91(2) places at the disposal of EEC enterprises an anti-
dumping instrument which has the effect of a boomerang since it enables 
them to r.eturn the' goods wrongfully exported at low prices to the market 
of the originator of the dumping, without being liable to customs duties 
. and- quantitative' restriction. 
The purpose of this new system, which does not exist in any 
national or international legislations,1 is of a preventive nature since 
it faces the enterprise exporting at dumping prices with the possibility 
of having the goods concerned returned to its own market at prices 
clpse to those of the initial export and leading to considerable disruption 
of the market. 
Implementation 
113. Article 91(2) expressly laid down that the Commission should 
draw up appropriate rules for the application of the system in question. 
The problems, most of them technical ones, raised by the im-
plementation of the system, have been studied in cooperatipn with 
governmental dumping experts and customs experts of the Member 
States. The opinions of the private sector were also taken into account. 
Thes,e studies have resulted in the adoption by the Commission of a 
regulation,2 which entered into force on 15 April 1960, and which 
defined the field of application of Article 91 (2), the necessary conditions 
under which the goods concerned might benefit from this system, and 
the formalities to be completed upon reimportation. 
This fairly technical regulation endeavours to respect as far as 
possible the automatic character of the system for reimporting free of 
duty laid down in Article 91(2). That is why no provision was made 
for authorization before reimportation as it was considered that this 
should be determined only by the economic interest of the reimporter. 
It is up to the reimporter to assess whether differences between 
prices on the home market of the originator of the dumping and the lower 
1 This was later included in Article 17 of the Stockholm Convention instituting the 
European Free Trade Assiciation (EFTA). 
2 Regulation No.8 of 11 March 1960, OJ No. 21 of 25 March 1960, p. 597 (amended . 
by Regulation No. 13 of 15 March 1961, OJ No. 25 of 8 Apri11961, p. 585). 
94 REP, CaMP. 1971 
prices charged on the export .market are sufficient to justify returning the 
goods to the country of , origin, taking transport costs intoa~count. 
It should be noted that, in order to facilitate the application of 
Commission Regulation No.8 by the customs administrations, the com-
petent authorities of the Member States have adopted a number of speci-
fic implementing measures. 
Application of the procedure 
114; Cases in which the ,"boomerang" system has been used are not 
known to the Commission, nor, in general, to the Member States, since 
'no prior authorization is required, to benefit from the system. 
There is little, doubt, however, that such cases must be extremely 
rare because the use of Article 91(2) is faced a priori with purely commer-
cial obstacles arising from the difficulties for the injured pa.t;ty not only 
of becoming the owner of the goods sold at dumping prices but also of 
reselling them in their country of origin. 
Conclusions 
115. It would seem that the effect of Article 91 (2) is one of appreciable 
prevention, and that the very threat of a "return dumping" has been 
enough to prevent 3;, number of prejudicial practices of this kind being 
carried out. This is confirmed by the limited number of complaints 
submitted to the Commission under Article 91(1). 
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CHAPTER II 
THE INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULES ON COMPETITION 
APPLICABLE TO ENTERPRISES 
Ji6. On 13 March 1972, the Council Regulation No. 17/62,1 namely the 
"First Implementing Regulation of Article 85 and Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty", will have been in force for 10 years. 
This regulation was amended and completed by a series of Council 
Regulations concerning: 
. exemption from compulsory noti#cation; 
application of Article 85(3) to categories of agreements; 
terms and conditions under which Article 85 and 86 apply to agri-
cUltural products and to transport by rail, by road and by waterway. 
For its part, the Commission issued implementing regulations on the 
form, contents and other details concerning applications and notifications 
as well as hearings of the parties concerned or of third parties. 
From 1 January 1973 and subject to a transitional period expiring on 
1 July 1973, the whole of this derived law will be fully applicable to 
agreements, decisions, concerted practices and to the abuse of dominant 
positions which by virtue of accession. of new Member States fall within the 
scope of Articles 85 and 86. 
It is therefore worthwhile: 
recalling the main objectives and scope of the regulations; 
briefly commenting on the application of these regulation; 
indicating in which fields these regulations could be completed in the 
next few months. 
1 Council Regulation No. 17, OJ No. 13 of 21 February 1962, p. 204, amended by 
OJ No. 58 of 10 July 1962, p. 1655, OJ No. 162 of 7 November 1963, p. 2696 and 
OJ No. L 285 of 29 December 1911, p. 49. 
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§ 1 - Objectives and scope of implementing Regulations adopted 
by the Council and the Commission for the application of Articles 85 and 86 
Regulation No. 17/621 
117. When drawing up Regulation No. 17, the Commission considered 
that it was of primary importance, in accordance with the terms of 
Article 87 (2b) of the Treaty of Rome, to: 
"determine the methods for applying Article 85 (3 ), bearing in mind 
the need' to ensure effective supervision and to simplify administrative 
control to the greatest possible 'extent." 
To this end, ,Regulation 17/62: 
recalls that agreements, decisjons and concerted practices ~eferred to 
in Article 85 ( 1) are null and void if they do not meet the conditions laid 
down in Article 85 ( 3 ), which has as consequence that the Commission 
cannot declare that the prohibition referred to in Article 85 ( 1) is not 
applicable. The Commission can, on its own initiative, declare that an ' 
agreement is prohibited and can also impose fines and periodic penalty 
payments for the purpose of enforcing the ban; 
lays down that in order to benefit from the declaration of inapplica-
bility the agreements referred to in Article 85 ( 1) must be notified to the 
Commission, unless they are exempted therefrom under Article 4(2) of 
Regulation No. 17/62 as amended by Counciil Regulation No. 2822/71.2 
Such n;lief may also stem from block exemption regulations adopted by 
the Commission. The only block exemption regulation issued by the Com-
mission up to now concerns' bilateraI agreements for exclusive dealing 
(Regulation 67/67).3 The chief consequence of a failure to notify is that 
the prohibited agreements may not be authorized for the periOd prior to 
the notification, even though they fulfil the conditions laid down in 
Article 85 ( 3) for that period. Furthermore, enterprises are also liable 
to the imposition of fines for breaches of Article 85 for the period prior to 
notification. It should be pointed out that Council Regulation No. 10 17 
concerning the application of Articles 85 and 86 in the field' of transport 
by road,'rail and waterway does not lay down compulsory notification, 
except in the case of agreements intended to reduce disturbances arising 
from the transport ma,rket structure. On the other hand, the Regulation 
provides for an "objection procedure" following voluntary_..notification; 
1 See note on the preceding page " 
2 EEC Regulation No. 2822 of 20 December 1971, OJ No. L 285. 29 December' 
1971, p. 49. , 
3 EEC Regulation No. 67/67 of 22 March 1967, OJ No. 57, 25 March 1967, p. 89. 
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lays down the powers of investigation of the competent authorities 
and guarantees the respect for the right of defence (hearings, professional 
secrecy), and of the right of the third parties concerned (publication of the 
contents of requests prior to the granting of exemptions under Article 85 ( 3 ) 
of negative clearances, hearings and publication of decisions) ; 1 
organises liaison between the national authorities and the Commis-
sion by the carrying out of procedures and provides for consultation of 
the Advisory Committee before a decision is taken; the Advisory Com-
mittee is composed of Member State officials competent in matters of 
agreements and dominant positions. 
Block exemption 
118. Article 85( 3) provides for the prohibition laid down in Article 85( 1) 
being declared inapplicable to certain categories of agreements. It was 
necessary therefore that the Council and the Commission define the terms 
and conditions for granting such block exemptions. 
The implementation of block exemptions is carried out in two stages: 
The Council defines those categories of agreement which could benefit 
from the terrris of Article 85 ( 3) and empowers the Commission to 
adopt regulations for block exemptions; 
Being thus empowered, the Commission defines more precisely those 
categories of agreements which couid benefit from exemption and 
adopts regulations after consulting the Advisory Committee on 
Restrictive Practices and Monopolies. 
To date, the Council has adopted the following empowering regu-
lations: 
Regulation No. 19/562 on bilateral exclusive dealing agreements and 
bilateral contracts linked with the acquisition or utilization of indus-
trial property rights and rights connected therewith; 
Regulation No. 2821/71 which concerns: 
('a) The applicacion of standard and patterns, 
1 See also Regulation No. 27 of 6 February 1962, OJ No. 35, 10 May 1962, p. 1118, 
amended by OJ No. L 189, 1 August 1968, p. 1, and by Regulation 96/63/EEC of 
25 July 1963, OJ No. 127 of 20 August 1963, p. 2268, and, in the field of transport, 
Regulations No. 1629/69 and 1630/69 of 8 August 1969, OJ No. L 209, 21 August 
1969, p. 1. 
2 EfC Regulation No. 9/65 of2 March 1965, OJ No. 36,6 March 1965, p. 533. 
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(b) Research and development of products or processes up to the 
industrial application stage, as well as the exploitation, including 
the provisions relating to industrial property rights and undis-
closed technical knowledge, 
(c) Specialization, including agreements necessary to its realisation. 
For its part, the Commission has adopted to date one block exemption 
regulation i.e. Regulation No. 67/67. This regulation concerns bilateral 
agreements on exclusive selling, exclusive purchasing, or exclusive selling 
or purchasing commitments in so far as the participating enterprises belong 
to at least two Member States. 
Competition rules applicable to agriculture, transport 
and ECSC products 
Production of, and trade in, agricultural products 
119. In Regulation No. 26/62,1 the Council, in implementation of 
Article 42 of the EEC Treaty, laid down that both the niles in Articles 85 
to 90 and the relative implementing regulations are applicable to this sector. 
It was, however, specified that Article 85( 1) does not apply to agreements 
which form an integral part of a national organization of the markets, or 
which are necessary for the attainment of the objectives set out in 
Article 39. In this connection, it was provided that, under certain condi-
tions, Article 85( 1) would not apply to agreements between farmers or 
between farmers' associations (Article 2 ( 1) of Regulation No. 26). 
Transport by road, rail and waterway 
120. Council Regulation No. 141 of 26 November 19622 lays down that 
Regulation No. 17 shall not apply to those agreements, decisions and con-
certed practices in the transport section which aim at, or result in the fixing 
of prices and conditions in respect of transport, the limiting or control of 
transport offers, or the sharing of transport markets. This inapplicability 
of Regulation No. 17 was limited in time as regards transport by rail, road 
or waterway, but not as regards sea and air transport. 
1 Regulation No. 26 of 4 April 1962; OJ No. 30 of 20 April 1962, p. 993, amended 
by OJ No. 53 of 1 July 1962, p. 1571. . 
2 Council Regulation No. 141 of 26 November 1962, OJ No. 124 of 28 November 
1962, p. 2751, amended by OJ No. 210 of 11 December 1965, p. 3141, and OJ 
No. 306 of 16 December 1967, p. 1. 
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In Regulation No. 1017,I which lays down the conditions for applying 
Articles 85 and 86 to transport by rail, road and waterway, the Council 
confirmed the application of the rules on competition to transport, while 
at the same time laying down terms and conditions different from those 
laid down in Regulation No. 17. This was for the purpose of taking into 
account the incidence of measures adopted within the framework of a com-
mon transport policy, as well as the effect of the specific characteristics 
of this sector .. Thus Regulation No. 1017 provides for the non-application 
of the prohibition of agreements, the sole aim and effect of which were 
the joint application of technical improvements or technical cooperation . 
. Moreover, this regulation lays down exemption from the prohibition for 
the grouping of small and medium-sized enterprises for the purpose of joint 
financing or acquisition of transport material and equipment directly linked 
with the supply of transport and needed for the joint utilization by the 
groupings in so far as the total capacity of the groupings as well as the " 
individual capacities of the member enterprises do not exceed certain ton-
nages. 
As indicated above, the procedures for implementing this Regulation 
differ slightly from those provided for in Regulation No. 17, with particular 
reference to the lack of compulsory notification. The same applies to the 
ways of liaison with the Member State authorities. Subject to the exclusive 
competence of the Commission, they provide for the possibility of a sup-
plementary examination at Council level, prior to a Commission decision, 
of any matter of principle which a Member State wishes to raise with 
regard to the common transport policy and which it considers to be con-
ne~ted with the particular case under Commission consideration. 
European Coal and Steel Community 
121. Article 65, which corresponds to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, has 
not given rise to implementing regulations. As regards Article 66, this 
sets up a control of mergers or take-overs and its implementation is based 
on two regulatory decisions,ll one of which definies the means of control 
which provide "the power to determine the actions of the enterprise",3 
and the other which defines, by means of quantitative criteria, those con-
centration operations which, because of their relatively minor importance, 
are relieved from the obligation of prior authorization.4 
1 Coun~il Regulation (EEC) No. 1017/68 of 19 July 1968, OJ No. L 175, 23 July 
1968, p. 1. 
A third regulatory dej;ision (Decision No. 26-54 of 6 May 1954; OJ of the H.A. 
of 11 May 1954, p. 35) concerning the Commission's right to information 
Decision No. 24/54 of 6 May 1954; OJ of the H.A. of 11 May 1954 p. 345. 
I Decision No. 25/67 of 22 June 1967; OJ No. 154 of 14 July 1967, p. 11. 
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Special transitional system resulting from the accession of new members 
122. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, a transitional period of 
six months (from 1 January 1973 to 30 June 1973) is laid down for the 
purpose of adapting those agreements which existed on 1 January 1973 
and fell within the scope of application of Article 85( 1) by virtue of acces-
sion (this delay concerns: Article 5 (1 ), Article 7 (1) and (2), Article 15 
(2a), Article 14" (6°) of Regubtion No. 17, Ardcle 4( 1) (1) and (2) of 
Regulation No. 19, Article 5 of l3,.egulation No. 67/67, Article 2 and Ar-
ticle 21(6°) of Regulation No. 1017/68). 
Under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, this period of adaptation is 
three months. ' 
§ 2 - Lessons to be drawn from the application of the Regulations 
123. The first question which arises is that' of the meaning of the'system 
of "compulsory notification". In this connection, it is important not to lose 
sight of additional precisions brought to the extent of the 'application of 
this obligation both by the block exemption regulations (to date Regula-
tion No. 67/67) and by the regulation amending Article 4( 2) of Regula-
tion No.' 17 (Regulation No. 2827/71). To these should be added Com-
mission Notices. ' 
Account should also be taken 0.£ the legal 'consequences which the 
Court of Justice has' attached to the notification procedure with regard to 
the provisional validity of the agreements. 
In this connection, the Court of Justice ruled as follows in cases 
Nos. 23~61,110-692 and 43-693 : 
Agreements and decisions falling within the terms of Article 85 ( 1 ) 
which had existed when Regulation No. 17/62 entered into. force 
and which' had been notified at the proper time in accordance with 
Article 5 of Regulation No. 17, are not null and void unless the 
Commission decides that they may not benefit from the terms of 
1 Ruling of the Court of Justice of 6 April 1962 in case 13-61 (De Geus v. Bosch 
and Van Rijn); OJ No. 33 of 4 May 1962, p. 1082, Recueil1962, p. 89. 
2 Ruling of the Court of Justice of 9 July 1969 in case 10-69 Portelange v. Smith 
Corona Merchant International; OJ No. C 105 of 14 August 1969), Rectiei! 1969, 
p.309. , 
3 Ruling of the Court of Justice of 18 March 1970 in case 43-69 (Bilger v. Jehle); 
OJ No. C 41 of 4 April 1970, Recueil2, O. 127. 
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Article 85 (3) or from the application of Article 7 ( 1) of Regulation 
No. 17 (Case No. 13-61); 
Agreements and decisions falling within the terms of Article 85 ( 1 ) 
which had existed when Regulation No. 17 entered into force, and 
which had to be notified are null and void as from the date of the 
entry into force of Regulation No. 17 if they had not been notified 
at the proper time (Case No. 13-61); 
Any agreement duly notified must be considered valid so long as the 
Commission has not refused. to grant the exemption provided for in 
Article 85 (3 ), or has not applied Article 15 (6) 1 of Regulation No. 
17 /62 (Case No. 10-69); 
Any agreement which need not be notified and which, therefore, has 
not been notified, remains valid so long as it has not been declared 
null and void (Case No.4 3-69) . 
It follows from the above that the obligation to notify agreements 
which, by reason of their perceptihle effect within the Common Market, 
must give rise to an investigation and to an individual decision permits an 
effective supervision. In addition, far from being just a burden on enter-
prises, it provides the latter, in view of the provisional validity deriving 
therefrom, with the legal security needed for'the development of their 
activities without, however prejudicing the principle of prohibition in the 
event that the Commission should refuse at a later date to grant the 
benefits of Article 85 (3) to an agreement falling under Article 85( 1 ). 
The notification system is not sufficient, however, to ensure the full 
application of the rules on competition. The Commission must also carry 
out regular supervision of market development in order to find and, where 
necessary, suppress non notified restrictive practices. In this, the Commis-
sion acts either upon receipt of formal or informal complaints, or on the 
basis of information gained from economic and financial documents. 
124. The' powers 0/ investigation and enquiry provided for in Artkles 13 
and 14 of Regulation No. 17 enable the Commission to supervise, in liaison 
with the competent national authorities, the respect of Articles 85 and 86 
by enterprises. This cooperation has proved very successful. 
It is worth pointing out that the Commission for the first time in 1971 
was obliged to request in.formation from enterprises by means of decision,2 
1 Article 15(6), lays down that the Commission may communicate to enterprises 
that a first examination reveals that their agreemf'nts fall under the terms of Article 
85(1) and are not likely to benefit from Article 85 (3). 
2 Commission Decision of 1 February 1971; OJ No. L 34 of 11 February 1971, p. 13; 
OJ No. L 161 of 19 July 1971, p. 2. 
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and to impose fines on a particular enterprise for submitting incomplete 
documentation for verification.1 
Article 12 of Regulation No. 17 provides for the possibility of carry-
ing out inquiries into sectors of the economy. To date, the Commission 
has twice made use of this Article: 
In the margarine sector, the inquiry lasted three years. During the 
inquiry, restrictions practised by the enterprise in a dominant position 
were suppressed (bonuses for exclusive purchase); 
In t~e brewery sector, an enquiry is at present being held for the 
purpose of assessing the incidence of the "brewery contracts" system. 
General and frequent recourse to inquiry into sectors of the economy 
is not possible, partly because of the basic conditions to be fulfilled and 
partly because of the heavy administrative work involved . 
. '
125. Recourse to block exemptions encourages cooperation among enter-
prises by simplifying the administrative formalities which enterprises must-' 
fulfil and by giving them the necessary legal security, within the limits laid' 
down. 
On the other hand, while providing for the possibility of putting an 
end to abuses of exemption by enterprises, this proced~e relieves the co,p1-
petent authorities from the duty of having to examine large numbers of 
requests dlUS enabling them to concentrate on the examination of particu-
larly serious restrictions on competition which· require either prohibitions 
or individual authorization decisions. -
As regards the ECSC, Decision No. 24/54 which defines the control 
components of enterprises by listing the economic means of mergers or 
take·overs, has made possible a progressive application of Article 66 and 
has provided the Commission with invaluable experience regarding methods 
used in regrouping enterprises. 
§ 3 - Regulations to be adopted 
126. In application of Regulations Nos. 19/65 and 2821/71, the Com-
mission intends to adopt regulations providing for: I 
an extension of the term of validity of Regulation No, 67/67, 
1 EC Bulletin, No. 11/71, Part Two, Chap. I, Sec. 5. 
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exemption for agreements connected with the acqUlSltlOn and utili-
zation of industrial property rights, and similar rights, 
block exemptions with respect to standards, research and develop-
ment, and specialization. . 
The Commission will shortly submit to the Council a draft of a 
regulation on rhe prescription for the proceedings and executions of de-
cisions within the framework of Council Regulations Nos. 11, 17 and 1017. 
This regulation is being proposed following the rulings of the Court of 
Justice in cases Nos. 41-69, 44-69 and 45~69.1 
As it had indicated during the parliamentary debates of 7 June 1971, 
on the draft resolution on the Berkhouwer Report,2 the Commission is 
examining both the legal feasibility and the possible contents of a draft 
regulation to be submitted to the Council providing for control of concen-
trations of a certain size. 
§ 4 - Commission Notices on the application of Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty and Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty 
i27. The Notice is a general measure by means of which the Commission 
gives hs opinion on matters of principle raised by the application of 
European competition law. Such is the case of Notices which inform the 
economic ciroles concerned of the types of agreement which, according to 
the Commission, do not come within the s~ope of application of Article 85, 
particularly: 
the Notice of 1962 on patent licensing contracts3 and the Notice of 
1968 on cooperation among enterprises,s both of which list several 
agreements or clauses which, by their subject are unlikely to restrict 
competition, and 
the Notice of 1970 on agreements of minor importances which, by 
referring to two cumulative quantitative criteria, namely, market 
1 Rulings of the Court of Justice of 15 July 1970 in cases 41-69 (Chemiefarma v. the 
Commission), 44~69 (Buchler v. the Commission) and 45-69 (Boehringer v. the 
Commission); OJ No. C 130, 27 October 1970, p. 3, Recuei! 1970,6, pages 661, 
733 and 769. 
2 European Parliament, Resolution on the Rules on Competition and the Position 
of European Enterprises in the Common Market and in the world economy, OJ 
No. C 66,1 July 1971, p. 11. . 
3 OJ No. 139 of 24 December 1962, p. 2922; amended OJ No. L 75 of 29 July 1968, 
p. 3 OJ No. C 84 of 28 August 1968, p. 14. 
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share (5%) and aggregate turnover (15 million units of account for 
production, 20 million units of account fot distribution), provides in 
. actua~l fact an administrative case law which has been gradually' 
developped by the Commission1 and confirmed in a number of rulings 
of the Court of Justice.:! This case law has established that an 
agreement between enterpnises is not prohibited under the terms of 
ArtiCle. &5 unless it perceptibly restricts competition and trade 
between Member States. 
128. With regard to the ECSC, the Commission published, in 1970, the 
"Generail Guidelines on a Competition Policy in rdlation to the Structures 
of the Iron and Steel Industry" in which. it stated that there was no danger 
to the maintenance of effecciv~ competition from mergers which did not 
exceed l3 % of the total Community output of crude steeP This i~ the 
synthesis of experience gained, since the entry into force of the ECSC 
Treaty in 1952, into an important sector of the Community's economic Me. 
§ 5 - General problems arising from the application 
of Community law on competition 
The relation between competition rules governed by Community law' 
and national law (Supremacy of Community law) 
129. The Court of Justice of the European Communities has laid down 
that the EEC Treaty creates a Iegal order to. which the Member States are 
subjected, and that its apJilication may not vary from one State to another 
. as a. resullt of measures based on national law . Thus the Court· of Justice ' 
has established the prinoip'le of full and untiform application of Community 
law from which results its supremacy over national law. 
In the field of European competition law directly binding upon enter-
prises, this supremacy of Community law must be assured since national 
law on agreementJs varies considerably from one legal system to another 
and alIso in relation to Community law. Both German and French legal 
1 Commission Decision of 11 March 1964 "Grosfillex-Fillistorf:'; OJ No. 58 of 
9 April 1964, p. 915. 
2 Rulings of the Court of Justice of 30 June 1966, in case 56-65 "Societe technique 
miniere v, Maschinenbau Ulm"; OJ No. 170 of 29 September 1966, p. 3013, 
Recueil 196.6, p. 337; of 13 July 1966 in cases 56 and 58"66 "Grundig-Consten v. 
the Commission", OJ No. 170 of 29 September 1966; p. 3015, Recueil 1966, p. 429; 
of 9 July 1969 in case 5-69 and "VSI v. Vervaeke", OJ No. C 105 of 14 August 
1969, p. 15, Recueil 1969, 4, p. 295. . 
3 OJ No. C 12 of)O January 1970, p. 5; cf. infra, p. 90. 
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systems are bas~d on .the priciple of prohibition, w:hile the Belgian, Luxem-
bourg and Dutch legal systems are based on ,the principle of abuse which 
aims at suppressing agreements and dominant positions which are against 
the genera:l interest. haly has as yet no specific legal sys~em with regard 
to agreements. 
In its ruling of 13 February 1969 in case No. 14-68,1 the Court of 
Justice held that the application of the EEC competition rules does not 
exclude, in principle, the application of the Jaws of the Member States, but 
that, in the event of conflict, Community law shaM prevaH. The Court 
also established that, failing' a regulation adopted under the terms of 
Article 87 (2e) which would provIde otherwise, national ·authorities may 
intervene against 'an agreement by applying their domestic .law, even where 
the procedure concerning the compatibiility of such an agrement with Com-
munity law is laid before the Commission for' consideration. While 
accepting the parallelism of procedures concerning one and the same agree· 
ment', the Court under1ines the fact that ·a decision reached as a resu:It of 
national proceedings may not override a Commission decision. 
Should a Commission decision precede a national one, then "the 
national authorities are bound to respect its ~£fects". If, on the other 
hand, a Commission deci'sion occurs after a nationaildecision and is "in 
conflict with the effects of the decision handed down by the nationail 
authoriti~s, then it is up to the latter to take the appropriate measures". 
Cumulative Sanctions 
130. The very fact that one and the same restrictive agreement maybe 
the subject of two para!1lel procedures, namely a Community and a national 
one, raises the problem of- the imposition of double fines. In the case 
mentioned, the Court of Justice -ruled on the question and ·stated that "if, 
subject to full and uniform application of Community law, the possibi!lity 
of a double procedure was bound to lead .to cumulative sanctions, then a 
general requirement of equity, to be found in Article 90 ( 2) of the ECSC 
Treaty implies that any previous repressive decision should be taken into 
account when determining the sanctions to be applied". 
The problem of possible compensation for sanctions resuilting from 
the cumulative application of Community law and of the law of a Member 
State has not yet ar~sen in practice. It did arise, however, in the case of 
the "International Quinine Agreement" where cumulative sanctions result 
1 Ruling of the Court of Justice of 13 February 1969 in case 14-68 (Bayer AG); OJ 
No. C 30 of 7 March 1969, p. 2, Recuei/1969, 1, p. 1. 
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from the application of both Community law and American anti-trust laws. 
The Commission! was of the opinion, however, that there were in this 
case two sepamte infringements and that, consequently, there was no cause 
for granting the compensation claimed. 
The application of the competition rules to enterprises of 
non-member countries 
131. The full and uniform application of Community law means that 
enterpris~ haViing thekseats in non-member countries are ,also subject to 
Community law if they carry out prohibited practices within the Common 
Market. The Commission recently illustrated this principle by imposing, 
for the first time, fines on several 'enterprises of non-member countries 
which had paTticipated in concerted price increases within· the Common 
Market. (See decision on Dyestuffs mentioned previous1ly). Th1s decision 
was' challenged before the Court of Justice, and the Court wm shottJly 
rule on thi,s aspect of "extracterritorial application of the Community rules 
on competition". 
1 Commission Decision of 25 November 1971 (Bohringer); OJ No. L 282 of 23 
December 1971, p. 46. 
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Part two 
Competition policy with regard to State 
intervention vis-a-vis enterprises 
Preliminary notes 
Within the, framework of competition policy, State intervention v,is-
a-vis enterprises stems f,rom three series of provi'sions relating to: . 
(a) State aid, . 
(b) public enterprises, 
( c) the adjustment of monopolies. 
A description of Community action vis-a.-vis State intervention wiJ,I 
be given in the above order. 
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CHAPTER I 
STATE AID 
Although based on common principles, Community action regarding 
aid takes paace within the fJ.1amework of two d1stinotive Treaties> .namely, 
the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Paris. 
SECTION 1 
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE EEC TREATY 
§ 1 . General 
132. Article 92( 1) lays down the incompatibility with the Common Market 
of State aid fostering certain enterprises or productions that adversely 
affect trade by distorting or threatening to distort competitiOn. 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same article, however, provide that certain 
faidy broadly defined categories of aid are, or can be, considered compatible 
with the Common Market. . 
This concept of the Treaty is based on the following: 
The Community"s action involves the setting up of a system which 
ensures that competition is not distorted in the Common Market (Article 3 
(f) of the Treaty). Such a system constitutes an essenda1 factor of 
economic growth. It assumes that enterpl'ises operate on the market'S by 
their own means and that State aid must not reduce the scope of the free 
movement of goods or compromise the optimum distribution of .production 
factors. 
Nevertheless, ,intervention by the States represents a necessary instru-
.tp.ent of structuml policy when the operation of the market by i!tself does 
not make it possible (or at least not within acceptable time-limits) to attain 
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certain objectives of development justified for the sake of better quantita-
tive or qualitative growth or when it Jeads to intolerable social tension. 
That is the reason for exemption provisions applied to the principle 
of incompatibillity which enable the Community authorities to act in a 
basicaUy realistic manner ,in their control over 'aid, and to authorize actions 
which will contribute to the attainment of the general objectives laid down 
in Article 2 of the Treaty. 
Member States cannot, of course, grant aid out'side the control of 
the Community, a control that is generally exercized by the Commission 
'( in practice, with the help of the Member States), and in certain cases, 
by the Councill. The Commission will, therefore, intervene whenever 
national aid is likely to be harmful to the interests of nationals of other 
Member States without providing in return a generally improved operational 
balance or a more active growth for the Community as a whole. 
133. State aid generally means a cotlflict of interests between the recipient 
economic agents 'and theiT competitors in other Member States who find 
themselves placed in .a less favorable position on the Community marhts 
than that which they would have held in the ,absence of such aid. 
In addition, unilateral ini11iatives which do not take into account, 
at least approximately, common objectives can only ,lead to a waste of 
means within 'a common market from the point of view of both national 
and Community interes1:s. Conflict between objectives and measures drawn 
up essentLallJly within national contexts may very well resurlt in a reciproca!l. 
neutra1lization of national policies, or in a shifting of difficuhies f.rom one 
Member State to another, ot even in new diffi<Jult·ies arising . 
. It is inevitable that Member States will be better informed of nation-
ally anticipated "gains" arising from their own decisions rather than from 
their negative counterpart ~t Community Ilevel, and that they will tend to 
underestimate any reaction which their decisions may trigger off on the part 
of their partners, thus rendering the operation costly all round. Experience 
has ·shown that Member States cannot a'lways be immediately and fuUy 
aware of the Community perspective in the matter, such perspective neyer-
theless guaranteeing effectiveness and a saving in national initiat,ives. 
134. The ultimate objective of Community aid action is, in fact, to rein-
troduce this Community perspective and. to ensure that the aims of each 
Member State take it,s partners' interests into account, that they come 
within the context of a ,smooth economicgrowth of the Community as a 
whole, and that they contribute to its achievement. Where compevition 
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alone is not enough to bring about the desired structural development and 
where additional State aid is 'required, both the need and the means chosen 
to deal with the particular situation -should be ev,aluatedat Community 
level. 
Community action with regard to aid must not, therefore, be treated 
as a confrontation between unrealistic "principles of competition" -and the 
need to promote orderly structur~J changes, since it tends to make an essen-
tial contribution to the latter by being a factor of 'effectiveness and better 
control rather than a disturbing element in national initiatives. 
135. Difficulties facing Comnmnity action are met at various levels. 
In the first place, and this is ineV'itable, perfect economic rationaliza-
tion cannot eas.iJ.y be applied to State aid. While directing national action 
towards rationalization, account must nevertheless be taken of the social 
and political necessities w~ich it must satisfy. 
Secondly, the Community, in view of the means provi'ded by the 
Treaty, can OIrlyact in cases where nadonal aid is harmfull to the economic 
activities of other. Member States. The Community does not have the 
necessary powers to intervene in cases of aid which, without fulfilling the 
conditions of incompatibility provided for in Art. 92, (1), are just in-
effective. 
Thi's is shown in cases where ,important frnanda! aid continues to be 
granted for out-of-date activities, when it could be better used in more 
promising and dynamic sectors, the development of which might even be 
hampered by financial contributions ;indirectly resulting from such aid. 
Generally speaking, it is often difficult to convince Member States that 
alternative ,solutions to those. planned by them a~e more advis,able> even 
where such alternative solutions are more promising from a Community 
point of view for settling problems. 
136. The control·of aid granted also meets with technical difficulties, which 
the Commission is trying to remove gradually and which are caused by the 
insufficient transparency of both the means of ,action and their effects. 
The "components ofafd" forming part of certain actions on the part 
of the Member States cannot always easHybe identified (StJate participa-
tions, the working out of certain inf.rastructures, etc. ). . 
Other initiatives are taken at such a diffuse Jevel that their control 
presents serious practical difficulties (initiatives on the part of certain 
decentralized local authorities of which not even the central authorities 
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themselves are always aware). The form of some types of aid makes it 
difficult to evaluate their incidence (State guarantees for loans contracted 
by certain enterprises, certain tax exemptions etc.). I t is difficuilt to 
unravel the sectoria:land ,regional consequences of the application of some 
systems of aid of an excessively general nature, as it is also difficult to 
isolate sectorial consequences resulting from aid 'systems for regional 
development. 
137. Furthermore, the Commission's influence regarding aid is exerted 
for the moment more by "reaction" to successive national initiatives rather 
than by Community action proper. The htter is rendered difficult by 
the instit'utional and politioal problems involved andth·e differing 'situations 
faoing each Member State, 'so that very often a variety of solutions is call1ed 
for. Wherever possible, national aid wl1l be provided within a Community 
framework, and allthough this cannot ensure absolute coherence, it at least 
enables costly reciproca!1 neutrailization or the shifting of difficulties from 
one Member State to another to be avoided. 
138. FinaUy, efforts towards an overall concept of regional and sectol'iaI 
structural problems in the Community, of their relative seriousness to 
Member States, and the required initiative to be undertaken; do not always 
progres·s as fast as could be wished. It is indeed difficult to develop such 
a concept at Community level when it does not aIlways exist even at 
national Jevel, or, if it does exist, then only vaguely. Moreover, this 
implies ·a high level of awareness of both the solidarity and the interde-
pendence of national interests which do, in fact, ~xist a:lready~ 
The Commission i,s thus depr,ived of a reference system which wouJd. 
fadlitate hs a~sessment of the lega!1ity of the aims and methods of the 
Member States' intervention. Such a referenoe system, which implies an 
increa,sing measure of coordination between nationailstructuml policies and 
the setting ,in motion of 'appropriate Community act.ion, must gradually be 
achieved in line with progress made towards economlc and monetary union. 
But the smooth operation of .the Community requires right now a certain 
coherence between the Member States' structural initiatives pursued by 
means of aid. At the present 'state of progress of the Common Market, 
the impact of such initiatives on the equilibrium of the Member States is 
alltoo evident for the concept to be exclusively unilaterall. 
Even in the absence of a more general concertation, the Commission 
must therefore act pragmatically in developing the aims and priorities 
which are justified in the common ,interest, so that those initiatives which 
could weaken Community cohesion and provoke serious confrontations 
may be excluded. 
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139. This pragmatic action constitutes, at present the main instrument for 
bringing to Ught common views on svructural intervention and for reducing, 
by means of arbitration, partitioning 'and rivalry . which may exist between 
the various nationail policies. The rime·limit·s 'and tmnsitional per:iods ·stiU 
required for the achievement of a genuine Community coordination of such 
policies should not be a reason for ,slowing down act·ion as required by the 
Treaty and fa.iiling which, the necessary convergence would become more 
remote. In addition, if progress achieved in obtaining a genuine Com-
munitystrategy on structural problems willI increase the effectiveness of 
action taken, coordination in the matter of State aid will also create a favor-
able climate for working out and applying tMs strategy. 
§ 2 - General regional aid systems 
140. It is .in the matter of aid for regional development that Community 
control has had to face the more serious obstacles. It is in this field that 
1971 has been areal turn~ng point. 
PROBLEMS 
141. Technicall progress, economic growth and an increasing intensity in 
both international and Community competition have caused, and indeed 
have required, great changes in economic activity and in the structure of 
employment. These changes, particular-Iy fel[ in certJain regions, were not 
sufficiently aimed at reducing disparities in income and employment 
among regions. A greater awareness of these disparities renders them less 
bearablle than in the past to the populations in the Iess-favou'red regions. 
At the same ti·me, while the development of the Common Market 
has altered certain ·attitudes, more enterpr~ses ·are deciding to consider allil 
the possibilities offered within the geographica;l ,area of the Community 
rather than to stay within national limits for placing new investments. 
The Vf,\NOUS regions of the Community are therefore increasingly competing 
with each other to attract investments. Hence the considerable increase 
in the number of zones to which regiona!l aid had formerly been restricted 
and the higher rate of intervention \Vhich often ·involved mutua:! outbidding. 
142. The negative consequences of this development are obvious. 
National initiatives for regional development are becoming more and 
more costly. Part of the aid granted at present only achieves reciprocal 
neutralization with unjustified profits for the benefiting enterprises as the 
only counterpart. In fact, this process of outbidding ~annot appreciably 
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affect the aggregate flow of investments, which, at Community level, can 
be mobilized for the purpose of regional development. 
The rate of aid ,and the means employed no flonger correspond to the 
relative seriousness of the situation in the various regions when assessed at 
Community level. The choice of the flocation of investmen:ts tends to be 
made at the' expense of the les's-favouredregions and against the distl'ibu-
tion of activities required by the common interest. 
Regional aid systems are often of a very general nature so that it is 
difficult to determine beforehand its incidence and therefore its compat-
ibility. All industrial sectors can benefit from such aid systems. In order 
to attract investments, the advantages 'offered often exceed the compen-
sation for material inconvenience imposed on the benefiting enterprises as a 
result of the particular choice of ~ocation it is hoped to bring about. Under 
cover of worthwhile regional objectives, artificial sectoraJ development can 
be brought into being which, in 'some ,sectors, may produce harmful effects 
from the common interest point of v,iew. 
These are the negative consequences which must be removed 1n the 
interest both of greater eHectiveness of regional policies and of healthier 
competition, whi,le bearing in mind that regiona:l aid, propel'ly and carefully 
.applied, constitutes one of the essential instruments of regional development 
and enables a greater balance to be achieved in the growth of the various 
regions, which is one of the objectives of the Treaty of Rome and also 
one of the prior conditions for greater and more thorough integration. 
The Commission pursues these objectives: 
(a) by seeking, together with the Member States, an overall solution for 
coordination of regional aid, 
,( b ) by taking up a position on specific questions relating to certain State 
aid systems. 
THE SEARCH FOR A COORDINATION SOLUTION 
143. In 1968, the Commission had proposed a pragm~tic method to the 
Member States, i.e. prior notice of 'significant cases of generail regional aid 
syst~ms, by means of which the Commis'sion, in 'accordance with Articles 92 
et seq of the EEC Treaty. woU'ld be able to assess the effects of such systems 
upon ,compet,ition and trade, and to give an op1nion on their compatJibirlity 
with the Common Market. In this way: 
(a) the systems' tmnsparency wou1d have been .improved by the know-
ledge of the geographical and sectoral location of the main invest-· 
ments benefiting from iaid; 
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(b) the amount of aid _,actuaUy granted could have been more accurately 
assessed; 
( c) outbidding with rega'rd to regiona!l aid would have been considerably 
reduced by this very confrontation. This might have given rise to a 
better "Community attitude" on the part of Member States towards 
the main problems (theascerta]rung of the most urgent regional and 
-sectora'l problems and fitting them into a common framework of 
priorities) . 
144. Certain States rejected this approach and, rather than basing them-
selves on individual cases in order gradua11y to arrive at a basis for coordina-
tion, preferred a more systematic and allround approach founded on 
the aid systems themselves. In fact, the two solutions are, in the long run, 
complementary rather than alternative. The examination of individual 
cases was bound in time to result in a coordination of aid systems, while 
the latter could not be fully effective without individual cases being 
examined, if only for the purpose of control. 
Consequently, the choice of the method did not matter. The Com-
mission had favoured the solution of individual cases, main'ly for practical 
reasons, such as speed of im~ementation, flexibility, and the avoidance 
of a chaJ;lenge to the aid systems. 
The Commission therefore sought another solution that wou1d coor-
dinate and adjust the aid systems themselves. 
What was needed was to make the.systems more transparent, to make 
their territorial and sectoral aspects more specific, and to slow down out-
bidding by fixing a ceiling of aid intensity,· at ,least ·for the more industria-
lized regions of the Community (called "centra!l regions"). All the. 
Member States cooperated in the preparation of the coordination solution, 
and a geneml consensus of opinion (as a result of work carried out in 
implementation of the pt~visions of Article 92 et seq. of the EEe Treaty, 
which lasted two years) was reached on the principles that were to govern 
such a solution. 
145. On 23 June 1971, the above pvinciples were included in a Commis-
sion Communication! in which the Commission informed the Council that, 
as from 1 January 1972 and within the framework of the mission assigned 
to it by the Treaty's provisions, it wou,ld apply these principles to general 
systems of regional aid already in force, or due to enter into force, in the 
1 OJ No. C 111 of 4 November 1971, p. 7. 
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centrail regions of the Community. .The Commi'ssion considered it desirable 
that the Member States undertake to abide by these principles in applying 
their regional aid systems. On 20 October 1971, the governments of the 
, Members States, meeting within the Council, adopted a "First Resolution 
on General Regional Aid Systems"l in which they, in fact, gave this under-
taking. 
146. The principles for coordinating general aid systems, as laid down in 
the Communication of the Commission of 23 June 1971,are.given below: 
Gradual implementation 
147. Gradual implementation mainly concerns the territorial scope of 
application, which, at .first, will be limited to the regions designated as 
"centra:l regions". These include the Community as a whale with the 
exception of 'Berlin, the "Zonenrandgebiet" (.a strip of tel'ritory a few 
dozen kHometers wide along the eastern borders of the German Federal 
Republic, the "Mezzogiorno", and one .third of France (West and South 
West). 
The zones thus excluded are called "peripheral regions" and an 
appropriate solution for them will be worked out, taking the specific prob-
lems of ,each region into account, ' 
If this division into "central" and "peripheral" regions does not follow 
rigorouly scientific criteria, it corresponds, nevertheless, to fairly well 
defined situations with regard to both regions: 
(a) The "peripherai" regions correspond mostly to large geographical 
areas which are far from the consumer and indusvrial cent'res of 
the Community. In these regions, agriculture is still important, living 
standards are still relatively low, and unemployment is still an acute 
problem. In view of the seriousness of the other problems to be 
solved and the many handicaps to be overcome, the effects of aid in 
these regions do not cause too much worry. 
(b) The "central" regions are generally fairly industrialized even if some-
times rather out-of-date, and face as a result serious reconversion 
problems. Since they have a well-developedinfrastructUl'e and are 
geographically close to one another, it is in these regions that the 
effect of outbidding is most felt. 
2 OJ N° C 111 of 4 November 1971, p. 1. 
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Even in the "central" regions, coordination can only gradually be 
carried out. A transitional period of one year has been laid down to this 
end from the date of implementation of the coordination poliCy, i.e. 1 Janu· 
ary 1972. 
Aspects covered by coordination 
I 
.148. The coordination and adaptation of genetall aid systems concern four 
basic aspects, namely, a single ceiling for the aid intensity, transparency 
of aid, regional specificity, and sectoral repercussions. They can only grad-
ually be put into operation. The necessary technical work is proceeding, 
with regard to some of these aspects, such as improved transparency of 
some forms of aid or the drawing up of a procedure aiming at grasping the 
sectoral effects of regional aid. 
The single intensity ceiling 
149. In the Community's "central" regions, Member States must respect a 
single intensity ceiling when applying regional aid to a given investor for 
a given investment. This ceiling, which enters into force on 1 January 1972 
and which takes into account all cumulative regional aid regardless of form, 
is fixed at 20 % of the investment in net grant equivalence calculated on 
the basis of a common method for aid evaluation. 
In order to compare various forms of "aid and the different aid systems 
of the Member States, it is necessary that this method, which is based on 
the relative amount of aid granted as against the amount invested, should 
only take aid after taxation into account, i.e. the net grant equivalent re-
maining to the beneficiary after deduction of profits tax. The result is that 
the maximum amounts calculated by this method are considerably lower 
than the nominal aid rates envisaged in general aid systems which do not 
take this taxation into account. 
Since the trend in "central" regions should be towards a reduction in 
the amount of aid, the level of the ceiling wiM be re-examined at the end 
of 1973, taking into account experience gained and adjustements made with 
regard to existing aid systems for the purpose of more effective trans-
parency. The fixing of a single ceiling does not mean that the granting of 
aid is justified in every central region zone. Only those regions (or, within 
them, certain clearly-defined zones) where the socio-economic situation 
justifies the .. granting of aid may benefit from it. Below this ceiling, 
which represents an upper Ilmit, the Commission will see to it that the 
Member States vary the intensity of the original aid in relation to the 
characteristics of the region concerned, and where necessary, in relation to 
sectoral needs. 
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Furthermore, notwithstanding the limit of 20%, the Commission 
may waive the ceiling on the basis of supporting social and ecoonmic 
evidence which must be supplied beforeband. These derogations must be 
applied qn an exceptional basis and will" be the subject of periodic com-
munications from the Commission to the Council. , 
Transparency of aid 
_ 150. Respect for the cei!ling implies that it should be possible to determine 
the relative percentage of ill aid granted to an investment in relation to the 
total amount of the investment by applying a common evaluation method 
worked out with the assistance of experts from the Member States. This 
method brings to light two categories of aid, namely: 
(a) Transparent aid based on investment and for which it is possible to 
calcuLite the relation between the investment and the amount of aid 
from w,hich it benefits; 
( b ) Non-transparent aid for which no calculation of this relation is pOs-
~~ . 
Bearing in mind this definition of aid transparency and the respect 
for the principle according to which transparency is an essential requirement 
for the coordination and evaluation of general aid sys tems, the Member 
States have undertaken to cease introducing further non-transparent aid to 
take advantage of changes in, or renewal of, existing systems to give them 
effective transparency, and also to cut out aid, the non-transparency of 
which cannot be remedied. Experts are now working on these questions. 
Regional specificity 
151. This concerns a differentiation, according to nature, acuteness and 
urgency, of regional development problems which the public authorities 
are trying to work out. 
Since the concept of regional specificity is directly linked with the 
drawing-up of a Community regional policy, no more precise provisions 
than those contained in the Treaty could at present determine those Com-' 
munity regions where aid is justified to varying degrees and those where 
such justification does not exist. The Commission must, therefore, within 
the framework of these provisions,. examine each case separately in order 
to see if a situation which a Member State wishes to remedy justifies such 
aid, and "also if the intensity of the aid is adapted to the seriousness of the 
s'ituation. Furthermore, the following principles must be followed: " 
( a) regional aid must not cover the entite national territory of a Member 
State, with the exception of the Grand DUchy of Luxembourg, which 
is considered as a single region. " 
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· (b) general aid system must clearly define, either geographically or by 
means of quantitative criteria, the delimrnatJion of 'regions, or of zones 
within such regions, which are to benefit fro~ aid; 
( c) Except where growth points are concerned, regional aid may not 'be 
granted to isolated geographical spots having practically no influence 
on the growth of a region; 
(d) Aid intensity. should be adapted to the nature, seriousness and urgency 
of the problem; 
(e) The graduation and variation in the rates of aid according to area and 
region must be dearly indicated. 
Sectoral repercussions 
152. It is in the goods and services sectors that the effects of regional aid 
on competition and trade are most felt. But all industrial sectors, without 
distinction, may normally benefit from general regional aid systems and 
it is difficult to evaluate the particular influence of such aid on different 
sectors. 
It is necessary, therefore, to work out a method which will make it 
Possible to gra'sp the sectora'l incidence of regional aid, since the latter can 
raise problems at Community level. Such a method, which is at present 
being worked out; may consist of an examination in three stages, namely: 
(a) a general statistical survey showing the main sectors where problems 
may arise, since statistical indices show that they are particularly 
affected by the application of regional aid and by intra-Community 
trade; 
(b) A similar statistical survey, by branch, within the sectors which have 
been defined; . 
(c) Finally, an additional survey taking into account qualitative and other 
indices, which cannot as yet quantified for the sectors or branches 
concetI}ed by means of the above quantitative surveys. 
Supervision of coordination 
153. Since coordination ·and adjustment of regio'nal aid systems ~s pro-
gres~ive, supervision is essential not only to ensure. gradual implementation, ' 
but also to evaluate the real results of the coordination and, where necessary, 
to improve the application method~. 
The Commission carries out ~upervision by means of a posteriori 
communications submitted to it concerning the most significant cases of 
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application, in accordance with a procedure guaranteeing secrecy ,which will 
be worked out in cooperation with Member States' experts. 
The results of this procedure will be periodically studied with senior 
national officials dealing with aid. An annual report will be submitted by 
the Commission 'to the Council and other Community institutions concerned. 
Coordination of regional aid systems in the "central" regions constitutes 
a first stage towards the elimination of outbidding with regard to aid, a 
problem concerning which'the European Parliament has shown its preoc-
cupation in its resolution on the rules on competition and on the position 
of enterprises within the Common Market and within the world. economy.l 
Coordination should make it possible not only to maintain more effective 
'competition, but also to bring about a closer relation between regional aid 
and the relative seriousness, at Community level, of regional difficulties 
which must· be solved. The resu'ltingrestriction on aid to the "central" 
regions should increase the effectiveness of initiatives for the benefit of 
<I'peripheral" regions where the problems are much more acute. 
TIlE COMMISSION'S POSITION IN SPECIFIC CASES 
154. The principles of coordination have been established by the Com-
mission in application of Articles 92, et seq of the Treaty. In its normal 
management of these provisions, the Commission was led to assert some 
of these principles even before they had been laid down for genel;'al applic-
ation. Some of the aid projects examined by the Commission in 1971 
illustrate this. 
rtwestment grants in the German coal sector 
155. On 17 February 1971, the Commission handed down a decision, in 
accordance with Article 93(2,1) of the EEC Treaty which requested the 
Federal Republic of Germany to put an immediate end to non-selective 
investment grants in the North-Rhine Westphalia region, as provided for 
in paragraph 32 of the "Kohlegesetz" of 15 May 1968.2 
These investment grants, amounting to 1 0%, had been introduced 
in 1968 by German law together with a series of measures for reorganizing 
the coal indl:lstry in order to slow down the economic decline of the regions 
affected by the coal crisis, and to find other employment for those who had 
lost their jobs as a result of the closing down of a number of coal mines. 
1 OJ N° C 66 of 1 July 1971, p. 1t. 
2 OJ N° L' 57 of 10 March 1971, p. 19. 
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This encouragement to set up or enlarge enterprises other than those con-
cerned with coal was intended to create new possibilities of employment 
and a diversification of structures that had formerly been too dependent on 
the mining industry. 
At that time, the Commission had raised no objections to the granting 
of aiCl for a period limited to two years. In view of the continued deterior-
ation of coal marketing conditions, in view of the exceptional increase in 
colliery stocks, in view of the unfavourable developments of revenue 
indices in relation to the rest of the FederaJ territory, and in view of the 
need to create 2000 new jobs during this period, the Commission considered 
that such regional aid could be agreed to even with regard to rich and 
industrial areas, since it was intended to prevent these regions suffering 
from serious social and economic problems as a result of the recession 
in an industry which held a determining position in the structures of these 
reiions. 
In any case, the application of aid was considered satisfactory, since 
it showed that: 
( a) considerable efforts had been undertaken at the same time for the 
reorganization of the sick benefit sector; 
(b) the aid was transparent, i.e. measurable in advance in relation to the 
investment and included selectivity mechanisms. Since the grant 
was made by means of tax deduction, only profit-making enterprises 
(therefore competitive ones) couId benefit; 
(c) In view of the fact that, despite the problems to be faced, the regions 
concerned had been industrialized for a long time and therefore exerted 
a certain attraction on potential investors, the intensity of aid remained 
lower that the maximum granted to less developed regions; 
(d) Finally the benefiting coal mining regions were clearly and fully 
defined. "; 
156. This aid, which was origirurlly intended to last two years, was 
extended by Parliament until 1 January 1972. 
The Commission opposed this extension, since it considered that the 
conditions referred to above were no longer fulfilled, in view of the stab-
ility achieved in the coal sector and the satisfactory development of the 
economic and employment situation in the North-Rhine Westphalia Land. 
Over a period of two years, several dozen thousand jobs had been created, 
unemployment had almost vanished in the main coal mining regions, and 
the coal crisis, even if not completely resolved, had been considerably 
mitigated. Continuing aid throughout the regions concerned would not 
only have been contrary to the common interest, there was in fact no 
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obvious reason for it. Indeed, it could have been harmful to less favoured 
zones still existing in the coal mining regions .. 
The Commission's attitude was not purely negative. Without questioning 
the need for extending the period of aid in coal mining regions outside the 
North-Rhine Westphalia Land, where other regional problems arose in 
addition to those connected with the coal mining recession, the Commission 
was of the opinion that a non-selective application of aid in this Land was 
not justified in the absence of precise objectives and of a general plan for 
reorganizing coal mines, taking into account results already achieved by 
the granting of investment aid, and also that one of the most industrialized 
and prosperous regions of the Community was concerned. Such an exten-
sion of aid would have resulted in increasing the disparities between the 
different regions of the Community and was, therefore, incompatible with 
. the principle of the Common Market. 
This was the first time that the Commission formally opposed the 
application of a general aid system with special reference to regional speci- . 
Hcity, that is to say that it considered that the region was not entitled to 
benefit from the regional derogations laid down in paragraph :3 of Article 92 
of the EEC Treaty in view of the economic and social conditions prevailing 
there. 
157. The Commission's decisions which obliged the Federall Republic to 
put an immediate end to the non-selective granting of aid, nevertheless 
left open the possibility of selective aid limited to zones or localities of 
the North-Rhine Westphalia Land in which they were justified because of 
economic or social difficulties. 
The German Government accepted the decision and finally proposed 
the following selection criteria to the Commission: 
(a) Zones in which more than 20% of industrial employment is in coal 
mines and in which the gross domestic product per inhabitant is 
below the average for the Land by no less than 10%; 
(b) Zones in which collieries were negatively reorganized (closing down 
of mines) before 31 December 1971. 
In view of the law's objectives in this matter, the Commission cons,id-
ered that these criteria were satisfactory. The first two criteria make it 
possible to identify those zones where coal mining still played an important 
role and where the consequences of the recession in this industry had not 
yet completely been eliminated. The third identified those zones where 
the creation of new jobs was still necessary as a result of labour being 
released through the closing down of mines. 
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German aid for the purpose of reducing the purchasing cost 
of industrial sites 
158. In order that the prindple of coordination may be respected, partic-
ular attention must be paid to aid which, by its nature, is in general non-
transparent. As already mentioned, efforts are being made to reduce this 
non-transparency. The Commission is at present keeping a careful eye on 
aid which takes the form of price reduction for equipment bought by 
investors. Such is the case with reduced purchase prices for industrial 
sites. The local authorities can often grant such aid, which is also State 
aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the EEC Treaty, and falls therefore 
within the context of the coordination solution. 
15 9. An example of aid in the form ofa reduction ,in the purchasing price 
of sites is that of the German draft law on the sale at reduced prices of land 
belonging to the Bund. According to this draft law, land, whether or not 
built up, may be sold at prices of up to 30'% below its true value, subject 
to its being used for setting up, extending, reconverting or rationalising 
enterprises. When adopting this measure, the German government expres-
sed the hope that it would encourage the Lander and local governments to 
allocate more generously the many sites in their possession for the setting 
up of new enterprises. When expressing a favourable opinion on this 
kind of aid, the Commission took into account the fact that the fixing of 
a limit for price reductions made this aid transparent. The Commission 
also saw to it that such aid be granted only in zones where it was recognized 
that regional aid systems were justified. In addition, the Commission in-
sisted, in so far as regulations were adopted for similar purposes at local 
authority level, that the same degree of transparency and specific regional 
application be respected. 
Measures similarly taken by four Lander (Bavaria, Hesse, Rhine 
WestphaJia, and the Saar, which provide for tax exemption on land transfers 
in favour of investors acquiring industrial sites, fall within the above-
mentioned context .• Aid for land acquisition takes the form of tax aid, 
but since the tax rate is known, the aid operation can be considered trans· 
parent. When deciding on these measures, the Commission has insisted 
that such aid should not be granted outside those zones where regional 
aid systems were admissible. 
Dutch regional aid systems 
160. A very important cha'nge in Dutch policy concerning regiona'laid 
systems has taken place in the sense of greater regional specificity. 
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The main feature '0£ the Dutch regional structure is the existence, 
alongside regions which have need of development or reorganization, of 
an exceptional industrial and demographic concentration within a very 
limited geographical area, namely the Randstad. This feature has been a 
dominant factor in the direction taken by the regional intervention policy 
of the Netherlands since the beginning, but this direction was further 
accentuated by the changes which have taken place. 
Together with the suspension of the grants for aid in favour of new 
investments, in both the.industrial and services sectors, in certain develop-
ment and conversion areas (which will make possible the greater concen-
tration of budgetary means available for the development of other regions), 
the 'Dutch government decided to grant aid to enterprises in the Randstad 
which either moved or extended into the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, 
Drenthe or Overijssel, where the situation was much less favourable. The 
Commission riaturally favoured these changes. 
The Belgian Dra/tLaw on Economic Expansion' 
161. The Belgian Draft Law on Economic EX1pansion was submitted to 
the Commission at the end of 1969, and gave rise to a number of objections 
from the point of view of both the principle for coordinating regional aid 
systems and the principles applicable to other categories of intervention. 
This draft law, as its title indicates, does not exclusively refer to a 
system of general regional aid, but constitutes a complex system of measures 
(including regional as well as sectoral aid ·systems) which aim at developing 
the economy of the country as a whole. It w~s intended that this draft 
law should replace previous regional aid laws (the laws of 18 July 1959 
and 14' July 1966). 
At the draft law stage, the Commission noted that it was. not in a 
position to estimate the real scope of . the aid envisaged, because the im-
plementing regulations with regard to both methods and field of application 
. of the aid conce~ned were still lacking. It was not possible,' therefore, Ito 
verify regional specificity of regional aid or to check whether the aid was 
adequate as regards the difficulties to be solved. The' same applied to 
sectoral aid .since there was no indication in the draft law with regard to 
those sectors most likely to benefit from it. 
In such cases, a presumption of incompatibility exists with regard to 
both regional and sectoral aid since, once a draft law is enacted, it can be 
applied without precisions concerning all points raised. being given and 
without the Commission being able to estimate the incidence of aid on 
trade and competition within the Community. 
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162. In June 1970, the Commission was, therefore, Jed to initiate the 
procedure laid down in Article 93 (2) of the EEC Treaty.1 This meant that 
the Belgian government 'was automatically refused permission to put the 
proposed aid systems into operation until such time as the Commission had 
taken a final decision. 
At the same time, the Commission decided to subject recognition of 
the compatibility of sectoml aid with the principle of the Common Market 
to prior examination of significant individual cases of application. This 
requirement was based on two considerations. Firstly, the draft law laid 
down that sectoral aid should be granted to sectors outside the geographical 
zones for which aid could be granted. This meant that the possibility of 
granting ,regional specificity to this sectoral aid was excluded in advance. 
Secondly, discussions with the Belgian authorities had shown that the latter 
could. not envisage prior determination of benefiting sectors without inter-
fering with the flexibility of the measures whi~h the Belgian government 
had tried to achieve. On the other hand, the absence of sectoral and 
regiorialspecificity would have. given this ·sectoml aid the character of 
general aid incompatible with the principles of the Common Mark~t. In 
order to avoid the suppression of such aid, the only solution was that of . 
prior examination of individual cases. 
This condition was accepted by the Belgian government, which also 
undertook to communicate to the Commission the draft regulations needed 
for the application of the proposed aid measures, in particular those which 
defined the zones in which regional aid would be applied. 
The draft law became the Law on Economic Expansion of the 30 De-
cember 1970 and entered into force on 1 January of the following year. 
163. The Belgian government, however, extended the term of validity of 
the previous decrees for the implementation of the Laws of 1959 and 1966, 
which had been rescinded upon the entry into force of the new law. This 
made possible the application of regional aid in zones in which the need 
for such aid was no longer apparent in view of the social and economic 
development in recent years. 
As a result, the Commission continued with the.procedure and gath-
ered the opinion of interested third parties.2 The Belgian' government 
1 The initiation of this procedure does not imply prior rejection of the draft law 
submitted to the CommissioI1 for examination Its purpose is only to enable a 
detailed examination to be made by the Commission in cooperation with all the 
Member States concerned, and to ensure that the application of the proposed mea-
sures does not create practically irreversible situations. 
2 OJ No. C 32 of 6 April 1971, p. ~. 
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endeavoured to find a solution which was compatible with the provisions 
of the Treaty. These efforts led to the drawing up of a draft amendment 
to the law which altered the delimination criteria of zones in which regional 
aid may be granted. On the basis of this amendment, the Belgian govern-
ment submitted 'a draft to the Commission which defined the new zones 
and which included the socio-economic criteria and justifications leading to 
their selection. This delimination is at present being examined by the Com-
mission, which will take a decision on the question by applying the prin-
ciples of the coordination solution. 
§ 3 - Sectoral aid-systems 
GENERAL PROBLEMS 
164. In general, the evaluation of sectoral aJid systems raises less serious 
problems than that of general regional aid systems, because their field of 
application and scope is more clearly defined. These systems do not, how-
ever, exhaust the question of theseetoral incidence of State aid. 
Regional aid, which ts usually general and a stimulant, does not res~lt, 
in every sector, in a genuine compensation of the handicaps facing enter-
prises because of their particuJ1ar location. Thus, either as a result of the 
more or less voluntary intentions of national administrations or as a result 
of the utilization by industrialists of the possibilities which are offered, the 
granting of aid can bring about sectoral effects which must be carefully 
examined. Otherweise. the col-mol of sectoral initiatives only could be 
evaded. Hence, the importance attached to the drawing up of a method 
for examining sectoral effects as provided for by the coordination solution 
for regionaiaid.1 
Systems also exi·st which are based on the need to "modernize", 
"adapt" and "foster the growth' of the national economy. Such systems 
are likely to be applied to all enterprises, regardless of sectoral or regional 
location. Because of the lack in specificity, these systems cannot 'legally 
benefit from the Treaty's exemption provisions, since they obviously cannot 
be evalluated a priori by the Commission. Initiatives undertaken within 
. the framework of coordination of general regional aid systems must there-
fore be followed up in order to make the necessary adjustments. which 
will make the above systems more specific or more subject to preliminary 
control. 
1 See .p. 126, item 4. 
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165. More~ver, sectoral aid must be supervised to ensure that certain 
criteria, which in fact apply to lfll types of aid, .are respected. These criteria 
should ensure that the aid does a minimum of harm to competition and 
has a maximum effectiveness with regard to the balanced development of 
the Community. Such aid must: 
be of a selective nature and only be granted to enterprises or to 
productions, the development and reorganizing of which justified the 
presumption that they wiltl be competitive in the long -run, having 
regard to the expected development of the sector concerned; 
be of a sufficiently temporary or even d~gressive nature in order to 
stimulate the dynamism of beneficiaries. It must foster the necessary 
adaptations and make it olear to the parties concerned that the artifi-
cial situation arising from the granting of aid cannot continue in-
definitely. Unless it is .intended to compensate competition distortions 
at Community level, which are created by measures adopted in non-
member countries, purely conservatory -aid outside reorganization 
programmes and' aid for the operation of plant must be excluded. 
Economic social progress cannot allow, in the long run, an unreason-
·able protection of sectors facing difficulties. Aid systems must there-
fore be such as to avoid preventing indefinitely the optimum alloca-
tion of production factors. They must either speed up structural 
changes or only slow down such changes temporarily, and this only 
until the necessary reconversion solutions have been found; 
be as transparent as possible, in order that the Community institu-
tions may easily eVlfluate their true incidence and effectiveness 
with regard to the aims ·to be attained, in order that the public 
authorities may be in a position to measure accurately the cost in-
volved, and in order that the enterprises concerned may assess the 
true situation; 
be of a form well -adapted to the objectives in view and, in -so far as 
the choice between various methods is possible, adopt those that have 
the least effect on intra-Community competition and the common 
interest. 
These principles are in direct line with those favoured in the medium-
term economic programmes and in the report on "the Rules on Competition 
and the Position of Enterprises within the Common Market and the World 
Economy",! which was submitted to the European Parliament by its 
Economic Committee on 2 February 1970. 
1 Report by Mr. Berkhouwer (doc. No. 197) paragraphs 41, 42, 44 and 45. 
130 REP. COMPo 1971 
166. As atlready emphasized above> national mltlatlves too often take 
stl'ic1!ly national objectives and situations into consideration. This misun-
derstanding of the Community context may lead to errors of lappreciation 
with regard to the economic data covering the branch in question and to 
extremely negative distortions of competition. As regardssectoral aid, 
here too a coherence of national initiatives must be sought in order to 
achieve optimum Community development. 
It is, therefore, necessary to oppose national aid which may cause 
difficultie~ in another Member State, or may unduly prevent equal de-
velopment, by artificially maintaining or developing certain production cap-
acities. Failing this, such aid is only a waste of resources from the common 
interest point of view. 
The Common Market results ina ,sy~biosis of national economies. 
Difficulties which justify the granting of sectora'l aid in one Member State 
are often aiso encountered in other Member States, since they are caused 
by a ·common economic development. In some branches, this phenomenon 
hasallrea8.y been noted, ailthough the aims, forman8. intensity of aid granted 
are not necessarily a1lways identical, since the 'structures and difficulties of 
the branches concerned are not aJ~ays the same in aU the Member States. 
When such situations arise, the Commissions does not act by "reac: 
tion" alone to the nationail initiatives undertaken successively. When the 
Commis'sion is in a pos!tion to formulate an accurate diagnosis of the 
negative development noted or forecast in a particular sector, a develop-
ment whi'ch wou!Id in all probability lead to national action on the part 
of the Member States, it tries to forestall matters and develop a " Com-
munity framework" within which nationall' initiatives should take place. 
Such a "framework" shou:1d include the main guidelines of the industrial 
aims to be attained as weB as details of the means to be used for this pur-
pose and which would be favourably viewed by the Commission when 
dealing with an a,id project for the sector concerned. The Member States 
wiU, of course, be properly advised of the contents of the Community 
"framework". The Commission naturally shares the view that such a for-
mula must not be considered as an encouragement to professional circles 
to ask for and to public authorities to promote in all Member States this 
type of aid, since the need for it may not be apparent in alil the Member 
States. 
In other branches, the development of the Common Market has led, 
in fact, to largely identical 'situations (e.g. shipbuilding and film produc-
tion). Here, the Commission must try to work out a genuine Community 
aid system. This is in fact a strengthened form of the action referrcti (0 . 
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above, which should also include the methods and intensity of aid applied 
to the Community as a whole. 
RECENT POSITIONS TAKEN UP BY THE COMMISSION 
167. Certain of these aims of a general order have, in recent years, been 
illustrated by positions adopted by the Commission. Other quite important 
Commission positions on agriculture or transport will not be considered 
here, since they cannot be separated from the context of common policies 
specific to these sectors and within which the purpose aimed at can be 
more clearly understood. In this connection, the Fifth Generall Report on 
the Activities of the CommunitiesshouJd be referred to. 
Shipbuilding 
168. Shipbuilding is one of the few industries to benefit from production 
aid throughout the world. 
This has led toa genuine "aid rush" during the period 1960-1970 for 
which there are several reasons. 
As against other industries, shipbuHding cannot be protected by 
conventional commercial policy measures (customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions) without prejudicing shipbuilders who carry out their business 
on markets where competition is extremely. active. The export of ships, 
therefore, also involves the export of certain manufactured products which 
are incorporated in the ships and which could, as such, not easi1ly be ex-
ported without encountering certain obstacles, especially customs duties. 
Fostering an increase in tonnage by lowering prices of ships and by main-
taining freight prices at a low ;level could alIso be to the advantage of. 
economies which are largely dependent upon seagoing trade. 
Thus, thanks to aid, some non-member countries have been able to 
build up an important, and in one particu<lar case, a dominating position on 
the world market. This -situation coU'ld not be ignored by the traditional 
shipbuilding countries of Western Europe, because of the regional and 
social considerations arising from the Ilocation of a number of shipyards. 
Their reactions were also motivated by shipping and industria'l policy 
considerations, since shipbuilding, being essentially an assembly industry, 
considerably influences the economy as a whole. 
It would have been better to normalize the competition conditions on 
a world-wide .basis rather than to adopt national protection measures which 
are bound to foster outbidding in the matter of aid. This was done within 
the OECD, which groups the world's main shipbuilding countries, but the 
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effective results of this work have only started to show themselves in 1971. 
In the meantime, measures had to be taken in Europe, and in the Com~ 
munity in particuUar, both at' national and at Community levels. Since 
1972, to aid traditionally granted in France and Italy was added aid granted 
in Germany, followed by aid granted in. the Netherlands and in Belgium 
from 1967 onwards. 
For its part, the Commission submitted to the Council, in 1965, a 
drilft directive concerning the granting of aid to shipbuilding with a view 
to correcting distortions of competition on the internationall shipbuiolding 
market. This directive was only adopted by the Council in July 1969.1 
It fixed the ceiling of national aid granted to shipbuilding at 10% of the 
selling price, ,a percentage which corresponded to the prejudice suffered 
by the Community shipyards as a result of distortion of competition. 
This directive was due to expire at the end of 1971. Nevertheless, it 
provided that the Commission could, before the date of expiry, submit a 
report on the international situation to' the Council together with any 
necessary proposals for measures to be taken later. The submission of a 
new draft directive wi11 have the effect of extending the term of vaHdity 
of the origin'<l!l directive until 30 June 1972. 
169. The directive of 1969 achieved its aims, which were to protect the 
Community shipbuilding industry and harmonize aid granted within the 
Community. 
Although the Community shipbu~lding ind~'Stry had suffered a reces-
sion unti:! 1967, the position, in quantit·ative terms, had improved sughtly 
by 1969 and stabilized after that. The improvement is more marked in 
quaHt:ative terms, a's the European industry ha'S specialized, in recent years, 
in the construction of ships of greater value added adapted to the require-
ment'S of modern maritime transport. . 
AC,tion taken to compensate distortions of competition was accom-
panied by structural measures intended to speed up the adaptation of the 
sector to the new market conditions and to technical progress. Because 
of the results obtained and as a positive result of the
t
1969 directive, there 
has been a relative improvement in the Community's position. . 
The balance-sheet with regard to the harmonization of specific aid 
within the Community is equally satisfactory. 
1 DJNo. L 206 of15 August 1969, p. 25. 
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In the early stages the situation was quite er.llatic, with aid exceeding 
30.% of the 'selling price in France and Italy, while elsewhere no aid was 
granted at aU. Since 1967, the situation has tended to become more 
balanced, the figure for national aid dropping, within a few years, to around 
10%, with the exception of ItaJy where the figure was still higher. Since 
the beginning of 1971, a downward alignment has been recorded, and now 
the average fluctuates around 5%, here again with the exception of Italy, 
where the figure for aid still hovers around the maximum rate of the 10% 
fixed by the directive. In some Member States, however, there are general 
aid systems which are to a {arge extent granted for shipbuilding and which, 
added to the specific aid, appreciably affect prices for ships. 
Efforts within the OECD for normllflizing competition conditions on 
the international market have resulted in two OECD Council resol~tions 
being successively adopted on 30 May 1969 and 16 December 1970 
respectively, which laid down the optimum credit conditions for the export 
of ships, a ceiling which was not to be exceeded. The last arrangement 
had an important effect in reducing export credit aid, since the rates of 
interest for this particular export credit had to remain below the figure 
of 75%. In addition, the OECD took action in order to arrive rapidly 
at an overall agreement which would result in the progressive abolition 
of allI forms of aid to the industry. The need for protection on the part 
of the Community shipping industry is therefore no longer so great. 
170. In view of the above, the Commission proposed to the Council in 
1971 the adoption of a new directive which would be valid for three years, 
but which would differ from the previous one on the following points: 
( a) The cei:ling of aid would he ,lower than the one 'Set previously. Export 
credit aid woU'ld be Hmited in accordance with the provisions laid 
down by the OECD (minimum rate at 7.5%, deposits 20%, dura-
tion 8 years) whilst other aid would be limited to 5% of the selling 
price in 1972, 4'% in 1973 and 3% in 1974. Because of the uncer-
tainty in the world economy since the summer of 1971, this degressive 
trend could be interrupted, if necesary, by a decision of the Council. 
A general review clause is also provided for; 
(b) • Within the Community Hmits for aid, account would be taken of 
export credit facilities and guarantees against rises in cost. In this 
way, another step forward would be taken to place the various Com-
munity shipyards on .an equal footing with regard to governmental 
support by taking measures other than those relating to specific aid 
for the sector under consideration. 
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The textile industry 
171. Thi,s traditionall industry has in recent years had to face serious 
structural difficulties which 'have a threefold origin, namely: 
( a) technological development is changing or likely to change production 
and marketing conditions in the sector; 
. (b) the relatively small rate of growth in domestic demand; 
(c) the development of 'certain productions in the developing countries 
and the basic tendency towards the progressive opening up of world-
wide textile markets. 
Because of its importance with regard to employment and exports, 
this industry had received particular attention on the part of most of the 
Member States in their industrial policy. Aids, which up to a few years 
age were still limited, have tended to increase. Their aim was mainIy to 
help the industry to adapt itself"to the new market requirements and to 
tethnica-l advance. This tendency to intervene could become even stronger 
in order to tackle the effects of the increasingly liberalized commercial 
policy which the Community and its partners may adopt. 
Due to lack of coordination, initiatives, adopted at individual rather 
than at Community level, may lose their effectiveness and adversely affect 
trade and competition within the Community. Competition in textiles 
is quite lively in the Community, ·and trade has reached a very high level 
and is rising consistently. Although adaptation problems have common 
features in the Community as a whole, they can nevertheless differ from 
country to country, according to the level of adaptation which has been 
reached in these countries. Furthermore, in spite of the close interdepen-
dence of the various branches of the textile industry, the problems facing 
the different branches are not always equally acute. 
172. On 30 July 1971, the Community undertook the task of coordinating 
national aid to the textile industry, and therefore, of preventing in time 
any risk of aid escalation. Basing its action on assessing powers conferred 
on it by Community provisions on aid, the Commission pointed out to the 
Member States a number of limits and requirements to which aid must be 
subjected. The object was not to encourage Member Stat~s to intervene in 
favour of the textile industry (in some cases there was no need for such 
intervention) but simply to direct the drawing up of measures to be applied 
where certain States considered intervention essential. Furthermore, while 
laying down the manner in which it would assess aid to the textile industry, 
this Communication does not replace the Commission's position regarding 
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each individual case of aid requested by virtue of the powers conferred on 
the Commission by the EEC Treaty. 
In ,its general guidelines, the Commission's first object has been to 
limit State interventions to certain forms of aid to the exclusion of any 
other. This exclusion refers particularly to aid which directly affects price 
formation and which is consequently likely appreciably to affect trade and 
competition in as sensitive a sector as that of textiles. This applies to all 
aid to production and operation. 
On the other hand, the Commission has been favourably disposed 
towards certain categori~s of aid, provided certain conditions were met. 
Such is the case with aid which fosters joint action for the development of 
research or the improvement of .short-term forecasts with a view to mitig-
ating particularly marked cyclical activity fluctuations on the textile market. 
It is also the case of aid for adjusting textiles structures in order to facilitate 
the elimination of excessive capacity for encouraging conversion of certain 
marginal activities towards activities outside the sector -itself, and finally 
to foster horizontal concentration or vertical integration of enterprises. 
The Commission was more restrictive with regard to aid for invest-
ments for the purpose of the sector's internal modernization or recon-
version, since such aid would seriously affect the competitive position 
between the beneficiaries and their competitors. Consequently, it is the 
Commission's view that the granting of such aid should meet a number 
of criteria. It should be motivated by particularly serious and acute social 
problems, its application should be strictly limited to those activities which 
are affected by serious adaptation problems, its aim should be to restore 
in the short term a satisfactory level of competitivity to the beneficiaries, 
it should in no case lead to an increase in capacity, and, finally it should 
take into account not only the national situation of the industry and its 
branches, but also the Community's situation. 
173. It should be noted that, in its decision of 27 May 19701 concel'ning 
an Italian draft law aiming at reshaping, reorganizing and converting textile 
industry, the Commission had already been led to apply some of tbe prin-
ciples referred to above by opposing the granting of aid to the textile 
industry in the form of an exemption of direct income tax owed by the 
enterprises concerned, and by emphasizing the need for the branches to 
be defined by taking both national and COlJ1munity excessive capacities 
into consideration. 
1 OJ No. L 128 of 12 June 1970, p. 33. 
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The film industry 
174. This sector has had to face a difficuit situation for a long time, asa 
result of competition from certain non-member countries (a large proportion 
of. the revenue from films comes from the Common Market) and from other 
types of leisure activities. In addition, Member States attach considerable 
importance to the sector as a means of information and culture. Finally, 
economically speaking, the film industry is a fairly important activity, as 
is shown by an annual Community turnover of approximately 600 million 
u.a.and by providing employment to approximately 200 000 people. As a 
result, every Member State with a film industry hlls felt the need to inter-
vene on its behalf. 
The Commission wishes to take the sector's particular characteristics 
into account while at the s~me ~ime trying .gradually to eliminate the most 
important differences in aid granted by various Member States. 
175. With this in view, the Commission first tried to align aid granted 
by the various Member States, both in respect of rate and form. 
Aid to exports which producers of certain Member States used to 
receive on the basis of revenue earned in other Member States has been 
abolished. The same applies to import duties on films which have bro).lght 
about discrimination against Community films. Furthermore, the national 
production' aid systems have been brought into line, so that their bases 
and rates are similar in France, Italy and Belgium, and this alignment will 
shortly include Germany. 
The Commission also' tried to obtain from each Member State the 
assurance that the benefits of national aid will be available to the produc-
tions of other Member States.. Indeed, cooperation at Cpmmunity level, 
which has taken shape by co-financing and co-production of films, cannot 
develop harmoniously within the framework of partitioned national sys-
tems. A certain liberalization of national aid system~ has already' been 
achieved with regard to short-length films and to tax rebates to cinema 
owners,so that, where such systems exist already, aid is granted indepen-
dently of the nationality of the films shown provided that they are produced 
in a Member State .. 
The Commission has rece~tly held discussions with, Member States 
in order to examine possibilities which exist in this respect and to deter-
mine methods for generalizing the opening of national aid to Community 
production as 'a whole. This would facilitate the growth of a sector which, 
within the framework of the Common Market, must broaden its fin~cial 
basis as regards both production' and marketing. 
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Aircraft production 
176. In those Member States with an aircraft industry, this sector· presents 
similar characteristics due to the lack of national. adaptation to the require- . 
ments of world-wide competitivity, and to the very considerable appeal 
for governmental support. 
This support is generally provided in the form of aid for research 
and development of prototypes. Such aid consists of financial support re-
payable only in the event of the commercial sUccess of the prototypes for 
which aid had been granted. 
The Commission is studying the problem of industrial development 
in the aircraft sector. Its conclusions should include guidelines and prop-
osals for government aid. Intra-Community cooperation in this sector 
would, in fact, be facilitated and strengthened by concertation of future 
aircraft production programmes. Such concertation deals particularly with 
the importance and methods of governmental financial supports. It would 
enaQle aid to be aligned to the extent considered desirable, and would help 
in seeking the most efficient type of State inetrvention. 
177. It is with this in view that aid for research and development could 
include the following measures: 
( a) alignment of the intervention rates of States cooperating in each 
project for the purpose of establishing a solid basis for cooperation 
between enterprises benefiting from such aid; 
(b) extension of aid for research and development to investments, initial 
tooling and equipment for production; . 
(c) aid granted should not be such as totally to relieve the benefiting 
enterprises of their financial, technical, or commercial responsibilities, 
and should include an obligation of repayment in all cases where the 
marketing of the prototype makes this possible. . 
178. With regard to aid other than that for research and development, 
European aircraft constructors who are facing strong competition from 
non-member countries have, on several occasions, submitted the problems 
of their sector to the Community's authorities and suggested the need 
for intervention to go beyond th~ stage of research and development. 
In this field, a machinery which would provide constructors with 
credits on similar terms in all the Member States would reduce the consider-
able cost of financial assets arising from the setting up of production and 
marketing structures. 
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Credit granted should: 
(a) .be offered at interest rates comparable to those of competing sectors in 
non-member countries; 
(b) be on a long-term basis in order to enable constructors to sell on the 
world market at competitive prices and conditions; 
( c) benefit in the first place those products resulting from cooperation. 
The proposals which the Commission ;m formulate on the basis 
of these preliminary guidelines wiil be examined with the Member States 
for the purpose of providing this sector, within a coordinating Community 
framework, with the means that will enable it to accede to an industrial 
and commercial size capable of competing o.n the world market. 
Sulphur 
179. Since 1968, the Sicilian regioMl authorities have intervened finan-
cially in order to cover by means of subsidies the operation deficits in the 
sulphur sector. . 
This activity, which was protected until 1968 by safeguard measures 
under Article 226 of the EEC Treaty, had been in deficit for a considerable 
number of decades due to the competition from other producer countries 
where the deposits of sulphur were more competitive (Mexico and Canad~). 
Sulphur is also a by-product of natural gas refining and this "inevitable" 
production also weighs heavily on the market. 
For a long time, theJtalian authorities believed that they could limit 
the annual running deficit of sulphur mines, or even eliminate it altogether, 
by reorganizing the indust~y. In view of the regional situation, they consid-
ered that it was in any case necessary to maintain the activity of these 
sulphur mines for a period long enough to enable new industries to be 
set up in the zones concerned. From 1968-1969 onwards, world sulphur 
prices have collapsed. The annual deficit of the Sicilian sulphur mines is 
now in the region of 15 to 20 thousand miUion lire, and this has more 
clearly shown up the lack of competiti~eness of Sicilian sulphur and the 
urgent need for encouraging alternative and economically sound activities. 
180. Aware of the urgency of this problem, the Commission undertook 
an examination of aid measures -which had been submitted to it by the 
Italian authorities. This aid only serves to extend the life of an activity 
which is in deficit and cannot achieve a proper balance. Since such aid 
alone cannot solve the social and regional problems raised, it can only be 
authorised to the extent that it maintains employment in zones for the 
time needed for setting up alternative activities with all possible speed. 
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The Commission insisted, therefore, that the responsible Italian 
authorities should accelerate the setting up of these alternative activities 
and give priority to those which would ensure a high level of employment. 
In this context, the Italian government, while informing the Commission 
in April 1971 of the measures recently undertaken by the Sicilian region 
with regard to the sulphur mines, had not provided sufficient assurances. 
In recent discussions with the Commission, the Italian authorities 
have, however, given further details that will make it possible for measures 
which, taken simultanesously with aid granted to the sulphur industry, will 
eliminate in the long run an abnormal situation from the point of view of 
competition as well as from that cjf a genuine solution of the social and 
economic problems raised. ' 
Aid financed by para-fiscal taxation imposed on imported products 
181. Certain aid granted by Member States is financed by means of para-
fiscal taxes which are imposed not only on domestic products but also on 
products imported from other Member States. In general, the tax is levied 
on the same products which benefit from the aid or on by-products thereof. 
: From a purely national point of view, the levying of a tax and the 
granting of aid represent in fact a simple redistribution of revenue within 
one and the same sector. As regards intra-Community trade and competi-
tion) such systems raise important problems. Since the tax is aho levied 
on products imported from other Member States, the direct competitors of 
th01e benefiting from aid contribute to this financing . 
. In addition, the automatic application of resources obtained from a 
para-fiscal tax raises a double problem. On the one hand, national parliam-
entary budgetary control of .resources allocated for aid is generally lacking, 
and this may lead to aid systems of an intensity which exceeds the objec-
tives or which may no longer be essential. On the other hand, the more 
enterprises of other Member States increase their sales in a particular 
Member State, the greater will be their contribution to an aid which is 
essentially intended to serve the interests of their own competitors. This 
means that the protective effect of aid increases in relation to the efforts 
of exporters. 
Another serious inconvenience of this machinery lies in the fact that it 
generally suggests the need for an additional control at frontiers between 
the Member States, since the levying of the para-fiscal tax imposed on 
imported products takes place most frequently at the frontiers and is col-
lected there by the customs authorities: 
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It is for this reason that the Commission considers that systems of 
aid financed by para-fiscal taxes on products imported from other Member 
States have a protect,ive effect which exceeds the effect of the aid itself. 
182. This point of view was confirmed by the Court in its ruHng l which 
rejected the appeal by the French government with the object of cancelling 
the Commission decision of 18 July 19692 concerning the French aid system 
to the textile sector. 
In its decision, while admitting the compatiqility of aid which, both 
in form and objective, met the real need for the mOdernization and reor-
ganization of the sector, the Commission was of the opinion that the 
financing of aid by means of para-fiscal taxes levied on imported Com- . 
munity products also had a protective effect which exceeded the purpose of 
the aid itself. It decided, therefore, that the system should no longer be 
applied since it affected competition and trade to an exte~t far in excess 
of what was Jndispensable and that,· in any case, it was contrary ·to the 
common interest. 
183. Following this ruUng of the Court, the French government decided 
that it would no longer subject products imported from other Member. 
States to the tax on textile products. For its part, the Commission, in 
January 1971, requested the Member States to abolish similar systems which 
might still apply there, or at least to alter them in such a way as to make 
them compatible with the provisions of the EEC Treaty, so that products 
imported from other Member States should not be subjected to such taxes . 
. The Commission has studied action taken as a result of this request. Al-
though certain systems are still under discussion, it should nevertheless be 
noted that action undertaken has led Member States either to adjust the 
system already in existence (France has in· fact suspended its system of 
subsidies for paper pulp which had been financed by a para-fiscal tax), or 
to cease introducing new systems which would be contrary to the prin-
ciples laid down by the Community institutions. 
Aid to enterprises in difficulty 
184. The Commission has been informed of various aid systems for in-
dustrial enterprises in difficulty, which certain Member States have either 
1 Ruling of the Court of Justice of 25 June 1970 in case 47-69; OJ No. C97 of 29 July 
197.0, p. 8.' 
2 OJ No. L 220 of 1 September 1969, p. 1. 
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introduced or intend to introduce for various reas(;ms, such as the main-
tenance of unemployment particularly when the economic situation clearly 
shows that a nu~ber of structur~l deficiencies exist. 
The Commission is not generally opposed to the introduction of such 
intervention insofar as it is sufficiently exceptionaI and in -So far as: 
(a) aid granted is within the framework of a sufficiently well-defined 
reorganization programme as to represent an effective contribution to 
the reorganization of the enterprises or regions concerned; 
(b) the field of sectoral or regional application where it is granted is -
defined with sufficient precision to enable its effect on competition 
and intra-Community trade to·be assessed. 
185. In this connection the Commission h~d to apply these principles ,in 
a Belgian case. 
Since 1968, the Belgian government has granted credits to enterprises 
with serious profitability problems and which, as a result of the situation, 
could not obtain help from public or private credit bodies on the terms 
usually followed by such bodies. 
The aid was' first granted within the framework of a convention con-
cluded on 9 May 1968 between the Belgian government and the "Societe 
Nationale de Credit a l'Industrie" (SNCI), which was acting on behalf of 
the government. The Commission was informed of -this agreement in 
December 1970 only. The ceiling for the intervention by the SNCI was 
set at 800 million Belgian francs. Within this limit, the SNCI advanced 
the necessary funds for the granting of credits, and the State guaranteed the 
SNCI against any possible failure of the benefiting enterprises by drawing 
on budgetary credits. When the amount covered by the convention became 
exhausted at the end of 1969, other credits were granted to the ·enterprises 
in difficulties, but these credits were granted directly by the State out of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs budget. 
186. This aid had to be considered incC?mpatible with the Common Mar-
ket since: -
(a) as with all aid to enterprises in difficulty, it affected competition and 
trade by preventing the consequences of the normal play of the market 
through artificially keeping enterprises alive which could encumber 
the structure of sectors facing adaptation difficulties and which, in 
order to stay on the market, might act in such manner as seriously 
to disturb the market; 
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(b it fell within the fr:amework of general aid systeI.IlS and was, therefore, 
likely to help all enterprises, regardless of sector: or geographical 
location. It was therefore impossible for tpe Commission to assess 
its effect; . 
(c) its aim was essentially conservatory in that the purpose was to 
. prevent the closing down of enterprises, and leading to unemploy-
ment. Nd definite undertaking was required from the recipients of 
the credits as regards an effort at adaptation that would enable the 
enterprises to resume a position which would be competitive. 
In its decision of '15 December 1971,1 the Commission therefore 
decided that Belgium had to put an immediate end to the granting of such 
credits to eriterprises in difficulty, and this either within the framework 
of the convention with the SNCI or as an item in the budget of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. 
§ 4 - Aid to export 
187. The advantages which Member States provide for their enterpri:ses 
with regard to exports are, in fact, a form of aid. In so far as it concerns 
relations with non-member countries, such aid must at first be examined 
within the context of Article 112 of the EtC Treaty which provides for aid 
alignment to the extent required for the purpose of ensuring that competi-
tion . among Community enterprises is not distorted and' also, where 
necessary, within the context of Article 92 if this aid indirectly affects 
intra-Community trade and competition . 
. Aid granted for sales in other member countries falls under Ar-
ticle 92. In this case, the Commission maintains a consistent position 
according to which such aid is incompatible with the general principles of 
a common market in which a customs union has been achieved in 1968. 
It is more especially incompatible with the free movement of goods and' 
services when a Member State artifically develops its sales in its partner, 
countries while exempting its domestic market from the effects of the aid 
granted. Such aid cannot be~efit from any exception whatsoever and 
this applies to any form of aid, including its intensity, reasons or ultimate 
objective. 
1 OJ No, L 10 of 13 January 1972, p. 22, 
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188. Thus the Commission had, in the past, insisted that Member States 
having price guarantee systems with regard to claims of enterprises resulting 
from export operations should, cease to apply them in intra-Community 
relations in so far as they affect competition and intra-Community trade. 
Similarly, the Commission had also secured the suppression of preferential 
rates, in these relations, by the B.elgian and French central banks for claims 
re discounts of French and Belgian exporters . 
. 
This position of the Commission has in fact been confirmed by the 
Court of Justicel in a decision concerning French rediscount rates. On the 
basis of the Court's ruling, the Commission requested the Italian Govern-
ment to suppress, in its intra-ColtJmu.nity relations, aU aid granted to ex-
porters in the form of a preferentia1 rate for the financing of medium-
term credits. Following this request, the Italian authorities informed the 
Commission, in Apr1l1971, that they had decided, by means of a ministerial 
order addressed to the Mediocredito, to stop applying this mechanism in 
their relations with other Member States. 
SECTION 2 - APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE ECSC TREATY TO STATE AID FOR. THE 
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 
189. With regard to State aid for the iron and 'stedl industry, and as the 
result of an appeal lodged by the Dutch Government before the Court of 
Justice against the position adopted by the Commission with regard to aid 
granted by the French Government under the "Plan professional de la 
siderurgie'',2 the Commission was led to define its position on the delimit-
ation between the prohibitions of Article 4 (c) and the provisions of Ar-
ticle 67 of the ECSC Treaty. • 
The Commission then restated its position, which was confirmed in 
the conclusions of the Advocate General, namely that the prohibition under 
Article 4( c) of the ECSC Treaty concerns aid granted solely to the coal 
and steel industry or in a discriminatory manner in favour of this industry. 
In fact, the ECSC Treaty only achieves a partial integration limited 
to the coal and steel sectors_ The Member States are still responsible for 
1 Ruling of the Court of Justice of 10 December 1969 in the joint cases 6 and 11-69, 
OJ No. C 19, 13 February 1970, p. 7, Recueil, 1969, p. 523. 
2 See. also, Ruling of the Court of Justice of6 July 1971 in case 59-70; OJ No. C 94 
of 24 September 1971, p. 4. 
144 .REP. COMPo 1971 
,. 
. ... 
;"l 
their country's general economiC policy as clearly indicated in Article 26.1 
This implies that Member States may continue to take general measures in 
favour of their economic and industrial development, including the coal 
and steel sectors, provided that such measures do not favour them more 
particularly. There is special advantage only when the competence of the 
Member States is exercised in a discriminatory manner, that is to say, if 
the; aid granted to coal and iron and steel enterprises is more advantageous 
than that allowed in similar situations to other analogous sectors. 
190. Nevertheless indiscriminate exercise of competences left to the States 
must be ~iewed under the terms of. Article 67 of the ECSC Treaty, this 
Article having been specially designed to solve problems arising out of 
partial integration. When Member States act in the exercise of the powers 
still held by them and which do not come under the ECSC Treaty, it 
should at least be possible to remedy certain appreciable effects which that 
action can have on the conditions of competition in the sectors falling within 
the scope of the Treaty of Paris. 
Is is, therefore, the Commission's duty to examine aid granted by 
the Member States to their iron and steel industries in order to decide 
whether such aid is compatible with the provisions of Article 4,( c), and 
possibly the manner in which such aid should be evaluated with regard to 
the provisions of Article 67 ( 2) and (3) of the Treaty. ,The provisions' 
of the latter Article do in fact lay down that any action by a Member State 
which is likely appreciably to affect c()nditions of competition in the coal 
and steel industries must be notified to the Commission. 
191. The Comm~ssion therefore expects to be informed beforehand of aid 
,granted to the iron and steel industry and its method of application. 
In view of the lack of information provided by the Member States'- the 
Commission 'has had to intervene on several occasions in order to obtain 
from the governments concerned a systematic notification of the required 
information, including information concerning aid previously granted. The 
Commission has, however, found. that information provided by some Mem-
ber States on aid granted was often missing or incomplete, and this in 
spite of repeated Commission reminders. The Commission therefore de-
cided, in December 1971, to summon two particular Member State!> to 
submi t their observations under the terms of Article 88 ( 1) with regard 
to non-observance on their part of the obligations under Article 86 ( 1 ) . 
1 See also, Ruling of the Court of Justice of 23 Febraury 1961 in case 30-59; OJ 
No. 17 of7 March 1961, p. 454,. Recueil 1961, p.l. 
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CHAPTER II 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
192. The State's partiCIpation in economic actIvltles by means of inter-
mediary enterprises, partially or wholly controlled by the public authorities, 
has for a long time been an important component of the economic system. 
The EEC Treaty in no way prejudices the system of ownership in Member 
States. ' . 
The Commission enforces the respect of several of the Treaty's 
provisions, which regulate the' activities of the Member States as regards 
private and public enterprises. More particularly, as far as public en~er­
prises as well as a number of private enterprises owning special or exclusive 
rights are concerned, the Commission sees to the application of Article 90( 1 ) 
of the EEe Treaty which forbids Member States to enact or to preserve 
measures which are contrary to the terms of the Treaty. 
In order that the Commission may carry out its duty in this field, 
it is necessary that it have detailed knowledge of the public sector which 
takes recent developments into account. It also. requires a re-examination 
of the relatiOIiship between the State and the public enterprises in the light 
of the Treaty's rules. These are the tasks which the Commission is to 
undertake in the immediate future. 
193. The Commission has already carried out a preliminary study on one 
·aspect of State participation in economic activities, namely competition 
between public and private enterprises. The results of this study are being 
examined by the Commission departments concerned. 
194. The question of the direct applicability of Article 90(2) was raised 
in 1971. Subject to certain conditions being fulfilled, this Article provides 
for an exemption from the Treaty's rules for enterprises responsible for 
administering a service in the general economic interest and for fiscal1 mono-
" 
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polies. The Court of Justice ruled! that since the application of this article 
carried with it the need to assess the requirements incorporated in the 
partiCU'lar duties of the enterprises concerned and, in addition, to s'afeguard 
the Community interest; and since such an assessment draws attention to 
the general economic and political objections persued by Member States 
under the Commission's scrutiny, the exemption in question is not at 
present -likely to create individual rights which national courts will have 
to safeguard. 
1 Ruling of the Court of Justice of 14 July 1971 in 'case 10-71, OJ No. C 103 of 16 
October 1971~ p. 7. . 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ADJUSTMENT OF NATIONAL COMMERCIAL MONOPOLIES 
195. Artiole 37 of the EEC Treaty imposes on the Member Scates with 
national commercial monopolies the duty of adjusting these monopolies in 
I 
order that, at the expiry of the transitional period, all discrimination should 
be abolished among nationals of the Member States with regard to supply 
and outlet conditions. 
As a result of experience gained by the Commission in this field 
during the transitional period it appeared that the incidence on imports 
from'Member States of differences with regard to the final aim of a partic-
u1ar monopoly (fiscal purpose, protection of national production, assurance 
of supplies, etc.) is in most ·cases essentially the same. The raison d'hre 
'of an exclusive right to import and to sell on the national market is to 
enable a monopoly to fix the limits and terms on which foreign products 
will be admitted on the market. 
In its decision-taking, the monopoly is above all pursuing a fixed 
objective, and it will be easily understood that the true scope for marketing 
foreign products (i.e. foreign products which would have been avaiJable 
in the absence of the monopoly's control) is only taken into consideration 
by the monopoly in so far as they do not hinder the attainment of the said 
objective. 
196. Thus it had been found that several provisions governing the opero-
tion of monopolies, as well as measures taken by the monopolies them-
selves, have a discriminatory effect on the conditions of supply and market-
ing of goods to the detriment of foreign suppliers. To give but a few 
examples, mention should, be made of the clear refusal to import, of quan-
titative restrictions of imports, of the imposition of more onerous marketing 
conditions for imported products than those applied to national products, 
or of conditions which are discriminating against the advertising of foreign 
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products or against information to imported products as far as retailers are 
concerned. 
The purpose of the granting of exclusive exporting rights may differ, 
but the discriminatory effects are the same. By reserving this right or by 
granting exclusive rights to an enterprise or other body, the State generally 
aims either at supplying the domestic market on a priority basis or at selling 
at varying conditions according to whether the products are sold on domestic 
or on foreign markets: In both cases, the result is discrimination in supply 
conditions against who nationals of other Member States use the products 
in question. 
197. Fp'llowing a number of recommendations addressed by the Commis-
sion to the Member States concerned by virtue of Article 37 ( 6) of the 
EEC Treaty, the Member States have carried out certain adjustments to 
their monopolies during the transitional period. In the recommendations 
sent by the Commission to three Member States (France, Germany and -
Italy) on 25 November and 22 December 1969, and relating to 12 mono-
polies in these States, the Commission noted however that, in most cases, 
the exclusion of all forms of discrimination covered by Article 37 has not 
yet been assured. 
In its recommendations, -the Commission emphasized the fact that 
Article 37 which falls under the sub heading -relating to the free movement 
of goods, and more particularly the Chapter concerning the removal of 
quantitative restrictions between Member States, aims at obtaining by the 
end of the transitional period, for products subject to a national monopoly 
of a' commercial nature .(or a similar system), the same results as those 
obtained for other products in application of Articles 30 to 34, that is to 
say, the free movement of goods. 
The Commission also emphasized the fact that Article 37 is not 
restricted to demanding the removal of discriminations, which are the direct 
result of provisions applicable to the products of a mo!).opoly, but aims at 
excluding discriminations that could stilI occur at the end of the transitional 
period and that could result from the special powers which the monopolies 
have with regard to the importation, and marketing on their domestic 
markets and exportation of certain products. This could also apply to 
their exports. 
, 
Generally speaking, the Commission was of the opinion that the best 
solution for reaching this result would be the abolition of the exclusive 
rights available to monopolies. The Commission therefore recommended 
that France and Italy, with reference to the monopolies on potash, basic 
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slag, matches, gunpowder and explosives on the one hand, and to the 
monopolies on lighters, flints, salt, cigarette paper and matches, on the 
other, should abolish the exclusive rights granted to these monopolies for 
importing, exporting or marketing these products insofar as trade between 
Member States is concerned. 
It should also be recalled that the Commission has accepted the con-
cept according to whioh Article 37 ( 1) is directly applicable. The conse-
quence of this direct applicability is that, in the absence of full monopoly 
adjustment, the national provisions which are incompatible with Article 37 
can no longer be invoked. 
It must however be stressed that, so long as a State harbouring mono-
polies refrains from declaring (in such form 'as it may consider appropriate) 
that nothing prevents the introduction of a system of free movement in 
the sector concerned, Article 37 ( 1) stands in danger of continuing to lack 
real efect. Unless such action is taken by States, the attainment of the 
objective of Article 37 ( 1) will be left' to individua:ls as for example in 
cases where the matter of a State refusing to admit certains imports is 
taken to court. The Commission therefore considelJs that the Member 
States concerned, should in practice allow individuals to exercise their rights 
under Article 37 ( 1) by taking the necessary measures in accordance with 
the obligation imposed on them by Article 5 of the EEC Treaty. 
, A number of special problems were raised in certain other cases. 
198. This applied to the French petroleum system, not only because, as 
opposed to other application cases of Article 37, trade in petroleum products 
in France is not carried out by a single enterprise or body but by a fairly 
large number of enterprises which have received a special authorization to 
carry out trade and are subject to public authority control. In addition, 
big disparities still exist between the policies of the various Member States, 
particularly as regards commercial and energy policies. This has led the 
Commission to recommend that France amend or abol.ish certain discrimin-
atory measures against nationals of other Member States in the matter of a 
limitation on unrefined petroleum imports originating in other Member 
States and on refined petroleum products.from the same States, by encour-
aging the marketing of national unrefined petroleum and refined petroleum 
products on the French market. As regards a whole series of other pro-
cisions which allow the public authorities to bring about such discrimin-
ation, the Commission request~d the French Government to see to it that 
all dIscrimination with regard \0 supply and marketing between nationals 
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of the Member States should be exclu,ded when the above provisions are 
applied. . '. ,. , .. 
199. In the case of alcohol monopolies (vihich exist in France and in 
Germany) a particular problem arises from the application of Article 37 ( 4 ) 
of the EEC Treaty according to which a monopoly of a commercial nature 
which includes a set of rules intended for facilitating the marketing oV· 
agricultural products, must apply the rules of Article 37 in that it ensures 
equivalent guarantees of 'employment and standards of living of the pro-
ducers concerned, taking into account the possible adaptation by them and· 
necessary specialization. In its recommendations addressed to the two 
governments,"the Commission tried to take into account the problem which 
the absence of a common organization of the markets of ethylic alcohol of 
agricultural origin in the matter of the exclusion of discrimination . required 
by Article 3"1. Although the Commis~ion requested France and Germany 
to take the necessary measures for abolishing all discrimination between 
nationals of the Member States as regards ethylic alcohol of non· agricultural 
origin, brandies and sRirits, it also p<?inted .out those measures which the 
two Governments could either maintain or adopt for the purpose of sa.fe-
guarding the basic objectives pursued at present by the national market 
organizations in both countries. 
200. With regard to manufactured tobacco, no recommendation~ were 
made in 1969 to the two countries· possessing a monopoly (France and 
Italy). This was due to the fact that'a special procedure had been followed. 
It should be recalled that the French and Italian governments had under-
taken to remove at the earliest possible date existing discriminations and 
to put end by no later than 1 January 1976 to exclusive rights in the 
matter of wholesale importation and marketing. This was done in ·Feb-
ruary 1970 when the regulation on the establishment of a common organ-
isation of the market for unmanufactured tobacco was adopted. 
201. The adjustments of the different monopolies and other systems can 
be summarized as follows: 
In almost all cases which raise no particular problems, the govern-
ments concerned formally promised the Commission that they would remove 
exclusive importation and marketing rights possessed by their monopolies 
as soon as possible. The abolition in the near feature of the Italian salt 
and cigarette paper monopolies has been anriounc~d within the framework 
of the present Italian tax reform. The abolition of the lighters' monopoly 
was the object of a decree of 20 April 1971 which completely reorganized 
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this sector by introducing a manufacturing tax on lighters. This decree 
also provides for the abolition of the monopoly on flints which will enter 
into torce on 21 April 1972. 
The undertaking to abolish exclusive rights also referred to the mono-
poly on matches although no date has yet been set . 
. In France, a thorough reform of the gunpowder and explosives mono-
poli(!s has already.led to the setting up of a competing public enterprise. 
" The French Government' has also committed itself to abolishing the 
exclu~iverights of the monopoly on'matches and to obeying the recom-
mendation of the Commission with regard to the potash monopoly, but in 
the latter case only in so far composite potash fertilizers are concerned. 
With regard to pure potash and potassium saits, the French Government 
emphasizes the importance of agricultural and regional development require-
ments in defending the ,retention of a monopolistic system. Similar argu-
ments are put forward with regard to basic slag.' 
The provisions of the French petroleum system, referred to above, 
which led to discrimination among nationals of the Member States have 
been amended by the French Government in accordance with the Com-
mission's recommendation. 
Both the French and the Italian Governments have informed the 
Commissi'on that they have adopted all the necessary measures which will 
etlllble them to meet the undertakings of February 1970 to abolish all 
exi~·ting discrimination with regard to the mantffactured tobacco mono-
polies. " 
Finally, where the alcohol monopolies are concerned, measures have 
been taken by the German Government, following the Commission's re-
commendation. For its part, the French Government has announced re-
peatedly adoption in the near future of certain measures, although has not 
yet fulfilled its cominitmept. 
It'shduld be pointed out, however, that the problem, in this sector, 
of the introduction'of free movement still remains despite the adoption of 
"measures which the Commissiono'elieve, in its recommendations, were 
indispensable. The full adjustment of these monopolies is conditional upon 
the common organization of the market for ethylic alcohol of agricultural 
orlgm. Since ethylic alcohol of non-agricultural origin cannot be distin-
guished, either physically or chemically, from alcohol of agricultural origin, 
any liberalization of non-agricultural alcohol might jeopardize the operation 
"0£ the national organization of the agricultural alcohol market. It can be 
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claimed thet the very raison d'e,re of these monopolies will automatically 
disappear with the establishment of a common organization of the market 
for alcohol of agricultural origin. 
202. The Commission is analysing the various reactions of the Member 
States to its recommendations, and will re-examine the cases where par-
ticular problems are raised, in order to decide whether a particular case 
requires a procedure for infringement under the terms of Article 169 of the 
EEC Treaty should be engaged. 
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Part Three 
The development of concentration 
within the Community 
Preliminary remarks 
203. Empirical research on concentration enables the Commission to 
base its competition policy on a thorough knowledge of the structures 
of the economic branches under consideration. In Europe, there is 
as yet no coherent and systematic information on changes which 
take the form of the setting up of new firms, of changes in the size of 
firms or plants, of mergers and of the closing down of firms. It is 
at present not yet possible, on the basis of official European statistics 
or of the official national statistics of the Member States, to carry out 
a comparative European analysis on the situation, development, causes 
and effects of mergers. That is why the Commission drew up, in 
1970 and 1971, a wide programme of studies, details of which are 
given in the chapter below. ,The last chapter Fomprises some general 
data o,n concentration operations between 1966 and 1970 among the 
member countries as well as between the Community and non-member 
countries. These data will help to bring to light the essential pattern 
of the <;oncentration process. 
§ 1 - The Commission's analytical study programme on concentration 
Purpose of the studies 
204. By limiting the studies on concentration to a small number of 
sectors only, the. studies on con'centration initiated by the Commission 
in 1970 represent a, first step in throwing some light on the reality 
behind Europe on competition. 'In order to fill the gaps in statistical 
information available, the services of research institutes and of Member 
State experts were sought. The period under review ranges from 
1962, the year in respect of which a census of European industrial 
activities, provided some comparable data on concentrations at Euro-
, pean level, to 1970. The guarantee that the information obtained 
will indeed be coherent and systematic is based a uniform methodology 
worked out by the Commission departments and imposed on the 
research institutes and experts engaged in the studies. ' 
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205. The aim of the studies on concentration is characterized by a 
four-stage programme. 
(a) The first stage consists of a description of the present level and 
development of mergers. 
(b) The second stage will require a study of the causes, and more 
paLi:icularly, the effects of economic concentration in Community 
countries. 
,(c) An appropriate choice of the economic data relating to the input, 
production, and output of the individual films will, in the third 
stage, enable a definition to be given of ,the logical pattern of 
the merger process. To quote only a few examples, is it true 
that control of supplies determines market power in selling? 
Does the concentration process in a given sector begin with 
investment? Does the concentration process follow specific 
patterns in different sectors? Is 'it possible to define "types" of 
concentration processes grouped by criteria such as technology 
or product characteristics? 
(d) The fourth stage will see efforts to determine whether concen-
trations in a particular sector provide conclusions concerning 
the predictable situation in the future as regards competition. 
Whether this programme of studies can be carried out and achieved in 
the four stages will depend not only on the possibilities available to 
the research institutes and national experts for overcoming the difficul-
ties in obtaining statistical data, but also on the availability of staff and 
financial means at the disposal of the Commission. 
Methodology to be applied 
206. In order to put into practice the methodology developed by the 
Commission for studies on concentration, it was necessary to adopt a 
pragmatic approach in the matter. This required the following four 
steps, in each of which the final aim, i.e. to obtain- comparable European 
statistical data on concentration :was of primary importance: 
158 
choice of sectors to be studied; 
preparation of a framework which will enable the research insti-
tutes to use the results of the studies on a uniform basis; 
drawing up of a catalogue definitely fixing the choice and defini-
tion of the factors for measuring concentration, that is to say, the 
groups, units, and variables to be taken into account. For this 
purpose the definitions of the "Office statistique des Communautes 
Europeennes" have been used as far as possible; 
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determination and justification of indices of concentration to be 
drawn up with aid of the studies envisaged. 
207. Three considerations govern the choice of sector. Firstly it was 
important that the range of branches cover, in each Member State, as 
large as possible a section of industrial activity. On the other hand, 
it was necessary to see to it, even if this meant sacrificing extensive 
coverage, 'that' the homogenity of sectors should be safeguarded as 
much as possible, that is to say, in official statistical terminology, that 
clearly defined sub-groups based on manufactured products should be 
taken into consideration. It was then necessary to find those groups in 
which concentration analysis would be of particular interest, that is to say 
those sectors in which the degree of concentration was high, medium or 
low. Finally, the probability of obtaining statistical data for those 
sectors rather than for others 'also played a part. 
208. At present, the programme of studies concerns the following 
sectors classified according to the nomenclatUre adopted by the "Office 
statistique des Communautes Europeennes" (N1CE): 
23: Textile industry 
Sub-sectors studied: 
232 - Processing of textiles by wool processing machinery 
233 - Processing of textiles by cotton processing machinery 
237 ~ Hosiery' 
27: Paper industry and manufacture of paper articles. 
31: Chemical industry 
Sub-sectors studied: 
313.1 - Specialized manufacture of pharmaceutical products in 
bulk or packed . 
313.2 - Manufacture of photographic products (photographic 
. films, discs and paper and secondary products) 
313.5 - Manufacture of household products (polishes, wax-
polishes and products for metal poli'shing, etc.) 
36: Construction of non-electric machines 
Sub-sectors studied : 
361 - Construction of agricultural machinery and tractors 
362 Construction of mechanical office equipment 
REP, COMPo 1971 159 
364.1 
366.3 
366.4 
366.5 
Construction of textile machinery and accessories 
Construction of machines for the mechanical preparation 
of construction equipment 
Construction of civil engineering equipment and equip-
ment for narrow-gauge industrial railways 
Construction of lifting and maintenance equipment 
37: Electro-technical construction 
Sub-sectors studied: 
375 Construction of electrical, radio, television, electro-
acoustic apparatus 
376 Construction of electrical household appliances 
38: Construction of transport equipment 
Sub-sector studied: 
385.1 - manufacture of bicycles, motor-cycles and mopeds 
209. Table 1 gives some structural data for 1962 (beginning of the 
period under review) (number of persons employed and turnover for 
these sectors and the selected sub-sectors in percentages of the total 
number of persons employed and the aggregate turnover of the industry) 
as well as the concentration rates of the sub-sectors (share of persons 
employed by the eight largest enterprises in percentages of the total 
number of persons employed in the sub-sector).l 
No attempt to interpret this table will be made here. The purpose 
of the table is only to provide a fairly modest quantitative illustration 
of the· economic importance and the different ~evels of concentration 
in the sectors chosen for the Commission's studies on concentration, 
in respect of the year serving as a basis for the studies. 
210. The aim of the system of classification worked out fo~' the quan-
titative part of the sectoral analysis is not ohly to enable a comparison 
and use of the results obtained to be made, it should also provide the 
Commission with 'the possibility of making use of statistical material 
on concentration which is already available elsewhere. 
211. The research institutes and national experts in charge of the studies 
are required to present the quantitative results of the concentration 
analysis obtained for each sector in the following form: 
1. Definition and delimitation of the branches 
1 Data is not available for the German Federal ·Republic. 
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2. Firms, units of economic activity and numbe~ ofpersons employed 
21.1 Firms· and number of persons employed, totals and in 'order 
of importance 
21.2 Units of economic actiV:ity andnu'mber of persons employed, 
totals and in order of importance 
3. Fully owned capital, aggregate gross wages and salaries 
31.1 Firms and fully owned capital, totals and in order of im-
portance 
32.1 Firms and aggregate gross wages and salaries, totals and in 
order of importance 
4. Turnover, net value of production, gross added value on the cost 
factors, cash-flow, gross investments and net profits 
41.1 Firms and turnovers, totals and in order of importance 
41.2 Units of economic activity and turnover, totals, and in ordet; 
of importance 
42.1 Firms and net value of production, totals and in order of 
importance 
42.2 Units of economic activity net value of production, totals and 
in order of importance 
43.1 Firms and gross added value on the cost factors, totals and in 
order of ill!-portance 
43.2 Units of economic activity, gross added value on the cost 
factors, totals and in order of importance 
44.1 Firms and cash-flow, totals, in order of importance 
45.1 Firms and gross investments, totals and in order of importance 
45.2 Units of economic activity and gross investments, totals and 
in order of importance 
46.1 Firms and net profits, totals, and in order of importance 
5. Imports and Exports 
51.1 Total imports of firms from the different Member States, 
from the EEC as a whole and from all non-member countries 
52.1 Total exports of firms to the different Member States, to the 
Community as a whole and to all the non-member countries 
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Table 1-Structural data and concentration ratios 
Sectors' 
23 Textile Industry 
232 
233 
237 
27 Paper-cardboard 
31 Chemical industry 
313.1 } 313.2 313 
313.5 
36 Construction of non-electrical 
361 
equipment 
362 
364.1-+ 364 
366.3 1 
366.4 J 366 
366.5 
37 Electro-technical construction 
375 
376 
38 Construction of transport equip-
ment 
385.1 -+ 385 
2/3 Manufacturing industries 
Industries 
Total of sub-scc/ors (three digit das-
sification) 
Total of sec/ors (two digit clas-
sification) 
(a) Labour employed· in % of Industries . 
(b) Turnover in % of Industries 
G 
(a) I 
5.0 
0.7 
1.4 
1.2 
1.6 
4.1 
0.9 
9.4 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
1.5 
8.0 
3.0 
0.8 
5.8 
0.2 
76.3 
100.0 
12.9 
33.9 
Structural datal 
F I 
(b) (a) I (b) (a) I 
4.3 7.2 6.4 10.7 
0.7 1.5 1.7 2.6 
1.1 1.9 1.5 2.7 
0.8 1.3 0.9 2.1 
1.8 1.7 2.1 1.4 
6.2 4.0 6.4 4.2 
1.1 1.5 2.4 1.4 
8.6 5.3 6.0 5.1 
0.8 0.5 0.6 0.3 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 
0.4 0.2 0.2 0.6 
1.5 0.7 1.0 0.5 
6.4 5.2 5.2 4.5 
2.1 1.4 1.5 0.3 
0.8 0.4 0.4 0.3 
6.9 9.6 9.5 7.3 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 
81.5 74.5 82.6 80.3 
100.0 100.0 110.0 100.0 
11.6 '11.7 13.0 13.2 
34.2 33.0 35.6 33.2 
1 OSCE (European Commnnities Statistics Office) Studies and Enquiries, 2,1969; Final results of the 1963 
industrial census p. 110 et seq. 
• LOUIS PHLIPA, Egrets of Industrial Oorwentration: A eross·seelion analysis for the Oommmt Market, 
Amsterdam·London Hl71, Statistical Appendix, p. 185 et seq. 
, Sectors defined in the "Nomenclature des industries ctablies dans les Communautes Europeennes" 
(NICE). Data Is only available for the three digit classification positions. 
• IndustrIes-Manufacturing Industries and mining Indudstries + Building and civil engineering + 
electricity, gas and water. 
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(b) 
7.9 
2.2 
2.0 
1.4 
1.8 
7.7 
2.5 
6.0 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.7 
5.0 
0.5 
0.5 
8.7 
0.6 
83.6 
100.0 
14.0 
, 
37.1 
of the selected sector groups for 1962 
Structural data' Concentration ratios' 
il 
Percentage of persons employed 
N EEC in the eight largest enterprises 
(a) , I (b) (a) I (b) (a) I (b) F I I I N I B 
6.4 5.0 9,3 9.0 7.0 5.7 - - - -
1.0 0.8 2,1 2.6 1.4 1.3 22 24 33 31 
2.4 1.7 2.4 . 2.3 1.9 1.5 24 23 42 36 
1.1 0.6 1.4 0,9 1.4 0.9 12 7 40 15 
1.8 2.4 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.9 - - - -
4.5 6,9 3.5 5.0 4.1 6.5 - - - -
1.0 1.4 1:4 1.9 1.2 1.8 22 24 48 61 
---
5.1 4,0 3.7 3.5 6.9 6.9 - - - -
0.1 0,1 0,2 0.3 0.5 0.6 42 21 41 69 
0.4 0.4 - - 0.4 0.4 84 94 81 -
- - 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 35 44 43 70 
0.6 0,5 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 21 30 33 59 
-
-
7,0 6,2 4.7 3.8 6.3 5,7 - - - -
6,7 5.9 1.0 0.7 2.2 1.8 51 47 98 .85 
- - 0.2 0,1 0.5 0,6 39 55 57 50 
8.4 10.7 5.5 7.6 7,2 8.2 - - - -
- - 0.2 0,2 0,2 0.2 52 65 46 60 
-
-
73.6 80.1 73.9 80,0 76,3 82.0 - - - -
-
100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 - - - -
15.1 13.8 12,1 12.1 12.7 12.4 - - - -
33.2 35,2 28.4 30.7 33.1 34.9 - - - -
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6. Degree of concentration 
61.1 Growth in the number of firms 
61.2 Growth in the number of units of economic activity 
62.1 Average value of the variable per 
firm and per person employed 
62.2 Average value of the variable per 
unit of economic activity and per 
person employed 
63.1 Variation coefficients for firms 
63.2 Variation coefficients for units of 
economic activity 
64.1 Gini coefficients for firms 
64.2 Gini coefficients for units of 
economic activity 
65.1 Linda indices for firms 
65.2 Linda indices for units of econom-
ic activity 
66.1 Concentration ratios for firms 
66.2 Concentration ratios for units of 
economic activity 
67.1 Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for 
firms 
67.2 Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for 
units of economic activity 
68.1 Entropy indices for firms 
68.2 Entropy indices for units of 
economic activity 
For the variables 
21, 31, 32, 
41,42,43, 
44,45,46 
respectivel y 
212. The drawing up of a list of definitions of variables and the choice 
made with regard to the indices of concentration should be considered 
in the perspective of coordinated research ,on concentration. More-
over, a thorough and scientific analysis of the situation and develop-
ment, as also of the causes and effects of economic concentration requires 
a wide-range of data and of measurement processes. 
It is evident from the different mathematical principles applied 
in the various methods of calculation for the purpose of measuring 
concentration, that no concentration measurement can provide an 
answer to all the questions raised by competition policy. Each of 
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the known methods for measuring concentration brings certain aspects 
to the fore while neglecting others. Thus, in every case concentration 
should be measured by a variety of methods. . 
Finally, statistical reality does not permit the limitation of studies 
to only one or two measurements of concentration. Since existing 
statistics differ considerably from one sector to another and from one 
country to another (for example; there exists. sometimes individual 
data only while in other cases only data by order of magnitude are 
available) the means for plculating concentration indices are also 
variable. In order to obtain at least one or two comparable indices of 
inter-sectorial or inter-regional concentration, recourse must be had to 
the greatest extent possible, to the whole available range of calculation 
methods. 
213. In view' of the need for extensive information with regard to·> 
concentration analysis, the methodology worked out by the Commis-
sion's departments represents a minimum programme only. Thus, 
the required data do not make it possible directly to evaluate financial 
inter-penetrations of. the vertical concentration process. In addition, 
the tertiary sector, which is becoming increasingly important, has had 
to be omitted from the present choice of sectors. From the point of 
view of available statistics, the required data should be considered as 
a maximal programme. It follows, and this has been clearly shown in 
previous studies, that changes must be made with regard to the defini-
tions ih the course of the studies and it will not be possible to take certain 
variables into consideration. 
The present state of progress 
214. In order to bring the studies of concentration to a successful 
conclusion, two obstacles must be overcome; namely the problem of 
statistical information and that of the cost involved. As regards the 
problem of statistical information, it is necessary to know whether the 
research institutes in the various member countries are able to' collect 
the necessary basic statistical material. The prqblem of ~ost is one qf 
the limitations set by the Commission's financial capabilities. The 
criteria regarding statistical material and cost cannot be considered 
separately. 
In order to take these criteria into account during the studies on 
concentration, the programmes of studies and the estimates of cost of 
the Member States' research ins'titutes were to be submitted for detailed 
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examination by the Commission in 1970. The results of this analysis 
are: 
The sub-division of the variables by firms and units of economic 
activity could give rise to serious difficulties in the various sectors. 
Whether this applies to all variables will emerge in the course of the 
studies. 
The figures on average cost per sectoral group as indicated by the 
various research institutes shows considerable differences. In this case 
considerable differences can be noted from one sector to another. The 
textile industry and the construction of non-electrical machinery head 
the list. 
215. On the basis of the results of this preliminary study, a study pro-
gramme was prepared in 1971, the details of which are given in Table 2. 
Table 2-Studies on concentration being undertaken or envisaged by the 
Commission with indications of the probable date of completion 
Group of sectors 
NICE classiflclLt ion 
23 Textile industry 
27 Paper industry and manufac-
ture of pape~ articles 
31 Chemical industry 
36 Construction of non-electrical 
equipment 
: 37 Electro-technic~l construction 
38 Construction of transport 
equipment 
Probable dAte of conplet.ion 
Germany I France I Italy 
1972 1972 1972 
1972 1972 1972 
1973 1973 1972 
1973 1972 1973 
1973 1973 1973 
1972 1973 1972 
Nether· I Belgium lands 
1972 
1972 1972 
1972 1973 
1972 
It follows that the possibility of obtaining statistical material 
which takes into account the cost involved for the research institutes, 
and the financial possibilities of the Commission will be limited to six 
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groups of sectors to be studied in respect of the ""large" countries of 
the EEC, namely Germany, France and Italy, and three groups of 
sectors to be studied in respect of the "small" member countries, namely 
Belgium and the Netherlands. ' 
216~ The present programme of studies represents only a first step 
in an attempt to describe and analyse concentration in the Community. 
The Commission considers, however, that this first step is needed to 
arrive at economically valid conclusions on concentration within the 
Common Market. 
§ 2 - Some orientation data concerning international interpenetration and 
concentration trends in the Community between 1966 and 1970 
The statistics of international operations in the EEe 
used as basic material 
217. The present attemp to arrive at some orientation data concerning 
international inter-penetration and concentration trends in the Com-
munity'is based on a systematic evaluation of cross-frontier acquisitio~s 
of holdings and on the setting up of subsidiaries as published in the 
specialized press. The basic statistical data represents, therefore, only 
a sample of all the international operations undertaken by enterprises 
within the EEC between 1966 and 1970,1 The absolute figures given 
in the following tables should, therefore, be interpreted with extreme 
caution; As far as the question of knowing whether the presentation 
of structures and developments reflects reality to a sufficiently large 
extent is concerned, this depends on the degree to which the sample 
examined is sufficiently representative. It is not possible to give general 
indications on this subject. This question will be raised later when deal-
ing with the interpretation of results. 
218. Another reason why the present study can only be considered as 
a first attempt to trace international inter-penetrations and concentra-
tion trends within the Community is that: 
all data on transactions at purely national level are lacking; 
1 In relation to the data fublished in the "Memorandum on Industrial Policy," (the 
Community's industria p.olicy, Memorandum of the Commission to the Council, 
Brussels 1970, p. 89 et seq.), the number of samples has been increased as a result 
of additional studies. The general conclusions are, however, essentially the same. 
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·each operation is evaluated in the same way, that is to say, no 
differentiation between "large" and "small" cases is made; 
data on concentration is not sub-divided into horizontal, vertical 
and diagonal mergers (conglomerate); 
research on the causes of resulting structures and trends is not 
possible. 
219. In spite of all the necessary reservations concerning the significance 
of the basic statistical material, the Commission is publishing the results 
of this study. In the first place, this is being done because better 
material is not available at present. Moreover, the Commission con-
siders the publication of even approximate information is better than 
none at all. 
International operations in the EEe from 1966 to 1970 
220. Table 3 lists international operations for the period from 1966 to 
1970, in the Community, totals and sub-division by type of operation. 
221. The types of operation include: 
acquisitions of Holdings, i.e. international financial acquISIt10nS 
of an enterprise by at least one enterprise from another Member 
State, the range of-possibilities stretching from minority acquisi-
tions to the takeover of the capital of one enterprise by another; 
the setting up of joint subsidiaries which includes the setting up 
of new enterprises in one of the Member States by at least two 
enterprises, one of which is of a different nationality; 
the setting up of simple subsidiaries by means of which an enter-
prise from a non-member country or from a member country 
sets up a subsidiary in another member country. 
In addition to the listing of the number of international operations 
by type, Table 3 also indicates the number of participations in the 
operations. These figures show how many times enterprises have 
participated in international transactions. This does !;lot necessarily 
mean that different enterprises are involved in each case. A particularly 
active enterprise may have participated several times in different inter-
national operations in the same year. 
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Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
J 
Table 3---Type and number of participations.in international. operations within the EEC from 1966 to .1970 
Acquisitions of 
holdings 
Number 
of 
opera-
tions 
254 
228 
241 
265 
327 
Number 
of 
partici-
pations 
535 
468 
485 
525 
642 
Types of operations 
Setting up of 
joint subsidiaries 
Number 
of 
opera-
tions 
315 
299 
292 
324 
345 
Number 
of 
partici-
pations 
959 
840 
888 
946 
977 
Aggregate of 
operations 
Setting up of 
simple subsidiaries 
Number 
of 
opera-
tions 
781 
830 
890 
989· 
1199 
Number 
Number I of 
of opera-
partici- tions 
pations 
781 1350 
830 1357 
890 1423 
989 1578 
1199 1871 
Number 
of 
partici- I 
pations . 
2275 
2138 
2263 
2460 
2818 
Operations in number 
of participants 
Unila-
teral 
opera-
tions 
781 
830 
890 
989 
1199 
Bi-
lateral 
opera-
tions 
.461 
444 
435 
472 
576 
Multi-
lateral 
opera-
tions 
108 
83 
98 
117 
96 
222. As regards the sub-division of international operations in relatIon 
to the number of participants, it should also be noted that: 
unilateral operations and the setting up of simple subsidiaries are 
one and the same operation; 
bilateral operations include the acquisitions of holdings and the 
setting up of joint subsidiaries by two participating enterprises; 
multilateral operations include all international transactions between 
three or more participating enterprises. 
223. The data in Table 3 show that international activity among EEC 
enterprises has developed cortstantly and with increasing growth rates 
during the period under review. Taking the figure 100 as a standard -
for international operations in 1966, one arrives at figures of 101 for 
1967,105 for 1968 and 117 for 1969, to reach a figure of 139 for 1970. 
Among the types of operation, the setting up of simple subsidiaries 
(or unilateral operations) shows, without exception, the most important 
growth rate (154 for 1970 against 100 for 1966). The trend has not 
been constant for other types of operation. It should be noted, however, 
that the increase in the acquisition of holdings has been more marked 
than that for the setting up of joint subsidiaries. Bilateral operations 
have also tended to increase, whereas multilateral operations have been 
clearly regressive. . 
224. The observations concerning multilateral operations are confirmed 
by the reduction in the average number of participants per international 
operation. Whereas in 1966, 2.11 enterprises were concerned in the 
acquisition of holdings and 3.04 enterprises were concerned in the 
setting up of joint subsidiaries, these figures for 1970 dropped to 1.96 
for acquisitions and 2.83 for joint subsidiaries respectively. 
225. The structure of economic operations in the.EEC has not changed 
in essence during the period under review (see Graph 1). The classifi-
cation in percentages of the various types of operation has remained the 
same in spite 'of differences in rate of development over a period of 
time. 
As far as types of operation are concerned, it is the setting up of 
simple subsidiaries that predominates, and this is followed by the 
'setting up of joint subsidiaries and the acquisition of holdings. 
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Graph 
Structure of international operations In the EEC, classified by type of 
operation - 1966 and 1970 
1966 
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With regard to international operations sub-divided by numbers 
of participants, unilateral operations are increasing their lead followed 
by bilateral and multilateral operations. 
226. A conclusion can already be drawn from these general data. It is 
clear that international inter-penetration has continued to increase in 
the EEC between 1966 and 1970. Linked with this are concentration 
processes, although to a lesser degree. This is shown by the increasing 
total of the number of cases of the acquisition of holdings and the 
setting-up of joint subsidiaries. 
Sub-division b)' region of international operations in the EEe 
227. In the first phase with regard to the sub-division of international 
operations in the EEC by region, the three forms of operation and the 
operations as a whole have been split according to participation of 
firms of EEC countries and of non-member countries (see Table 4). 
As far as the number of operations is concerned, the share of 
non-member country firms in all forms of operation during the whole 
of the period under ,review (with the exception of the setting up joint 
and simple subsidiaries in 1968) was nearly twice that of the share of 
Member State firms. 
228. With reference to the number of participations in international 
operations, enterprises of non-member countries predominate. in the 
setting up of. simple subsidiaries. On the other hand, as regards the 
acquisition of holdings and the setting up of joint subsidiaries, the 
"participation-frequency" of Member State firms is higher. Where the 
acquisition of holdings in the EEC is concerned, there were always 
approximately two member country firms for one non-member country 
firm. In the case of the setting up of joint subsidiaries in the EEC, the 
corresponding rates have moved from three EEC participants between 
1966 and 1968 to two in 1969 and 1970, 
229. During the period under review, operations carried out solely 
between Member State firms registered a marked growth as compared 
with operations carried out in the EEC with the participation of non-
member country firms. 
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:u Table 4--Sub-division by region of international operations and forms of operations in EEC countries 
. and non-member countries from 1966 to 1970 
Number of operations Number of participations is the operations 
Partlel- Setting up of Sett.ing up of Partlei- Setting up of Setting up of Year simple Total simple Total pntions joint subsidiaries subsidiaries patlons jOint subsidiaries subsidiaries 
EEC I Nl\1C EEC I·NMC EEC I NMC EEC I NMC EEC I NMC EEC I NMC EEC I NMC EEC I NMC 
1966 33 67 34 66 35 65 35 65 67 33 72 28 35 65 58 42 
~ .. 
1967 34 66 33 67 37 63 35 65 68 32 72 28 37 63 57 43 
1968 32 68 41 59 42 58 40 60 68 32 72 28 42 58 59 41 
! 
1969 40 60 35 65 39 61 38 62 71 29 68 32 39 61 57 43 
, 
1970 35 65 34 66 39 61 38 62 67 33 69 31 39 61 
I 
56 44 
N.B. in pereentnges of the respective forms of operation. EEC - operations solely between Member State firms. NMC - operations in which non-member 
country firms participated. 
On the other hand, with regard to the number of participations 
in international operations, the proportion of n<'n-member country 
enterprises increased during the period under review (see Graph 2). 
It i~ true that the growth rate of intra-Community transactions was higher 
in comparison with non-member country participations, for the setting 
up of joint subsidiaries, and, to a lesser extent, for participations as 
such. 
230. The period under review is too short and the basic statistical ma-
terial too linuted to draw conclusions from the results so far obtained 
as regards an increased activity cilmember country firms in international 
operations carried out in the nEC as compared with non-member 
countries. Certain implications, however, do point in this direction. 
231. Before going into a more detailed regional analysis of the basic 
statistical material, certain remarks concerning methodology become 
necessary in order to avoid errors of interpretation with regard to the 
results. So far, there was some measure of certainty in presuming that 
any differences in the sampling of the basic materials in relation to reality 
were evenly distributed for all the cases studied. 
Structural data and trends would in this case come very close to 
reality. On the other hand, it is fairly certain that, if more or less all 
international operations are included in the sampling relating to the 
Benelux countries, and, with few exceptions, relating to France, there 
are considerable gaps in the basic data for Germany and Italy. A com-
parison of the nature and frequency of international operations in the 
various member countries can therefore only be made with reservations. 
232. The regional sub-division of international operations according to 
form of operation in the different member countries does not give rise 
to reservations of the same magnitude (see Table 5). 
Both for 1966 and 1970, the picture is the'same, namely the inter-
national setting up of simple subsidiaries is the most frequent type of 
international operation. On the other hand, with regard to th~ acquisi-
tion of holdings and the setting up of joint subsidiaries, the places held 
by the Benelux countries and the "large" three member countries are 
reversed. Thus international acquisitions were more frequent in 
Germany, France and Italy than in the Benelux countries. In the latter, 
the setting up of joint subsidiaries played a much more important part, 
while, especially in Germany, such operations were relatively few . 
. 
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Table 5-Sub-divisions by region of international operations according to their form in 
the Member States of the EEe in 1966 and 1970 
1966 1970 
Fonn of operation' 
G 
1 
F I I I N ·1 B I L I EEC G 1 F 1 I I N I 
.,. 
Acquisition of holdings 22 25 20 14 15 15 19 18 25 19 19 
Setting up of joint sub- 12 21 18 35 29 32 23 11 22 17 21 
sidiaries 
Setting up of simple sub- 66 54 62 51 56 53 58 71 53 64 60 
sidiaries 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
~ , in % of the total number of operations. 
:u 
8 
s:: 
:u 
B 
1 
L I EEC 
11 10 18 
20 26 18 
" 
69 64 64 
100 100 100 
233. The above-mentioned reservations are fully valid with regard to 
the sub-division of international operations among Member States 
listed in Graph 3. The fact that it is necessary to have reservations con-
cerning the structural data is also reflected in the results of an initial 
attempt at regional weighting of basic data. Based on the empirical . 
observation that if absolute values change in time, the structures remain 
stable at least from a medium-term point of view, the data used were 
taken from the European Industrial Census of 1963. When weighting 
the number of operations with the share'of the various Member States 
in the total number of firms, the order of the countries in terms of the 
frequency of international operations in their territories would be as 
follows for 1966 as well as 1970: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
, . 
234. Conclusions regarding the development of international operations 
in the Member States are ~omewhat more certain. The largest increase 
was recorded in France (index 100 in 1966 to inc).ex 160 in 1970) followed 
by Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy apd the Netherlands in that 
order. 
235. The sub-division by region of the number of participations in 
international operations enables the share of non-member country firms 
to be determinded (see Graph 4). According to the data available in 
1966 and in 1970, it was the American firms in the EEC which most fre-
quently intervened in international operations. Disregarding partici-
pation of member country firms the intervention of British and Swiss 
firms come next, followed by the remainder of the non-member countries, 
Scandinavian firms, and, in 1970, Japanese firms. 
With regard to the development between 1966 and 1970, Germany, 
. Great Britain and Switzerland have all moved up one place intfJ.e classi-
fication, whereas Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium have all dropped 
one place. There is no change in the order for the other countries. 
236. In order to give a more detailed outline of the situation and devel-
opment of international inter-penetration between Member State firms 
and the non-member country firms, details of inter-penetration by par-
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Graph 3 
Structure by region of International operations In the EEC 
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Graph 4 
Structure by region of the number of participations In International 
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ticipation in bilateral operations have been tabulated according to the 
nationality of participating firms for ~oth 1966 and 1970 (see Table 6). 
On average, taking the whole of the period under consideration, 
the percentage of participation in bilateral operations with firms of' 
other Member States only was 55% for German firms; 52% for French 
firms, 43% for Italian firms, 48% for Dutch firms, 61 % for Belgian 
firms and 71 % for Luxembourg firms. 
237. Classified in order of percentage of participation in bilateralopera-
tions within the EEC, the countries of origin of the three main partners 
were: 
(a) for German firms: the United States, the Netherlands and Belgium 
in 1966 and France, the United States and the Netherlands in 1970; 
(b) for French firms: the United States, Belgium and Great Britain in 
1966 and the United States, Germany and Great Britain in 1970; 
(c) for Italian firms: the United States, France and Switzerland for 
both 1966 and 1970; 
(d) for Dutch firms: the United States, Great Britain and Germany in 
1966, and the United States, Germany and Belgium in 1970; 
(e) for Belgian firms: France, the United States and the Netherlands 
in 1966, and the Netherlands, France and the United States in 1970. 
If the bilateral operations of Luxembourg firms are ignored, the 
group of the three main p~rtners contains eight times as many firms from 
non-member countries in 1966 as against only seven times as many in 
1970. It seems, therefore, that firms from the Member States have 
taken a more active part in bilateral operations within the Community. 
Sub-div.ision try sector and region of international operations 
within the EEe 
238. In order to reduce to the greatest extent possible the margin of 
error when carrying out a sectorial analysis of international operations 
within the EEC, and to increase as far as possible the number of cases 
per sector, a detailed sub-division per branch had to be abandonned and 
a more general evaluation of seven economic branches had to be under-
taken. 
180 REP. COMP, 1971 
JJ 
m 
~ 
() 
o 
s: 
~ 
Table 6-Sub-division by 'region, of participations 1 in bilateral operations within the EEC according 'to' 
, the nationality of the participants, in 1966 and in 1970 ' 
Firms originating in the EEe countries Firms originating in non-~ember countries 
Bilateral operations between 
count,ries originating in 
I I I I I I 
Tot-
I SC' I I I I I 
Tot-
G F I N B L tal GB S US J OC' tal 
Germany with the firms of- 1966 - 11 3 14 13 1 42 10 ,2 7 37 0 2 58 
-1970 - 24 3 17 8' 2 54 9 3 12 19 4 3 46 
France with the firms of ... 1966 11 - 7 12 20 2 52 12 1 7 25 0 3 48 
1970 21 ,- 6 5 11 2 45 13 2 8 26 1 5 55 
Italy with ·the firms of ... 1966 7 17 - 7 7 1 39 9 3 14 25 0 10 61 
1970 7 15 - 5 7 5 39 9 3 _9 33 0 7 61 
Netherlands with the firms 1966 15 13 2 - 14 0 44 22 '2 5 25 1 1 56 
of ... 
1970 24 8 3 - 17 2 54 12 2 7 24 1 0 46 
Belgium with the firms of ... 1966 15 25 4 15 - 5 64 5 0 5 22 1 -3 36 
1970 12 19 6 20 - 3 60 7 0 5 19 3 6 40 
-
-
Luxembourg with the' firms 1966 11 16 6 22 6 - 61 6 0 16 11 0 6 39 
of. .. 
1970 11 14 14 14 4 - 57 4 4 17 14 0 4 43' 
." 
1 in % of the total number of partiCipations.' SO - Scandinavian countries.' 00,- other non·member countries.' -less than 1 %. 
To· 
tal 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
The sectorial structure of international operations in 1966 and in 
1970 are given in Graph 5. International operations have, in each case, 
been the most numerous in the metallurgy industry and the least numer-
ous in the energy sector (with particular reference to the petroleum 
industry). The second place in forms of frequency of operation was 
taken by the' services, Whereas the "other manufacturing industries" 
(rising from fourth to third place) and the foodstuffs industry (rising 
from sixth to fifth place) both rose by one place between 1966 and 1970, 
the chemical industry (dropping' from third to fourth place) and the 
textile industry (dropping from fifth to sixth place) both dropped by one 
place during the same period. 
239. During that period (see Table 7), the highest growth rates for inter-
national operations were recorded in the European foodstuffs industry. 
A large increase in international operations was also recorded in the ser-
vices and in "other' manufacturing industries" (publishing, the paper 
industry, the glass industry, the leather industry, the footwear industry, 
the furniture industry, etc.) as well as in the textile industry. The figures 
regarding metallurgy and the chemical industries remained fairly con-
stant during the periOd under review. The number of international 
operations in the energy sector decreased appreciably. 
Table 7-Deydopment of international operations within the EEC by economic 
sector from 1966 to 1970 (1966 = 100) 
Other 
lIIetal· Chemical Textile manu- Food· Year lurgy Energy industry industry fact.uring stuffs Services Total indus- industry 
tries 
1966 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1967 84 89 110 113 138 143 96 101 
1968 94 100 108 100 106 162 122 105 
1969 98 73 112 126 122 202 149 117 
1970 116 62 105 139 152 272 195 139 
240. With regard to the different branches of industry an attempt has 
been made, similar to the procedures used for regional sub-division, to 
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Graph 5 
Sectorial structure of international operati~ns within the EEC 
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Table 8-Sub-division by regions and sectors of international 
. 1966 
Structure by region 
I I I I I < I G F I N B t EEC 
Economic 
Metallurgy 29 20 11 16 22 2 100 
Energy 29 13 16 18 16 8 100 
Chemical industry 15 22 20 18 22 3 100 
Textile industry 21 15 12 9 39 4 100 
Other manufacturing indus-
tries 26 21 15 12 24 2 100 
Foodstuffs 15 21 17 17 24 6 100 
Services 10 17 9 19 25 20 100 
Total 22 19 13 16 24 6 100 
Structure 
Metallurgy 56 44 .38 43 40 15 43 
Energy 4 2 3 3 2 4 3 
Chemical industry 10 17 23 17 14 8 . 15 
Textile ~ndustry 5 4 5 3 9 4 6 
Other manufacturing indus-. 
tries 14 13 14 9 12 '5 12 
Foodstuffs 2 4 5 4 3 4 3 
Services 9 16 12 21 20 60 18 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
184 REP. COMPo 1971 
operations within the EEe in 1966 and 1970 (in percentages) 
1970 
G F X n I L EEe 
sector 
29 23 13 13 19 3 100 
31 17 17 13 22 0 100 
20 24 13 12 28 3 100 
27 20 12 15 22 4 100 
24 28 8 12 25 3 100 
26 20 14 20 18 2 100 
19 18 9 14 23 17 100 
24 22 12 13 22 7 100 
by sector 
42 38 40 34 30 17 36 
2 1 2 1 1· 0 1 
10 12 13 11 15 5 11 
6 5 6 6 6 3 6 
13 17, 10 12 15 6 13 
7 6 8 10 6 2 7 
20 21 21 26 27 67 26 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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weight the number of international operations with the number of firms 
operating in a particular sector. Here again, it was necessary to have 
recourse to the results of the European Industrial Census of 1963. For 
1970, even after weighting, the· metallurgy industry would still retain 
its first place. The second place would be taken by the chemical indus-
try, followed by the energy sector, other manufacturing industries, the 
foodstuffs industry and the textile industry. The. true part played by 
international operations in the various branches of the economy is 
probably better reflected by this method rather than by the operations 
percentage classification according to sectorial groups. Failing better 
statistical material, a more detailed examination of the problem cannot 
be undertaken. 
241. With regard to the sub-division by sector and by region of inter-
national operations within the EEC in 1966 and 1970, reference should 
be made to Table 8 which represents· a synthesis of the regional and sec-
toral analysis of basic data. 
Synthesis of results 
242. Any synthesis of the main results of this study must concentrate 
on the following points: 
between 1966 and 1970 there has been a net increase in international 
inter-penetration and trends towards concentration in the EEC; 
structures underwent limited changes only. This was true for 
the types of operation as well as for regional and sectorial sub-div-
ision of international operations within the EEC; 
certain factors tend to show that the activities of firms in the 
Member States with regard to international operations are on the 
increase as against non-member country firm activities. 
243. Finally, the fact should once more be emphasized that the present 
analysis of international operations within the EEC is only a first attempt 
of a very limited nature. More accurate information ca!l only be pro-
vided when a representative basic documentation has become available, 
when operations in the Member States can be included, and when the 
sub-division of operations in "small" and "large" cases will be possible. 
The possibilities of arriving at this result are very limited however .. 
The other line of action which the Commission has undertaken in order 
to arrive at better conclusions concerning the situation and development 
of concentration within the Community by means of quantitative sector-
ial studies· maybe more promising. 
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Part Four 
Consumer protection 
Preliminary remarks 
The Commission's competition policy under the EEC Treaty is 
an essential means for increasing the effectiveness and smooth operation 
of the economic system, for promoting economic growth and for en-
suring to the greatest possible extent that demand will be met. This does 
. not only mean an increase in the offer of consumer goods, but also a 
continued improvement in quality. Competition policy fosters such 
improvements by encouraging innovation. In order that the consumer 
may fully benefit from the effects of the Common Market, and this is 
for him the. one condition for viewing Europe as a reality, the Commis-
sion endeavours actively to promote the protection of, and provide in-
formation to the consumer. This action is intended to make the 
consumer more fully conscious of the part he has to play and capable of 
making an intelligent choice in the market, and also to protect consu-
mer's rights and health. 
It is clear that the vital activity of keeping the consumer informed 
should increasingly be carried out by consumers' associations. To be 
effective, the latter's activities should increasingly be coordinated at 
Community level, and here too the Commission has its part to play. 
The Commission has, especially since the setting up of a consumer 
department whose task it is to study these questions, undertaken a 
number of activities which reflect its point of view in favour of a coor-
dinated and effective consumer policy. 
This policy had been worked out in cooperation with the con-' 
sumer's contact committee and covers essentially the field detailed below. 
§ 1 - Study of the Common Market's effects on consumers 
244. Price differences still exist within the Common Market. This was 
shown in the latest investigation carried out on retail prices by the Stat-
istical Office of the European Communities in 1970. These differences 
are not necessarily in contradiction with -the concept of the integration 
of markets since appreciable price differences exist also within national 
markets. 
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In so far as these price differences are caused by infringements of 
the competition rules of the Treaty and especially by agreements on 
market-sharing, the Commission has used its competition policy to 
correct such differences. Thus, in 1970, several hundred exclusive 
dealing agreements were adapted to the Treaty's competition rules, and 
in 120 cases concerning other distribution systems, export prohibitions 
were removed. 
Price differences will, however, continue to a large extent because, 
in many cases, they are based on structural differences between the 
various markets (taxation, earnings and consumer habits for example). 
The sellers take these different factors into account especially taxation 
rates-when they fu: ~heir prices in order to adapt them to the particular 
characteristics of each market. 
245. Nevertheless, with regard to certain products listed in Table 9, the 
price differences are relatively small. These prices are taken from the 
figures in the latest census of 1970. This census which was. carried out 
in large and medium-sized towns of the six EEC countries and included 
representative retail shops, concentrated on articles which are of partic-
ular value to the consumer or which play an important part in iritra-
Community trade or in trade with non-member countries. 
Table 91 
Products G F N D L 
Pigmeat (cutlets) 116 100 126 104 104 100 
Cooked ham 123 100 120 103 112 119 
Whisky, selected brands2 100 112 109 101 113 102 
Dress material, pure virgin wool guar-
anteed Wool Mark. Width 140 cm 100 102 111 114 113 104 
Vacuum cleaners (with normal acces-
sories) selected makes and models 109 100 116 111 114 113 
Medium play 45 small-track records: 
two popular and fashionable songs, 
selected makes 110 105 106 100 104 106 
Razor blades, selected brand 103 108 108 105 100 108 
1 In this Table and in those which follow, prices have been converted Into indices based on the lowest 
price. 
• For selected branded articles it is the manufacturers brand and not the marketing one which has been 
taken into consideration in order to ensure better price comparison. 
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Each article has been very accurately described in order that the 
prices of articles of similar quality may be noted in each sample store 
in everyone of the six member countries so that full comparability of 
prices between Member States may be obtained and an objective idea of 
the true position may be given. 
For other products, such as those listed in Table 10, 'the price dif": 
ferences are quite important. 
Table 10 
Products G F I ·r N B I L 
Soluble coffee! selected brands 157 100 194 108 102 106 
Blankets of synthetic fibre (220 X 
240 cm) normal brands 174 100 117 137 152 187 
Saucepans (0 20 cm) selected brand 116 172 100 118 148 122 
Electric light bulbs, selected brands 178 106 141 134 116 100 
Portable radios, current brands 100 167 155 129 143 111 
Men's shirts in poplin cotton 169 179 168 100 110 140 
. 246. One of the causes of price differences is taxation. For this reason, 
it was thought worthwhile analysing gross prices (i.e. including tax) and 
net prices (excluding TTl) in the six countries in respect of products 
retailed in November 1970. In 1970, all countries, with the exception 
of Italy, had introduced value added tax, but each country has its own 
rates, thus France applies four different tax rates rising from 7.5% (re-
duced tax) to 33.3% (higher tax), whereas the taxes applied in the three 
other countries vary from 5.5% to 11 % in Germany, 4% to 12% in the 
Netherlands and 4% to 8% in Luxembourg. The following tables are 
based on prices including only VAT. 
Finally every country applies its own system of taxation. While 
in France beverages are taxed in the same way, Italy applies different 
rates in different cases. 
1 TT - Turnover Tax. 
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In Italy where value added tax will be introduced in July 1972 only 
and in Belgium where it has come into force on 1 January 1971, there 
exist a great number of rates of VAT, which are difficult to assess. In 
these two countries a cascade type turnover tax had still been applied 
at the time of the study. The rates of tax for these two countries include 
therefore the turnover tax, which was levied at the retail level as well as 
the import equalization tax. 
In order to examine the effect of the turnover tax on the price level 
in November 1970 comparable articles were divided into sub-groups 
e.g. all passenger cars were put in one and all meat products in anothel' 
sub-group. As these sub-groups are relatively homogeneous, the rate 
of VAT or the turnover tax for all articles of one sub-group is the same. 
The gross-prices were converted into index prices on the basis of the 
lowest prices., The same was done with the net prices. 
, The tax charge has different effects in the different sub-groups. 
Concerning meat and meat products, except canned meat, the dif-
ferences between the net prices from one country to another are prac-
tically the same as those between gross prices i.e. taxation has practically 
no be~ring. 
G F I oN B L 
Tax rates! (V AT or TT) 5.5 7.5 3.3 4 7 2 
Price difference (tax included) 118 105 109 111 113 100 
Price difference (tax excluded) 115 100 108 110 109 101 
'In %. 
The same is true for tyres and car spare parts. 
G F I N B L 
Tax rates! (V AT or TT) 11 23 9.5 12 7.75 8 
Price difference (tax included) 132 114 100 115 114 102 
. Price difference (tax excluded) 130 102 100 112 116 103 
1 in %. 
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On the other hand the prices for motor cars show on average a 
certain alignment, if taxes are disregarded. 
G }' I }of n L 
Tax rates! (VAT or TT) 11 33.3 10.5 122 18.5 8 
Price difference (tax included) 107 121 108 122 108 100 
Price difference (tax excluded) 106 100 107 111 100 102 
1 in %. 
2 In the Netherlands in addit10n to tho 12% tax. a spocial consumer tax of 15% is levied; this ha. been 
taken into account in calcuIa!,ing the indices for that country. 
Taxation had had a definite incidence on the differences in Commu-
nity prices for radios and sound producing equipment. 
Tax rates! (VAT or TT) 
Price difference (tax included) 
Price difference (tax excluded) 
1 in %. 
G 
11 
100 
100 
},' 
33.3 
138 
115 
I 
13.5 
107 
105 
N 
12 
120 
119 
B 
31 
119 
100 
L 
8 
125 
128 
Taxation is not the only factor explaining considerable price 
differences for furniture and floor-coverings when comparing net prices 
in the different countries. 
G ]j' I N n L 
Tax rates! (VAT or TT) 11 23 9.5 12 14.5 10 
Price difference (tax included) 127 129 100 124 119 112 
1) rice difference (tax excluded) 131 121 100 127 119 117 
1 in % .. 
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This was even more true for consumable household articles (de-
tergents, cleaning powders) for which the differences between the net 
prices are greater than the differences between the gross prices. 
Tax rates l (VAT or TT) 
Price difference (tax included) 
Price difference (tax excluded) 
1 in %. 
G 
11 
114 
117 
F 
23 
130 
120 
I 
7 
102 
107 
N 
4 
139 
151 
II 
19 
105 
100 
L 
8 
100 
105 
The analysis from the taxation angle which has been made for 
sectors grouping a number of products can also be made for certain 
significant products taken alone. Thus the price of normal quality radios 
shows the incidence of taxation on price levels. 
Tax rates l (VAT or TT) 
Price difference (tax included) 
Price difference (tax excluded) 
1 in %. 
G 
11 
100 
100 
F 
33.3 
167 
139 
I 
9.5 
155 
157 
N 
12 
129 
128 
B 
31 
143 
121 
8 
111 
144 
Disregarding tax, it is France and not Italy that offered the most 
expensive radios. In addition, the price disparity between the cheapest 
and the most expensive countries has decreased. 
For dish-washing detergents in plastic containers (545 g) for exam-
ple, there are considerable differences in price even before tax, which 
proves that taxation is not the only factor explaining these differences. 
Tax rates l (VAT or TT) 
Price difference (tax included) 
Price difference (tax excluded) 
1 in %. 
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G 
11 
203 
201 
23 
183 
162 
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Furthermore, each market has its own particular structures and 
characteristics, which explains why a refrigerator of current make is sold 
cheaper in Germany than in France or the Netherlands even when tax-
ation is not taken into account. 
G ]' I N B L 
Ta.'r rates l 11 23 9.5 12 21.5 8 
Table top refrigerator, 140 li-
tres, current make (one star) 
Price difference (tax included) 100 132 103 120 112 118 
Price difference (tax excluded) 100 119 104 119 102 122 
'In %. 
It.should be noted that there is a definite levelling of prices exclud-
ing tax which is not apparent in the prices inclusive of tax. 
Furthermore, the consumer habits vary from one country to 
another. This explains why German consumers, who consume a rela-
tively small quantity of bread, accept higher prices for this commodity. 
For normal types of bread, it should be noted that taxation some-
times increases price differences, and sometimes decreases them. 
G J<' I N B I" 
Tax rates l 5.5 7.5 3 4 0 22 
Price difference (tax included) 157 121 114 100 100 121 
Price difference (tax excluded) 161 117 115 100 104 124 
'In %. 
• Reduced temporarily to 2 %. 
Thus the difference between prices excluding tax in Belgium and 
Germany is 61 % while the difference between prices inclusive of tax is 
only 57%. 
This comparison between prices inclusive of tax and those exclusive 
of tax emphasizes the incidence of taxation on price differences. 
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247. The standard of living of consumers has risen considerablY since the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Rome. 
Since that date, all the member countries have considerably in-
creased their trade with their Community partners. In 1968, the volume 
of intra-Community trade was $6 790 million and that of imports from 
non-member countries was $16 150 million. In 1970, the volume of 
intra-Community trade had risen to $42 800 million while imports from 
non-member countries had reached $45 621 million. Thus, the share of 
intra-Community imports of gross imports had risen from 30% in 
1958 to nearly 50% in 1970. Competition had thereby been stimulated 
and the consumer had benefited from a considerable increase in the quan-
tity and range of products at his disposal. 
National accounts show that total household expenditure within the 
Community had trebled (+ 211%) between 1959 and 1971. Even if 
one takes the rising prices into account, this means that the volume of 
private consumption had nearly doubled (+ 96%) in the same period. 
It is interesting to show the contribution of the Common Market 
in favour of the consumer by comparing the household expenditure 
figures with those of the United States and Great Britain in the period 
from 1959 to 1970. 
Percentage growth rate of private consumption from 1958 to 1970 
Current prices 
Net prices 
The Community 
+ 189 
+ 92 
United States 
+ 113 
+ 35 
Great Britain 
+ 104 
+ 38 
In 1970, the annual consumption expenditure per inhabitant for the 
various Community countries was $1 645 for Germany, $1 711 for France 
$1 093 for Italy, $1 359 for the Netherlands, $1 590 for Belgium and 
$1 650 for Luxembourg. 
As against the national annual income per inhabitant, these figures 
represent approximately 70% for Germany and the Netherlands, 76% 
for Belgium and France, 78% for Luxembourg and 79% for Italy. The 
relatively high proportion of consumption expenditure in Italy may 
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possibly be explained by the fact that the national income per inhabitant 
is lower. On the other hand, it would seem that the propensity to 
save money is more marked in Germany and in the Netherlands than in 
the other Community countries. 
Since the standard of living has risen, the structure of private con-
sumption for all the Community countries has also developed since the 
establishing of the Common Market. The proportion of certain ex-
penditure has diminished. Thus, while expenditure for food and 
clothing represented more than half the total household expenditure of 
the Community in 1959, this category of expenditure has at present 
dropped to around 40% (1970). In Italy, such expenditure initially 
represented about 60%, but has since fallen to 51 %. Other expenditure 
such, as "transport and communication", on the other hand, have in-
creased from about 7% to 10%. 
Furthermore, the structure of private consumption in various 
countries is influenced by consumption habits which differ from country 
. to country. For example, the German consumer spent relatively more 
on furniture in 1970 than his French counterpart (13% as against 8%). 
On the other hand, the French consumer spent a considerable part of 
his budget on "personal health and hygiene" (11 % against 4% in 
Germany). 
The considerable increase in intra-Community trade and, therefore, 
of products on the market, as well as the rise in the standard of living 
have resulted in an appreciable improvement in the conditions of the 
consumer in the Common Market between 1958 and 1971. 
§ 2 - General information for the benefit of the consumer 
248. Above all it is important to impress upon the parties concerned and 
particularly the consumers themselves the importance of the part they 
have to play in our economy and to keep them informed of the advan-
tages offered by a Common Market to the consumer. 
Among the Commission's activities in this field meetings held with 
those responsible for TV consumers' programmes of the six Member 
States and with the consumers' representatives are of vital importance. 
Three meetings were held in 1970 and 1971 in Brussels, Berlin and Rome 
respectively. 
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The accelerated growth and diversification of production, with 
their inevitable consequences for the natural environment, and also the 
growing importance of advertising result in the consumers requiring 
more and more objective information and protection in order to adapt 
themselves to constantly changing situations with regard to the economy 
and the markets. This need is greater for those whose income level is 
fairly low and whose educational level is also lower. Television can 
no doubt play an important part in providing this kind of information. 
It is for this reason that the meetings were organized. They were based 
on films and working documents and their purpose was to reveal the 
best method of presentation and argumentation to inform and increase 
the awareness of the television audience on subjects interesting the 
consumer in general or subjects linked with the life and work within the 
Community so that the participants could exchange views on their 
experiences. 
The Commission also provides information to the consumer and 
other interested circles by means of symposia, publications, booklets and 
information stands at fairs and exhibitions. 
§ 3 - Participation in the work of international organizations 
249. The Commission is taking an active part in the work of certain 
international organizations for the information and protection of the 
consumer. The Council of Europe and the OECD are attaching 
increasing importance to these questions. The Council of Europe has 
just finished a study, begun in 1968, on misleading advertising. A 
second report concerning the education and information of the con-
sumer is being prepared. Finally, another working party has begun 
the study of unfair or misleading contract clauses. The OECD is 
about to complete the report on labelling and comparative testing of 
products, and will shortly undertake a study of the safety of products 
and of consumer credit. 
In addition to the work of these two international organizations, 
the International Standardization Organization (ISO) is responsible for 
preparing and recommending standards for many products of interest 
to the consumer and has carried out studies directly concerning the 
consumer on quality labels corresponding with certain standards, of the 
use of labels for information purposes and of the working out of stan-
dards for comparative tests. 
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§ 4 - Taking consumer interests into consideration 
in Commission proceedings 
250. The harmonization of laws which is being carried out within the 
framework of the general programme for the elimination of technical 
barriers of 28 May 1969, raises problems concerning the protection of 
the consumer's health, the defence of the economic interests and the 
provision of information. 
In the foodstuffs field, work is being carried out on a variety of pro-
ducts, such as extracts of coffee and tea, yeasts, various sauces, bakery, 
confectionery, beer, ice-cream, baby foods, starches and starch flour and 
pesticide residues, irradiated foods, additives to animal feedingstuff and 
DDT. 
The defence of the consumer's interest is especially concerned with 
the appellation, composition and specific purity of products as well as 
with the problem of additives. These data should figure on the labels, 
should be accurate and provide all the information required by the con-
sumer. 
As regards additives, their use should be reduced to a minimum 
and be confined, where necessary, to certain fixed proportions. 
A-s regards labelling, the work of harmonizing national food laws 
is being carried out pragmatically and product by product. Because of 
this, there is a need for the drawing up of a model directive which will 
give the consumer full, clear and intelligible information. This work 
will be continued in 1973 in cooperation with the acceding countries. 
It should be noted that, in the meantime, directives are already 
leading to improved labelling by the abolition of codes and signs which 
cannot be understood by the consumer, or by giving time-limits for 
perishable goods rather than the date of manufacture, as well as by adding 
instructions for use. 
If the work carried out by the Commission in this field is important 
in view of the fact that it concerns directly the consumer's health, the 
work being carried out on products other than foodstuffs is equally 
important. This is the case for example of directives adopted for the 
motor vehicle sector with regard to air pollution, noise, brakes, steering 
systems and interior fittings of vehicles which have been the subject of 
a draft directive submitted to the Council. Mention should also be 
made of a directive regarding textile appellation. The consumers of 
the six Member States well in the future find on textile products every-
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where the same appellations and exact data on the fibre ·compOSltion. 
In addition, a label giving cleaning or washing instructions, an indispen-
sable complement with regard to appellation labelling for the infor-
mation of the consumer, may be the subject, at the appropriate time, of 
Community action. 
251. The problem of hite purchase is also of great significance to the 
consumer. Indeed, the consumer should be in a position to compare 
the different offers on the market and to make his decision in full know-
ledge of the true cost of the credit offered to him. It is well known 
that a nominal annual rate of interest corresponds to a real rate of int-
erest which is considerable higher. The possibility of including an 
indication of the real annual rate of interest in all such contracts has also 
been examined. 
Furthermore, the consumer must increasingly be protected from 
abuse through door-to-door sales. He should be given, for example, a 
period of seven days in which to think things over in order to enable 
him to cancel his hire purchase contract if he so wishes. 
During the three meetings held with Member State governmental 
experts in the last three years, the Commission defined and clarified the 
extent and scope of this matter for the consumer. This study of im-
portance will be continued on a broader basis, taking into account the 
various legal aspects, with particular reference to private international 
law, bankruptcy law and the law on guarantees. 
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LIST 
of general measures (Council Regulations and Commission Regulations, Regulatory 
Decisions and Notices), individual Deci,ion, of the Commission and rulings of the 
Court of Justice relating to the application of articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty esta-
blishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and of Articles 65 and 66 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). * ' 
REGULA nONS, REGULATORY DECISIONS 
AND NOTICES 
I-Regulation, and Notices of General Application 
, . 
1. Regulations implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. 
Regulation No. 17 of the Council (1) of 6 (1) OJ No. 13 of 21 February 
February 1962 First Regulation implementing 1962, p. 204. , 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty modified and (2) OJ No. 58 of 10 July 1962, 
completed by Regulation No. 59 (2), No. 118(63 p. 1655. 
EEC (3) ,and No. 2822/71 EEC (4) (2) OJ No. 162 of 7 November 
1963, p. 2696. 
Regulation No. 27 of the Commission (1) of 
3 May 1962 , 
First Regulation implementing Council Regu~ 
lation No. 17, modified by Regulation (EEC) 
No. 1133/68 (2) (Form, content and other 
details concerning applications and notifica-
tions) 
Regulation No. 99/63/EEC of the Com'mission 
of 25 July 1963 on the hearings provided for 
in A):ticle 19 (1) and (2) of Council Regulation 
No. 17 
(4) OJ No. L 285 of 29 Decem-
ber 1971, p. 49. 
(1) OJ No. 35 of 10 May .1962, 
p. 1118. 
(2) OJ No. L 189 of 1 Augus~ 
1968, p. 1. 
OJ No. 127 of 20 August 1963, 
p.2268. . 
2. Regulations implementing Article 85 (3) of the EECTreaty in specific fields. ' 
Regulation No. 19/65/EEC of the Council of OJ No. 36 of 6 Mardi 1965, 
2 March 1965 on the application of Article p. 533. 
85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements and concerted practices 
* All references are to the French editions 
REP. COMP, 1971 
Regulation No. 67/67/EEC of the Commission 
of 22 March 1967 on the application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
exclusive dealing agreements 
Regulaion (EEe) No. 2821/71 of the Council 
of 20 December 1971 on application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to categories of agree-
ments, decisions and concerted practices 
3. Commission Notices 
Notice on exclusive dealing contracts with 
commercial agents 
N~tice on patent licensing' agreements 
Notice on agreements, decisions and concerted 
pr~ctic~s in the field of cooperation between 
enterprises 
Notice on agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices of minor importance which do not 
fall under Article 85(1) of the Treaty establish-
ing the EEC 
II-Transport 
Regulation No. 141 of the Council (1) of 26 
November 1962 exempting transport from the 
application of Council Regulation No. 17, 
modified by Regulations No. 165/54/EEC (2) 
and No. 1002/67/EEC (3) 
Regulation (EEe) No. 1017/68 of the Council 
of 19 July 1968 applying rules of competition 
to transport by rail, road and inland waterway 
Regulation (EEe) No. 1629/69 of the Commis-
sion of 8 August 1969 on the form, content 
and other details of complaints pursuant to 
Article 10, applications pursuant to Article 12 
and notifications pursuant to Article 14(1) of 
Council Regulation (EEe) No. 1017/68 of 
19 July 1968 
Regulation (EEe) No. 1630/69 of the Commis-
sion of 8 August 1969 on the hearings provided 
for in Article 26(1) and (2) of Council Regula-
tion (EEe) No. 1017/68 of 19 July 1968 
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OJ No. 57 of 25 March ;1967, 
p.849. 
OJ No. L 285 of 29 December 
1971, p 46. 
OJ No. 139 of 24 December 
1962, p. 2921. 
OJ No. 139 of 24 December 
1962, p. 2922. 
OJ No. C 75 of29 July 1968, p. 3 
Rectification O.J. No. C 84 of 
28 August 1968, p. 14. 
OJ No. C 64 of 2 June, 1970, 
p.1. 
(1) OJ No. 124 of 28 November 
1962, p. 2751. 
(2) OJ No. 210 of 11 December 
1965, p. 314. 
(3) OJ No; 306 of 16 December 
1967, p.,l. 
OJ No. L 175 of 23 July 1968, 
p.1. 
OJ No. L 209 of 21 August 1969, 
p.1. 
OJ No. L209 of 21 August 1969, 
p.l1. 
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III-'-Agricu/ture 
Regulation No. 26 of the Council of 4 April 
1962 applying certain rules on competition to 
production of and trade in agricultural pro-
ducts, modified by Council Regulation No. 49. 
of 29 June 1962 
OJ No. 30 of 20 April 1962, 
p.993. 
OJ No. 53 of 1 July 1962, 
p. 1571. 
IV-Coal and Steel . 
1. Regulatory Decisions 
Decision No. 24/54 of 6 May 1954 laying down 
in implementation of Article 66(1) of the 
Treaty a regulation on what constitutes con-
trol of an undertaking 
Decision No. 26/54 of 6 May 1954 laying down 
in implementation of Article 66 (4) of the 
Treaty a regulation concerning information to 
be furnished 
Decision No. 25/67 of 22 June 1967 laying down 
in implementation of Article 66(3) of the Treaty 
a regulation concerning exemption from prior 
authorisation 
2. Notice 
OJ of the HA of 11 May 1954, 
p.345. 
OJ of the HA 11 May 1954, 
p.350. 
OJ No. 154 of 14 July 1967, 
p. 11. 
General guideline on competitIon policy in OJ No. C 12 of 30 January 1970, 
iron and steel structures p. 5. 
DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL CASES 
1. Concerning Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC-Treaty 
Decision of 1'1 March 1964 on an application 
for negative clearance under Article 2 ·of Coun-
cil Regulation No. 17 Grorjil/ex-FiJlistor! 
Decision of 1 June 1964 on an application for 
negative clearance under Article 2 of Council 
Regulation No. 17 BENDIX-Mertens & Straet 
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OJ No. 58, April 1964, p 915 
IP (64) 66, 23 March 1964 
Bulletin 6-64, Ch. II, sec. 28 
7th (EEe) General Report (1964) 
sec. 67 (1964) C.M.L.R. 237 
OJ No. 92, 10 June 1964, p. 1426 
IP (64) 100,2 June 1964 
Bulletin 7-64, Ch. III sec. 32 
8th (EEe) General Report (1965) 
sec. 59 (1964). C.M.L.R. 416 
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Decision of 30 July 1964 on an application for 
negative clearance under Article 2 of Council 
Regulation No. 17 Nicholas Freres- Vitapro 
Decision of 23 September 1964 on a procee-
ding under Article 85 of the Treaty Grundig-
Consten 
Decision of 22 October 1964 on an application 
for negative clearance under Article 2 of Council 
Regulation No. 17 Dutch Engineers and Contrac-
tors A!!ociation (DECA) 
Decision of 8 July 1965 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty D.R. U.-Blondel 
Decision of 17 September 1965 on a procee-
ding under Article 85 of the Treaty Hummel-
Isbecque 
Decision of 17 December 1965 on a procee-
ding under Article 85 of the Treaty jallate-
Voss and jallate- Vandeputte 
Decision of27 June 1967 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty Transocean Marine 
Paint A!!ociafion 
Decision of 26 February 1968 of an application 
for negative clearance under Article 2 of Coun-
cil Re~ulation No. 17 EUROGYPSUM 
Decision of 17 July 1968 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the, Treaty Alliance de Construc~ 
feurs/ran;aii de'machines-outils ' 
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OJ No. 136, August 1964, p. 2287 
II' (64) 136,3 August 1964 
Bulletin 9/10-64, Ch. II, sec. 42 
8th' (EEC) General Report' (1965) 
sec. 60 (1964) C.M.L.R. 505 
OJ No. 161, 20 October 1964, 
p.2545 
IP (64) 149, 25 September 1964 
Bulletin 11-64, Ch. II, sec. 3 
8th (EEC) General Report (1965), 
sec. 62 (1964) C.M.L.R. 489 
OJ No. 173, 31 October 1964, 
p.2761 , , 
IP (64)165,28 October 1964 
Bulletin 12-64, Ch. III, sec. 6 
8th (EEC) General Report (1965) 
sec. 61 (1965) C.lvLL.R. 50 
OJ No. 131, 17 July 1965, p. 2194 
II' (65) 134, 12 July 1965 
Bulletin 9/10-65,' Ch. II, sec. 6 
9th (EEC) General Report (1966) 
sec. 61 (1965) C.M.L.R. 182 
OJ No. 156, 23 Septemb~r 1965, 
p. 258 p. 2581 
II' (65) 161, 23 September 1965 
Bulletin 11-65, Ch. I, sec. 3 
9th (EEC) General Report (1966), 
sec. 62(1965) C.M.L.R. 242 
OJ No.3, 6 January 1966, p. 37 
IP (66) 4, 10 January 1966 
Bulletin 3-66, Ch. III, sec. 8 
9th (EEC) General Report (1966), 
sec. 63 (1966) C.M.L.R. - D1 
OJ No. 163, 20 July 1967, p. 10 
IP (67) 103, 7 July 1967 
Bulletin 9/10-67, Ch. VI, sec. 7 
1st General Report (1967), sec. 48 
(1967) C.M.L.R. - D 9 
OJ No. L 57, 5 March 1968, p. 9 
IP (68) 43,. 7 March 1968 ' 
,Bulletin 4-68, Ch. III, sec. 5 
,2nd General Report (1968), sec 28 
(1968) C.M.L.R.-D 1 
OJ No. L 201, 12 August 1968, 
·p.l " 
P-46 July 1968 
' .• Bulletin 9/10-1968, Chap. II"sec. 5 
2nd General Report (1968), sec. 
28 (L968) C.M.L.R.-D 23 
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Decision of 17 July 1968 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the TreatY S.O.C.E.M.A.S .. 
Decision of .17 July 1968 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty A.C.E.C.-Berliet 
Decision of 6 November 1968 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty Cobelaz-U!ines 
tje Synthese 
Decision of 6 November 1968 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty Cobelaz-Cokeric! 
Decision of 6 November 1968 on a proceeding 
unqer Article 85 of the Treaty C.P.A. 
Decision of 6 November 1968 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty Rieckermann/ 
AEC-Elotherm 
Decision of 13 March 1969 on a proceeding un-
der Article 85 of the Treaty European Machine 
Tool Exhibition! 
Decision of 5 May 1969 on an application for 
negative clearance 'under Article 2 of Council 
Regulation No. 17 Convention Chaujournier! . 
Decision of 18 June 1969 on an application for 
negative clearance under Article 2 of Council 
Regulation No .. 17 Chri!tiani & Niel!en 
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OJ No, L 201; 12.'August 1968, 
p.7 . 
P-46, July 1968 
Bulletin 9/10-1968" Ch. II,. sec. 5 
2nd General Report (1968) sec. 28 
(1968) C.M.L.R.-D 28 
OJ No. L 201, 12 August 1968, 
p.7 
P-46, July 1968 , 
Bulletin 9/10-1968, Ch. II, sec. 5 
2nd General Report (1968)"sec.·28 
(1968) C.M.L.R.-D 35 
OJ No. L 276, 14 November 
1968, p. 13 
IP (68) 185, 14 November 1968 
Bulletin 1-69, Ch.' V, sec. 6 . 
2nd General Report (1968), sec. 
28 (1968) C.M.L.R.-D 45 
0] No. L. 276, 14 November 
1968, p.19 " .. 
IP (68) 185, 14 November 1968 
Bulletin 1-69, Ch. V, sec. 6 
2nd General Report (1968), sec. 
28 (1968) C.M.L.R.-D 68 
OJ No. L 276, '14 N~veniber 
1968, p. 29 
IP (68) 185, 14 November 1968 
Bulletin 1-69, Ch. V, sec. 6 
2nd General Report (1968), sec. 
28 (1968) C.IvLL.R.---;-D 5~ . 
OJ No: L 276, 14 November 
1968, p. 25 
IP (68) 184, 14 November 1968 
Bulletin 1-69, Ch. V, sec; 7 
2nd General Report (1968), sec. 
28 (1968) C.M.L.R.-D 78 
OJ No. L69, 20 March p. 13 
IP (69) 41, 15 Marc.h 1969 .. 
Bulletin 5-69; Ch. VI, sec. ,4 
(1969) C.M.L.R.--'-D 1 
OJ No. L 122,22 1\fay 1969, .p. 8 
IP: none . ' .' 
Bulletin 7-69 Ch. V, ·sec. -3 (1969) 
C.M.L.R.-D 15 
OJ No. L 165, 5 July 1969; p. 12 
IP (69) 116, 1 July 1969 
Bulletin 8-69, Ch. V, sec. 6 (1969) 
C.M.L.R.-D 36 
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Decision of 25 June 1969 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty V. V. V.F. 
Decision of 30 June 1969 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty SEIFA 
Decision of 16 July 1969 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty International Quinine 
Agreement 
Decision of 22 July 1969 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty Clima-Chappee/Bu-
dems 
Decision of 22 July 1969 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty jaz-Peter 
Decision of 24 July 1969 on a proceeding under 
Article 85' of the Treaty Dyestuffs 
Decision of 5 December 1969 on an application 
for negative clearance under Article 2 of Coun-
cil Regulation No. 17 Pirelli S.p.A.-Sociiti 
Dunlop 
Decision of 30 June 1970 on an application for \ 
negative clearance under Article 2 of Council 
Regulation No. 17 Kodak 
Decision of 30 June 1970 on an application for 
negative clearance under Article 2 of Council 
. Regulation No. 17 ASP A 
Decision of 29 June 1970 on an application for 
negative clearance under Article 2 of Council 
Regulation No. 17 Electrical/y--c-welded steel tubes 
Decision of 28 October 1970 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty julien- Van 
Katwijk 
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OJ No. L 168, 10 July 1969, p. 22 
IP (69) 131, 22 July 1969 
Bulletin 9/10-69, Ch. V, sec 13 
(1970) C.M.L.R.-D 1 
OJ No. L 173, 15 July 1969, p. 8 
IP (69) 123, 8 July 1969 . 
Bulletin 9/10-69, Ch. V, sec. 13 
OJ No. L 192, 5 August 1969, p. 5 
amended in official gazette No. 
225, 4 September 1969 (German 
text only) p. 40, July 1969 
Bulletin 9/10-69, Ch. V, sec. 11 
(1969) C.M.L.R.-D 41 
OJ No. L 195, 7 August 1969, p. 1 
IP (69) 134, 24 July 1969 
Bulletin 9/10-69, Ch. V, sec. 13 
(1970) C.M.L.R.-D 7 
OJ No. L 195, 7 August 1969, p. 5 
IP (69) 24 July 1969 
Bulletin 9/10-69, Ch. V, sec. 13 
(1970) C.M.L.R.-D 129 
OJ No. L 195, 7 August 1969, 
p.11 
P 44, July 1969 
Bulletin 9/10-69, Ch. V, sec. 12 
(1969) C.M.L.R.-D 23 
OJ No. L 242, 24 December 1969, 
p.41 
IP (69) 212, 15 December 1969 
Bulletin 2-1970, Ch. I, sec. 5 
OJ No. L 147, 7 July 1970 ,p. 24 
IP (70) 111, 2nd July 1970 
Bulletin 8-1970, Ch. I, sec. 15 
(1970) C.M.L.R.-D 19 
OJ No. L 148, 8 July 1970, p. 9 
IP (70) 110, 1st July 1970 
Bulletin 8-1970, Ch. I, sec. 14 
(1970) C.M.L.R.-D 25 
OJ No. L 153, 14 July 1970, p. 14 
IP (70) 112, 2 July 1970, Ch. I, 
sec. 12 (1970) C.M.L.R.-D 31 
OJ No. L 242,5 November 1970, 
p. 18 
IP (70) 187, 30 October 1970, 
Bulletin 12-1970, Ch. I, sec. 4 
(1970) C.M.L.R.-D 43 
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Decision of 28 October 1970 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty OMEGA 
Decision of 23 December 1970 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty S upexie 
Decision of 29 December 1970 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty Ceramic tiler 
Decision of 1 February 1971" on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 11, 
section 5, of Council Regulation No. 17 C.I. C. G.-
z.W.E.I./Z.P.V ' 
Decision of 28 May 1971 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty F.N./C.F. 
Decision of 2 June 1971 on a proceeding under 
Article 86 of Treaty GEMA 
Decision of 28 July 1971 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 15, sec. 1 
of Council Regulation No. 17 S.A. Raffinerie, 
T irlemontoise 
Three decisions of 18 June 1971 on a procee-
ding under Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 
11, sec. 5 of Council Regulation No. '17 Inquiry 
into market for beer 
Decision of 2 July 1971 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 11, sec. 5 of 
Council Regulation No. 17 Asphaltoid-Keller, SA 
Decision of 24 September 1971 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty CEMATEX 
Decision of 9 November 1971 on a proceeding 
under Article 86 of the Treaty S.I.A.E. 
Decision of 25 December 1971 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty Boehringer 
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OJ No.'L 242,5 November 1970, 
p. 22 
IP (70) 186, 30 October 1970 
Bulletin 12-1970, Ch. I, sec. 3 
(1970) C.M.L.R.-D 49 
OJ No. L 10, 13 January 1971, 
p. 12 
IP (71) 3, 6 January 1971 
Bulletin 2-1971, Ch. I, sec. 8 
(1971) C.M.L.R.-D 1 
OJ No. L 10, 13 January 1971, 
p. 15 
IP (71) 1, 4 January 1971, 
Bulletin 2-1971, Ch. I, sec. 9 
(1971) C.M.L.R.-D 6 
OJ No. L 34, 11 February 1971, 
p. 13 (1971) 
C.M.L.R.-D 23 
OJ No. L 134,20 June 1971, p 6 
IP (71) 100,2 June 1971 
Bulletin 8-1971, Ch. I, sec. 15 
OJ No L 134, 20 June 1971, p. 15 
IP (71) 103, 7 June 1971 
Bulletin 11-1971, Ch. I, sec. 16 
OJ unpublished 
IP (71) 176, 16 September 1971 
Bulletin 11-1971, Ch. I, sec. 5 
OJ No. L 161, 19 July 1971, 
pp. 2, 6, 10 
IP (71) 126,28 June 1971 
Bulletin 8-1971, Ch. I, sec. 17 
OJ No. L 161, 19 July 1971, p. 32 
IP-(71) 176, 16 September 1971 
Bulletin 9/10-1971, Ch. I, sec. 15 
OJ No. L 227, 8 October 1971, 
p. 26 
IP (71) 184, 1 October 1971 
Bulletin 11-1971, Ch. I, sec. 4 
OJ No. L 254,17 November 1971, 
p. 15 
OJ No. L 282, 23 December 
1971, p. 46 
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Decisio.n o.f 9 December 1971 o.n a pro.ceeding 
under Article 86 o.f the Treaty Continental Can 
Decisio.n o.f 16 December 1971 ~:m a proceeding 
under Article 85 o.f the Treaty V.C.H. 
Decisio.n fro.m 16 December 1971 o.n a pro.cee-
ding under Article 85 o~ the Treaty SAPCO 
Decisio.n from 20 December 1971 o.n a pro.cee-
ding under Article 85 o.f the Treaty SOP ELEM/ 
LANGEN 
Decisio.n fro.m 22 December 1971 o.n a procee-
ding under Article 85 o.f the Treaty Bllrrollghs-
De/planque 
Decisio.n from 22 December 1971 o.n a procee-
ding under Article 85 o.f the Treaty Burroughs-
Geha 
Decision fro.m 23 December 1971 o.n a pro.cee-
ding under Article 85 o.f the Treaty Henke/-
Co/gate 
Decisio.n from 23 pecember 1971 o.n a pro.cee-
ding under Article "85 o.f the Treaty N.C.H. 
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OJ No.. L 7, 8 January 1972, p. 25 
IP (71) 239 o.f 13 December 1971 
Bulletin 2-1972, Ch. I, sec. 27 
(1972) C.M.L.R.-D 11 
OJ No.. L 13, 17 January 1972, 
p.34 
IP (71) 250 o.f 22 December 1971 
Bulletin 2-1972, Ch I, sec. 25 
Co.mmerce Clearing Ho.use, Vo.l 1 
A 9492 
OJ No.. L 13, 17 January 1972, 
p.44 
IP (72) 2 o.f 7 January 1972 
Bulletin 2-1972, Ch. I, sec. 23 
(1972) C.M.L.R.-D 83 
OJ No.. L 13, 17 January 1972, 
p.47 
IP (72) 4 o.f 17 January 1972 
Bulletin 2-1972, Ch. I, sec. 24 
OJ No.. L 13, 17 January 1972, 
p. 50 
IP (71) 253 o.f 27 December 1971 
Bulletin 2-1972, Ch. I, sec 32 
(1972) C.M.L.R.-D 67 
OJ No.. L 13 17 January 1972, 
p. 53 
IP (71) 253 o.f 27 December 1971 
Bulletin 2-1972, Ch. I, sec. 22 
(1972) C.M.L.R.-D 72 
OJ No.. L 14, 18 January 1972, 
p. 14 
IP (72) 3 o.f 7 January 1072 
Bulletin 2-1972, Ch. I, sec .21 
Co.mmerce Clearing Ho.use, Vcl. 
1 A 9494 
OJ No.. L 22, 26 January 1972, 
p. 16 
IP (72) 5 o.f 7 January 1972 
Bulletin 2-1972, Ch. I, sec. 26 
Ccmmerce Clearing Hcuse, V 0.1. 
1 A 9493 
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2. Relative to Article 65 of the ECSC Treatyl 
(a) Coal 
Decision No. 19/57 of 26 July 1957 authorising 
joint purchase of fuel by wholesale coal dealers ' 
operating in Southern Germany (the validity 
of this Decision has been extended) 
Decision No. 44/59 'of 4 November 1959 con-
cerning the authorisation of joint sales of coal 
fuel from the Lorraine and Saarbergwerke AG 
mines by the "Union charbonniere sarro-lor-
raine, societe par actions franco-allemande-
Saar-Lothringische Kohlenunion, deutsch-
franzosische Gesellschaft auf Aktien" Saar-
brucken and Strasbourg (the validity of this 
Decision has been extended) 
Decision No. 1/63 of 16 January 1963 relating 
to the authorisation of joint sales of fuel' by , 
certain coal undertakings in Belgiu~ through 
the Comptoir belge des charbons, cooperative 
undertaking (Cobechar) (the validity of this 
Decision has been extended) 
(b) Steel 
Decision No. 38/67 of 21 December 1967 rela-
ting, to the authorisation of agreements made 
between two Italian iron and steel undertakings 
for specialisation and joint sales and purchases 
Decision No. 14/67 of ~4 June'1967 relating ,to 
the authorisation of agreements made between 
Belgian and French iron and steel undertakings 
for specialisation and joint sales and,purchases 
Decision No. 7Of118/ECSC of 21 January 1970 
relating to agreements and concerted practices 
on the German scrap market 
, ' 
DeCision No. 71/312jCECAof 27 July 1971 
concerning the authorisation of speciiil.isation, 
agreements for the production of rolled ,steel 
between' August Thyssen-HUtte AG, Fried. 
Krupp HUttenwerke AG; Theodor Wupper-
mann GmbH;, Ibach Stahlwerke KG, Eisen-
und Stahlwalzwerke Rotzel GmbH and FUrst-
lich Hohenzollernsche HUttenverwaltung and 
of agreements relating to joint sales of hot rolled 
wide strip and hoop and strip by Thyssen and ' 
Wuppermann and ~f hoop, and'stripby Krupp 
and Rotzel ':"." ' , 
OJ No. 24 of 10 J\ugust 1957; 
p.352. 
OJ, No.' 58 of 14 November 
1969"p.1147. 
OJ No. 15 of 30 January 1963, 
p. 161. 
OJ No. L 24 of 27 January 1968, 
p.16. 
OJ No. L 127 of 27 June 1967, 
p.2512. 
OJ No. L29 of 6 February .1970, 
p.30. .. 
OJ, No. L 201 of 5 September 
1971,.p. 1. 
-. . , 
1 'Only the most recent and,important Decisions are included here. 
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Decision No. 71/313/ECSCof27 July 1971 auth-
orising certain agreements made between 
Hoesch AG, Rheinstahl Hiittenwerke AG, 
Edelstahlwerke Witten AG, Siegenet AG 
Geisweid for specialisation and joint sales of 
rolled steel 
Decision No. 71/314/ECSC of 27 July 1971 
relating to the authorisation of agreements 
between Eisenwerk-Gesellschaft Maximilians-
hiitte mbH, Kl6ckner-Werke AG and Stahl-
werke Peine-Salzgitter AG for specialisation 
in the production of rolled steel products and 
for the setting up of an Orders Allocation Of-
fice for merchant steels and wire-rod 
Decision No. '71/315/ECSC of 27 July 1971 
authorising agreements for specialisation be-
tween iron and steel undertakings in South-
west Germany in the production of rolled steel 
and in joint purchases of iron ore. 
OJ No. L 201 of 5 September 
1971, p. 12. 
OJ No. L 201 of 5 September 
1971, p. 19. 
OJ No. L 201 of 5 SeptembeJ; 
1971, p. 27. 
RULINGS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Ruling (6 April 1962) in case 13/61 : request for 
preliminary ruling submitted by the Court of 
Appeal, The Hague, in re: "De GeuI 11. BOIch 
and van Rijn" 
Ruling (30 June 1-966) in case 56/65: request 
for preliminary r.uling submitted by the Paris 
Court of Appeal in re: "Societe technique miniere 
(LTM)v. MaIChilienbau Ulm GmbH MBU" 
Ruling (13 July 1966) in joint cases 56 and 58/ 
64: "Grundig-ConIten 11. EEC Commiuion". 
Suit for annulment of the Commission decision 
of 23 September 1964. 
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OJ No. 33, 4 April 1962, p. 1081. 
Court reports VIII, 89 
OJ No. 170, 29 September 1966, 
p.3013. 
P-40, July 1966 
Bulletin 8/1966, 
chap. V/C] 
Court Reports XII, 337 
10th (EEC) General Report 
(1967) P. 102, (59). 
OJ No. 170, 29 September 1966, 
p.3015. 
P-44, July 1966 
Bulletin 9/10-66, 
chap. VIII/C] 
Court Reports XII, 429 
10th (EEC) General Report 
(1967), p. 102 (59). 
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Ruling (13 July 1966) in case 32/65: "Govern-
ment of the Republic of Italy v. EEC Council and 
Commission". Suit for annulment of Articles 1 
et seq. of Regulation No. 19/65/EEC and for a 
declaration of inapplicability of Articles 4 (2, 
2a, 2b) and 5 (2) of Regulation No. 17 and of 
Regulation No. 153. 
Ruling (15 March 1967) in joint cases 8-11/66: 
suit filed by parties to a restrictive agreement 
concerning cement against the EEC Commis-
sion. 
Ruling (12 December 1967) in case 23/67: re-
quest for preliminary ruling by the Tribunal de 
Haecht Commerce de Liege in re: "Brasseries de 
v. Wilkin-Janssen" (contracts for supply of beer) 
Ruling (29 February 1968) in case 24/67: re-
quest for preliminary ruling submitted by the 
Court of Appeal The Hague, in re: "Parke, 
Davis & Co. v. Beintema-Interpharm and Centra-
pharm" 
Ruling (13 February 1969) in case 14/68: re-
quest for preliminary ruling submitted by the 
Court of Appeal for West Berlin, in the case 
of the fine served on a member of the Board of 
Directors of Farbenfabriken Bayer AG, Walt 
Wilhelm, and six other persons concerned 
Ruling (9 July 1969) in case 5/69: request for 
preliminary ruling by the Munich Appeal 
Court in re: "ViJlk v. Vervaecke" 
Ruling (9 July 1969) in case 10/69: request for 
preliminary ruling by the Brussels Tribunal de 
Commerce, in re: "Portelange v. Smith Corona 
Marchand International" and three other com-
panies 
Ruling (18 March 1970) in case 43/69: request 
for preliminary ruling submitted by the Ober-
landesgericht of Karlsruhe in re: "Bilger v. 
Jehle" 
Ruling (30 June 1970) in case 1/70: request for 
preliminary ruling submitted by the Oberlan-
desgericht of Karlsruhe in re: "Parfums Marcel 
Rochas GmbH v. Helmut Bilsch" 
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OJ No. 170, 29 September 
1966, p. 3016. 
P-44, July 1966 
Bulletin 9/10-66, 
chap. VIII/c] 
Court Reports XII, 563 
10th (BEC) General Report 
(1967), p. 102 (59). 
OJ No. 65,6 April 1967, p. 1025 
IP (67) 42, 23 March 1967 
Bulletin 5/1967 
chap VI/C] 
Court Reports XIII, p 93 
10th (EEC) General Report 
(1967), p. 103 (59) 
OJ No. C 4, 24 January 1968. 
P-5, January 1968 
Bulletin 2/1968, 
chap. VlII/c] 
Court Reports XIII, p. 525. 
OJ No. C 42, 6 March 1968, p. 1 
P-38, June 1968 
Bulletin 4/1968 
chap. V/C] 
Court Reports XIV"p. 81. 
OJ No. C 30, 7 March 1969, p. 2 
Bulletin 4/1969 
chap. X/C] 
Court Reports XIV, p. 1. 
OJ No. C 105, 14 August 1969, 
p. 15 
Bulletin 9-10/1969 
chap. IX 
Court Reports 1969, 4, p. 295. 
OJ No. C 105, 14 August 1969, 
p. 16~ 
Bulletin 9-10/1969 
CourtReports 1969, 4, p. 309. 
OJ No. C 41,4 April 1970, p. 8. 
Bulletin 5/1970, 
second part, chap.IV/C] 
Court Reports XVI, 2, p. 127. 
OJ No. C 97 ,29 July 1970, p. 11. 
Bulletin 8/1970, 
second part, chap. IV/CJ 
Court Reports XVI,S, p. 515. 
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. Ruling (15 July 1970) in cases 41/69, 44/69, 
45/69: suit for annulment or reformation of the 
Commission decision of 16 July 1969 on a 
proceeding under Article 85(1) of the EEC 
Treaty 
- "ACF Chemiefarma v. Commission" 
- "Buchler & Co. v. Commission" 
- "Boehringer Mannheim Gfl,bH v. Commission" 
Ruling (18 February 1971) in case 40/70: re-
quest for preliminary ruling on the interpre-
tatiQn Qf Articles 85 and 86 Qf the EEC Treaty, 
submitted by the Tribunalecivile e penale of 
Milan in re: "Sirena v. Eda" 
Judgment (6 May 1971) in case 1/71: request fQr 
preliminary ruling Qn the interpretatiQn Qf 
Article 85 Qf the EEC Treaty and Qf the regula-
tiQns implementing it, submitted by the Cham-
ber Qf CQmmerce Qf LyQn in re: "S.A. Cadi/-
Ion v. Firma Hoss Maschinenbau K-G" . 
Judgment (8 June 1971) in case 78/70: request 
fQr.preliminary ruling on the interpretatiQn Qf 
Articles 5(2), 85 (1) and 86 Qf the EEC Treaty, 
submitted by the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht 
Qf Hamburg in re: "Deutsche Grammophol1 
GmbH v. Metro-SB--Grossmarkte" 
Judgment (13 July 1971) in case 8/71: "Deut-
scher komponistenverband (DKV) v. Commission" 
Judgment (25 NQvember 1971) in case 22/71: 
"Beguelin v. Import Export, Nice, and Marbach, 
Hamburg" 
OJ No.. C 130, 27 OctQber 1970, 
p.3 . 
. Bulletin 9-10/1970, 
secQnd part, chap. IV/CJ 
CQurt RepQrts XVI, 6, p. 661, 
p. 733,p. 769. 
OJ No. C 33,7 April 1971, p 11. 
. Bulletin 4/1971, 
secQnd part, chap. IV/CJ 
Court Reports 1971, 1, p. 69. 
OJ No.. C 76, 27 July 1971, p. 9. 
Bulletin 7/1971, 
secQnd part, chap. IV/CJ 
CQurt RepQrts 1971, 4, p. 351. 
OJ No.. C 65, 29 June 1971, p. 14. 
Bulletin 8/1971, 
secQnd part, chap. IV/CJ 
Court RepQrts 1971, 5, p. 487. 
0JNQ. C 94, 24 September 1971, 
p.6. 
Bulletin 9-10/1971, 
second part, chap. IV/CJ . 
CQurt RepQrts 1971, 5, p. 705. 
OJ No.. C 9, 3 February 1972. 
NB: See also the transitiQnal 'prQvisiQns relating to. the Rules Qn CQmpetitiQn in 
the. AccessiQn Agreements .. 
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